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The purpose of this study was to investigate the various contestations and conceptions of Local 
Economic Development (LED) in the LED debate among stakeholders in the Ekurhuleni 
Aerotropolis Project. The aerotropolis is a project is said to be a LED project aimed at creating 
an airport city, that is believed to have the capacity to stimulate LED both within Ekurhuleni 
Metropolitan Municipality (EMM) and beyond its boundaries. This city would span a radius 
of 60 km around OR Tambo International Airport. The project stakeholders involved 
representatives of various government departments in Ekurhuleni and Gauteng Province, 
organised business, ward councillors, labour representatives, community-based organisations 
(CBOs) of various types, and ordinary community members. 
 
This study sought to examine the various contestations and conceptions of LED in the LED 
debate among stakeholders in the Ekurhuleni Aerotropolis Project. Furthermore, this study also 
sought to explain the nature of these contestations and their potential impact of LED discourse, 
more so in South Africa in particular. This study is important because LED has become a “new” 
glittering philosophy for development in South Africa. However, it is still riddled with 
unresolved theoretical, ideological and methodical tensions and contradictions, including 
unresolved moral challenges, which potentially nullify its value. 
 
The study followed a qualitative research design and followed a grounded theory approach. I 
collected data from literary texts, and through in-depth face-to-face conversations with the 
aerotropolis project stakeholders, which I interpreted to address the research questions. 
 
The key finding of the study is that LED discourse remains ideologically contested with no 
clear understanding about what it is all about, and how it should be practised. The study also 
found that the pro-growth LED model is mostly preferred by government authorities over the 
pro-poor model, on especially large government projects in the class of the aerotropolis project. 
That is, the project prioritises corporate interests of Multinational Corporations (MNCs) and 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) as attraction for LED stimulation over the interests of the 
poor, such as housing, water, and community-based initiatives, as drivers of LED. The study 
further found that the Aerotropolis Project was not anything new, as it is commonly suggested 
in Ekurhuleni. It proved to be only an infrastructure development project, which is aimed at 
making Gauteng a competitive smart regional-and-global city, in the open global free market 
economy. 
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Furthermore, the study found that race matters in LED in South Africa more than it is currently 
appreciated in LED discourse, due to the history of apartheid. However, the problem of race or 
racism remains unacknowledged in mainstream development and LED discourse. I therefore 
proposed Critical Race Theory (CRT) to be an analytic category in mainstream development 
and LED discourse to allow for an LED regime that will attend to the problem of racialised 
inequality in development in South Africa; this is also one of the contributions of this study. 
This is because failure by development and LED discourse to attend to the problem of race 
from a CRT perspective, will exacerbate the reproduction of racial inequalities in development 
in South Africa. Another contribution of this study is establishing variations in the meaning of 
the words local economic development and suggesting that the term be spelt with a hyphen, 
namely L-ED. This formulation highlights the agency of the category local and brings the 
politics of LED more closely to the fore. 
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In this study, I examine the various contestations and conceptions of LED in the LED debate 
among stakeholders in the Ekurhuleni Aerotropolis Project. I examine these contestations 
using  the  stakeholders  in  the  aerotropolis  project  of  Ekurhuleni  as  a  methodological 
sampling technique for the study. The aerotropolis project was championed by the 
Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (EMM) as part of its LED project. The EMM is in 
the East Rand region of Gauteng Province, South Africa, and is home to the largest airport 
in the country, OR Tambo International Airport. The aerotropolis is a project aimed at 
creating a new city – an airport city – that would span a radius of 60 km around OR Tambo 
International. The project is believed to have the potential to catalyse LED both within 
EMM and beyond its boundaries. 
 
The conceptualisation and planning of the project was performed by various stakeholders 
in and beyond EMM. Among them were representatives of various government departments 
in Ekurhuleni and Gauteng Province. Other stakeholders included organised business, ward 
councillors,  labour  representatives,  community-based  organisations  (CBOs)  of  various 
types, and ordinary community members. The diversity of ideological orientations, spatial 
locations, and multi-governance regimes of the aerotropolis project stakeholders provided 
a perfect methodological setting, and an interesting avenue to address the aim of the study, 
which was to examine the various contestations and conceptions of LED in the LED debate. 
I further also explained how those meanings have shaped the discourse on LED in South 
Africa. The findings from the stakeholders in the aerotropolis project and from the study in 
general, can also be potentially reflective of the nature of LED discourse in South Africa in 
general. 
 
In this chapter, I start by providing a background to the study by foregrounding it within the 
sphere of local government. This sphere of government is closest to the communities and is 
entrusted to oversee LED.  I provide this information to clarify for the reader that although 
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the aerotropolis1 project has a national economic impact, the project belongs to Ekurhuleni. 
This is because Ekurhuleni is the hub of the aerotropolis and that the Metro paid for the 
project at its initial stage. 
 
 
Furthermore, I reflect on the problem statement for this research. I identify the main 
challenges and complexities of LED discourse that this study focuses on. The chapter also 
presents a motivation for the research and a brief background to the aerotropolis project, 
where I mapped up a broad account of the concept of the aerotropolis and its unfoldment in 
Ekurhuleni. Then the chapter outlines the purpose of the study, including a list of research 
objectives, followed by a discussion about ethical issues considered and observed during 
the study. The last section of this chapter summarises the layout of the rest of the manuscript 
(Chapters 2 to 7) with a brief account of the content of each chapter. 
 
1.2 BACKGROUND TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA AND LED 
 
The  South  Africa  Constitution  provides  for  three  spheres  of  government:  national, 
provincial and local. Each level of government has specific tasks and responsibilities in 
public service and administration (RSA 1996). The highest legislative authority in the state 
is vested in parliament, which is also subject to the Constitution as supreme law of the land 
(Malherbe 1999). Because parliament is the highest legislative authority in the state, there 
are no limitations on the matters that it can legislate. Parliament shares some of its legislative 
authorities with Provincial government through the National Council of Provinces which is 
part of the National Assembly. According to Malherbe (1999) parliament has the power to 
amend the Constitution and to pass laws regarding any matter, including those matters it 
shares legislative authority with the provinces, excluding matters over which provinces have 
exclusive authority. 
 
The provincial government has the legislative authority over the following issue: 
 
 







1 John Kasarda coined the phrase “aerotropolis”. For his understanding of this phrase and a shift from airport 
city to aerotropolis, see Kasarda (2010), and Kasarda and Lindsay (2011). Examples of aerotropoles include 
Amsterdam’s Schiphol, London’s Heathrow, Hong Kong International, and São Paulo's Viracopas 
International Airport. 
3  
• A list of functional areas in respect of which the legislature has exclusive legislative 
authority 
• A list of functional areas in respect of which the legislature has concurrent legislative 
authority (together with parliament) 
• Any other matter that parliament by law assigns to the legislature 
 
• Any matter on which provincial legislation is envisaged in the Constitution 
 
• Any matter that is reasonably necessary for, or incidental to, the effective exercise 
of a power concerning the functional areas on which the legislature has exclusive 
legislative authority. 
• The  delegation  to  a  municipal  council  of  any legislative  authority,  except  the 




The provinces exercise exclusive powers over a limited number of matters as listed in 
schedule 5, Part A of the Constitution, such as: 
 
Abattoirs, Ambulance services, Archives other than national archives, Libraries other than national 
libraries, Liquor licences, Museums other than national museums, Provincial planning, Provincial 
cultural matters, Provincial recreation and amenities, Provincial sport, Provincial roads and traffic, 
Veterinary services, excluding regulation of the profession. 
 
 





Schedule 4, Part A provides for Functional areas of concurrent national and provincial 
legislative competence to be as follows: 
 
Administration of indigenous forests, Agriculture, Airports other  than international and national 
airports, Animal control and diseases, Casinos, racing, gambling and wagering, excluding lotteries 
and sports pools, Consumer protection, Cultural matters, Disaster management, Education at  all 
levels, excluding tertiary education, Environment, Health services, Housing, Indigenous law and 
customary law, subject to Chapter 12 of the Constitution, Industrial promotion, Language policy and 
the regulation of official languages to the extent that the provisions of section 6 of the Constitution 
expressly confer upon the provincial legislatures legislative competence, Media services directly 
controlled or provided by the provincial government, subject to section 192 , Nature conservation, 
excluding national parks, national botanical gardens and marine resources, Police to the extent that 
the provisions of Chapter 11 of the Constitution confer upon the provincial legislatures legislative 
competence, Pollution control, Population development, Property transfer fees, Provincial public 
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enterprises in respect of the functional areas in this Schedule and Schedule 5, Public transport, Public 
works only in respect of the needs of provincial government, departments in the discharge of their 
responsibilities to administer functions, specifically assigned to them in terms of the Constitution or 
any other law, Regional planning and development, Road traffic regulation, Soil conservation, 
Tourism and Trade. 
 
(Rautenbach and Malherbe 1999; RSA 1996) 
 
 
Some functional areas of concurrent national and provincial legislative competence listed 
in the forgoing, overlap and functionally cross over into those of municipalities, as we shall 
see later on. The boundaries of provinces are protected in the constitution, and according to 
Rautenbach and Malherbe (1999), the territory of provinces included adjacent territorial 
waters and the air space. However, the exercise of provincial authority is only on functional 
areas of competence in the territorial waters or air space which have been allocated to 
provinces. Furthermore, the Constitution empowers Provincial Government to establish 
municipalities and to decide on the category and functions it assigns to each municipality 
(Rautenbach and Malherbe 1999; RSA 1996). 
 
In this study, the focus is at the level of local government which is established in terms of 
section 151 of the South African Constitution (RSA Act 108 of 1996).        The local 
government sphere, also known as municipalities, is entrusted to deliver services to their 
respective communities (RSA 1996). This sphere of government is the closest to 
communities and the impact of LED is most keenly felt at this level. According to the 
Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998, municipalities are grouped into categories A, B, and 
C and have various types of municipalities (Rautenbach and Malherbe 1999; RSA 1998). 
The Provincial Government establishes municipalities and decides on the category that each 
municipality is assigned, in accordance with the Municipal Structures Act (Rautenbach and 
Malherbe 1999; RSA 1996; RSA 1998). 
 
Section 2 of the Municipal Structures Act lists the conditions for an area to qualify as a 
category A municipality. Such an area must feature the following; 
 
(a)  high population density; 
 
an intense movement of people, goods, and services; 
 
extensive development; and 
 
multiple business districts and industrial areas; 
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(c) a single area for which integrated development planning is desirable; and 
 
(d) having strong interdependent social and economic linkages between its constituent 
units (RSA 1998). 
 
 
Category A municipalities are also called metropolitan municipalities and have exclusive 
legislative and executive powers in the relevant area.     According to Rautenbach and 
Malherbe (1999), local councils or city councils (in cities and towns) and rural councils (in 
rural areas) can also described as primary local governments or municipalities in category 
A. Section 3 further states that areas that do not comply with the criteria set out in section 2 
must have municipalities of both category C and category B (RSA 1998). 
 
Municipalities that share legislative and executive powers with a larger entity (district 
council) is a local or category B municipality. District councils are secondary or category C 
municipalities, because they are made up of representatives of primary or local 
municipalities (Rautenbach and Malherbe 1999). District council fosters co-operation 
amongst adjacent municipalities and communities, and provision of cost-effective service 
delivery. 
 




• To govern, on their own initiative, the local government affairs of its community. 
 
 




• To provide democratic and accountable government for local communities; 
 
• To ensure that provision of services to communities is in a sustainable manner; 
 
• To promote social and economic development; 
 
• To promote a safe and healthy environment; and 
 
• To encourage the involvement of communities and community organisations in 
matters of local government (RSA 1996). 
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Section 156 (1) and (2) further states that a municipal council may make by-laws on local 
government matters which are listed in schedule 4 and 5 of the Constitution, and are subject 
to national and provincial legislation and includes the following: 
 
air pollution, building regulations, child care facilities, electricity and gas reticulation, fire -fighting 
services, local tourism, airports, planning, health services, public transport, public works, pontoons, 
ferries, jetties, piers and harbours (excluding international and national shipping), stormwater 
management systems, trading regulations, water and sanitation services, beaches and amusement 
facilities, billboards and advertisements in public places, cemeteries, funeral parlours and 
crematoriums, cleaning, control of public nuisances, control of undertakings that sell liquor, facilities 
for accommodation, care and burial of animals, fencing and fences, licensing of dogs, licensing and 
control of undertakings that sell food, local amenities, sport facilities, markets, abattoirs, parks and 
recreation, road, noise pollution, pounds, public places, refuse removal, refuse dumps and solid waste 
disposal, street trading, street lighting, and traffic and parking 
 
(Rautenbach and Malherbe 1999; RSA 1998). 
 
 
According to schedule 4 and 5 of the Constitution which provides for municipal functional 
areas and Part A, which provides for functional areas of concurrent national and provincial 
legislative competence, the operational nature of some of these functions involves the 
support  of  different  tier  of  government.  This  even  when  the  legislative  authority of  a 
function  may rest  exclusively at  a  particular  tier  of  government.  For  example,  health 
services, public transport and public works functions cut across as a functional competence 
of municipalities, the province and national government. 
 
Although the degree of influence or the scope of function of each tier of government may 
vary between all tiers, the delivery of such functions requires some collaborative effort 
between different spheres of government. Airports are one such entities. As indicated in 
schedule 4 and 5, three spheres of government have varied powers and authority over 
airports. More importantly, even when municipalities may exercise ‘exclusive’ powers over 
some airports, the provincial government exercises “exclusive” authority over the territory 
of provinces including the air space, as suggested by Rautenbach and Malherbe (1999). 
 
Even when municipalities have powers to govern on their own, their exercise of power is 
subject to both national and local government. Furthermore, municipal exercise of power is 
also limited by their competences listed in the constitution under schedules discussed earlier 
and which, also restrain their exercise of power over certain issues within their boundaries. 
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The White Paper on Local Government (Department of Provincial and Local Government 
 
1998) emphasised commitment to ensure that local government would lead development by 
modelling itself as a developmental local government. The same White Paper (ibid.) defined 
“developmental local government” as a local government that is committed to working with 
citizens  and  groups  in  the  community,  to  find  sustainable  ways  to  meet  their  social, 
economic and material needs and to improve the quality of their lives. It is within this sphere 
of local government that the ideals for a developmental government are expected to arise, 
and where problems of contestations regarding LED and development manifest. To achieve 
the developmental milestones, local government has undertaken several programmes. They 
range from assisting with building human capacity where it is lacking to offering 
development to improve the lives of people. 
 
The Local Government Turn Around Strategy (Department of Cooperative Governance and 
Traditional  Affairs,  2009)  highlights  some  of  these  support  initiatives,  such  as  urban 
renewal programmes; Project Consolidate, including Siyenza Manje; the five-year local 
government strategic agenda; the Accelerated Shared Growth Initiative South Africa 
(Asgisa); and the Extended Public Works Programme (EPWP). LED forms part of these 
development efforts (RSA 1996). I include LED in the list of government strategies to foster 
development for the people because it is emphasised in section 152 of the Constitution. 
 
 
The Department of Provincial and Local Government (DPLG) (2006) has reported positive 
outcomes regarding some of the development initiatives listed above. However, in the face 
of persistent high unemployment of around 27.2% in 2018 (Stats SA 2018), and endemic 
poverty, which remains rife across black communities, these success stories are few and far 
between. 
 
Despite the many government developmental programmes, this study focuses only on LED. 
LED is fundamental because it has taken centre-stage in the development of South Africa’s 
government, as evident in the state’s support for LED.  Among LED support initiatives is 
the National Spatial Development Perspective (NSDP).   The NSDP states that principles 
and methodology of the NSDP should inform the development plans, policies and 
programmes of all spheres and agencies of government as a matter of policy (Oranje et al 
2009; The Presidency 2006, cited in Rogerson 2008). 
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Mohammed (in Rogerson 2008) stated that the NSDP requires government spending on 
fixed investment, and that investment should be concentrated in areas of economic growth 
and potential. 
 
Commitment and support for LED thinking is also evident in the Integrated Development 
Plan (IDP). According to section 34 of the Municipal System Act 2000, the IDP requires all 
municipalities to conduct annual reviews, and amend their development plans in accordance 
with changing demands. The IDP also requires municipalities to engage with LED policy 
(Gunter 2005). Furthermore, support for LED is evident in the 2006–2011 National LED 
framework and the revised 2012–2016 National LED framework, which methodically guide 
LED thinking and practice. Most recently, the National Development Plan (NDP) and the 
2017-2022 National LED Framework serve the same purpose. 
 
 
1.3 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
 
The contemporary discourse on LED has gained widespread popularity in the political, 
intellectual, and public social arenas of development issues in South Africa. It has become 
a “new” and glittering philosophy for development. Discourse on development often refers 
to LED as a possible solution to the growth strategy and development challenges in South 
Africa  (Maharaj  and  Ramballi  1998).  LED  has  thus  become  the  silver  bullet  for 
development challenges recognised across government and the academic community. 
However,  LED  is  confronted  with  unresolved  theoretical,  ideological  and  methodical 
tensions  and  contradictions,  including  unresolved  moral  challenges,  which  potentially 
nullify its value. 
 
Key among the ideological challenges are (1) the meaning of “local” in LED, in a 
“globalized” world; (2) the meaning of “development” in LED – in a democratic, 
multicultural and racialized class society like South Africa; and (3) the explanation and 
moral justification for what “development” means and who it should be aimed at. The last 
point is especially pertinent in South African society, with its grotesquely racialized past – 
or current – inequality (Plaatjie 2018). 
 
Furthermore, these tensions also appear at the level of methodology. Here, the contestation 
is about whether LED initiatives should be pro-poor or pro-growth (Bond 2003; Nel and 
Binns 2003; Nel and Rogerson 2016(b)). 
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Against the background of the complexities and contestations about LED, the claim that 
LED  is  a  catalyst  for  development  is  viewed  with  suspicion.  Mqedlana  (2014:44) 
demystified some of the conceptual and ideological challenges in LED and suggested that 
LED should be understood in four ways, at least. It can be seen as a process or as an 
economic development intervention; as a locality; as a geographically based development 
intervention; and as a collaboration of key stakeholders (see Blackely and Leigh 2010; 
Department of Provincial and Local Government 2006-2; RSA 2009). However, despite 
Mqedlana’s efforts to bring clarity to the meaning of LED, each definitional category he 
suggested has its own theoretical complexities. For example, if LED is a geographically or 
spatially based development initiative, what are the definitive spatial categories of inclusion 
and exclusion within a given territory? This question is especially relevant given the racially 
designed spatial and social context of South Africa. Against this background of complexities 
confronting LED which seem unacknowledged in LED thinking and practice (especially in 
South Africa), I critically examine them and also discuss their impact on LED discourse and 




Government’s alleged failure to respond appropriately to the development challenges of 
poverty, unemployment and inequalities across South Africa, especially at local government 
levels, can arguably be attributed to inappropriate LED regimes. This regime discounts the 
structural problems experienced by many poor South African in township which 
circumscribe them from accessing opportunities to escape their plight, such as poor 
education,  poor  service  delivery,  bad  infrastructure  for  business,  sports  and  cultural 
activities, and racism, including wide spread corruption in the ANC -led government, which 
haemorrhages resources for the poor (Burger 2009; Jili and Banjo 2013; Tooley and Mahoai 
2007). For example, Mathibe and Croucamp (2019) states that black women-owned 
enterprises are confronted with structural problems owed to the past such as owner poor 
education and lack of professional qualification, and lack of collateral for owners to qualify 
for credit. 
 
Notwithstanding, LED thinking is often put forward as a solution for development 
challenges. The failure of LED to mitigate development challenges in communities is 
informed partly by its theoretical weaknesses. In turn, this weakness involves the denial of 
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internal ideological tensions and contradictions, including the disavowal of the fundamental 
historical challenge of racism in development. 
 
This study is important because it centres certain ideological and theoretical complexities 
of LED to examine their relevance to the real character of development in South Africa. 
This study thus illuminates some of these complexities in LED, such as the question of race 
and racism in development, which remains outside and unaccounted for in mainstream LED 
thinking  and  practice  in  South  Africa.  By  so  doing,  this  study  also  explores  newer 
ideological possibilities that can assist academics and development practitioners in the quest 
for a more transformed LED regime that is appropriate to the development challenges in 
South Africa. 
 
There appears to be policy consensus regarding the potential of an aerotropolis for 
development and LED growth (Addie 2014), even when LED is still in theoretical limbo. 
This study will therefore open avenues for more thoroughgoing future studies focussing 
specifically on the relationship between aerotropolis projects and LED in general, and in 
South Africa in particular. Such research endeavours will also be important because the 
relation between LED and the idea of an aerotropolis are generally under-theorised (Addie 
2014:88). Furthermore, this study is conducted at a time when contradictions in the capitalist 
world system are beginning to manifest at the global level (de Sosa Santos 2003; Wallerstein 
2004; Zizek 2010). This could also impact LED discourse in ways that offer opportunity for 
new possibilities and trajectories of re-imaginings and theorizing LED anew. 
 
1.5 BACKGROUND TO THE AEROTROPOLIS 
 
The “aerotropolis” is a phrase coined by John Kasarda, a professor at the University of North 
Carolina’s Kenana-Flagler Business School, and advisor and consultant on aerotropolis 
planning in cities the world over. According to Kasarda, the aerotropolis is the next form of 
living that will define and reconfigure people’s  use of space and how we exist within 
specific spaces in the 21st century. The aerotropolis is a new design for cities that are 
geographically situated around an airport, spreading as wide as 60 km. The aerotropolis is 
thus not an airport city as sometimes assumed but is a city in its own right with an airport 
as its core (Kasarda and Linday 2011). 
 
For Kasarda, the aerotropolis provides the next logical step in the historical progression of 
commerce and evolution of towns and cities. It is a response to globalization demands of 
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the 21st   century (Kasarda and Linday 2011). For example, in the current phase of 
globalisation and its success in making possible multiple networks of trade the world over, 
competition is no longer between individual companies but their supply chains.   That is, 
people compete to supply far-flung links in the chain in the shortest time possible. 
 
 
Kasarda stated that time itself has become a valuable product in trade, and the aviation 
industry is currently the fastest mode of transport through which commerce can leverage 
“the economy of time” (Kasarda and Linday 2011). 
 
To justify this historical evolutionary process regarding the nexus of transport and city 
formation, Kasarda quoted Joel Garreau. He stated that cities are always formed around 
whatever transportation mode exists at any given time. Garreau described this as follows: 
 
 
When the state of the art is a shoe leather and donkey, the result is the hilly path of Jerusalem. When 
it’s men on horseback and sailing ships, it’s the ports of Lisbon, Hong Kong, or Boston, and the 
canals of Venice and Amsterdam. The birth of railroad produces Kansas City, Omaha, and the 
stockyard of Chicago. And the mass production of the Model led first to Los Angeles and latter to 
Levittown. Today, the modern combination on the ground is the automobile and internet… Soaring 
above them all are jet aircrafts at the set of the Jet Age – collapsing Dallas and Dubai as effortlessly 
as the Internet nodes connecting them… Because of the airport… it’s possible to imagine a world 
capital in a place that was once an absolute backwater. 
 
(Garreau in Kasarda and Linday 2011:11) 
 
 
In light of the above quote, Kasarda proposed that the aviation industry is today’s state-of- 
the art mode of transport. It meets the demand for speed in commerce, be it for the timely 
delivery of health products to hospitals, perishable goods, or software and hardware ICT 
infrastructure in many regions of the world (Kasarda and Linday 2011). Thus, Kasarda also 
believed the airport to be the 21st  century’s nerve centre in new forms of urban and city 
planning, such as the aerotropolis. New cities will be built around airports and many 
corporations will be located within the aerotropolis zone to leverage time value and speed. 
This is pertinent for corporations that have supply chain networks in other far-flung places 
of the world. 
 
Initiated in 2011 by the  EMM Mayor, Mondli  Gungubele, the  Ekurhuleni  aerotropolis 
project was intended to adapt to new trends and practices. The Ekurhuleni Aerotropolis, 
according to Gungubele and the City of Ekurhuleni Report, is a response to maximise 
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potential gains from a growing global trend of a new urban form. This new form is busy 
evolving around airports in Memphis, Denver and Orlando in the US, Hong Kong and 




In South Africa, the aerotropolis project is taking place within the EMM but involves many 
other stakeholders outside its jurisdiction. It is anticipated to benefit businesses and 
communities within a radius of about 60 km from OR Tambo International Airport, with its 
effect being felt even as far as Carletonville, Hammanskraal and towns bordering the North 
West province (EMM 2013). It is however, also understood as a LED initiative of 
Ekurhuleni.   According to James (2019), the aerotropolis is estimated to create 581 000 
additional jobs, 169 000 of which will be in trade (retail, tourism, and culture), 100 000 in 
transport (logistics and distribution), 80 000 in manufacturing (primarily related to aviation 
and aerospace manufacturing) and about 26 000 in construction. 
 
The aerotropolis is understood as an Ekurhuleni LED project. However, the aerotropolis 
seems to straddle the global sphere, through TNC and MNCs and facilitation of international 
trade flows. It also straddles the local sphere through its use of the physical space and 
infrastructure around the airport which is the property variously belonging to Ekurhuleni 
and both the provincial and national government, and through its alleged job creation 
capacity for the local community. It serves as a hub where the global meets the local 
(Kasarda 2018). However, aerotropolis projects are alleged to exhibit corporate bias towards 
MNC and TNCs through unfair tax concession offered to them and which give them a 
competitive advantage over small local businesses and are also alleged counterproductive 
to community interests (Bridger 2015; Pleumarom 2017). High levels of greenhouse gas 
emissions,   lack   of   community  participation   and   consultation,   spatial   gentrification, 
inequality generation and exploitation of low income earners are some of the key concerns 
raised by aerotroplis critics (Bridger 2015; Paul 2013; Pleumarom 2017; Scheepers (2012). 
 
Given the large size and scope of the Ekurhuleni Aerotropolis, the project involves 
stakeholders other than the EMM, such as Gauteng provincial departments, Airports 
Company SA (ACSA), and international consultancy firms. All stakeholders played a role 
in  the  development  of  the  Ekurhuleni  Aerotropolis  Project  Master  Plan.  The  project 
consisted of the mayoral committee, political steering committee, technical steering 
committee, technical working group, and five technical working streams. I discussed these 
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entities in detail in Chapter 4. The project also involved civil society groups who also 
participated in the project. Civil society groups were made up of ward councillors, organised 
business leaders in Ekurhuleni, youth groups and community-based organisations (CBO). 
 
1.6 RESEARCH PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES 
 
The purpose of this study was to investigate the various contestations and conceptions of 
LED in the LED debate among stakeholders in the Ekurhuleni Aerotropolis Project. The 
study was guided by the following research objectives: 
 
 
• To unpack the nature of the aerotropolis project in Ekurhuleni. 
 
• To conceptualise the varied meanings and ideas about LED among stakeholders in 
the Ekurhuleni Aerotropolis Project 
• To  explain  the  nature  of  the  ideological  contestations  in  LED  among  the 
stakeholders in the aerotropolis project. 
• To suggest ways to improve LED discourse and practice in South Africa. 
 
 
Key Research questions 
 
 
• What is the nature of the aerotropolis project of Ekurhuleni? 
 
• What are the different conceptions and meanings of LED among stakeholders in the 
 
Ekurhuleni Aerotropolis Project? 
 
• What is the ideological contestation about LED among the stakeholders in the 
aerotropolis about? 
• How do we explain the inconsistencies in the contestation on LED among the 
stakeholders in the aerotropolis project? 
• What can be done to improve LED discourse and practice in South Africa? 
 
 
1.7 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
This study followed a qualitative research design and followed a grounded theory approach. 
According to Holton (2008) grounded theory has evolved from its classical understanding 
of being its own paradigm on the research landscape, to be more circular. Grounded theory 
is a general methodology that can be used with quantitative or qualitative data, and the 
mixed method as well (Holton 2008). The grounded theory approach complemented my 
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qualitative research design because the study was descriptive, explanatory and exploratory 
in nature. 
 
While this study was not about the aerotropolis project per se, but the views of the 
stakeholders in the project: the diversity of stakeholders’ ideological orientations, socio- 
economic class background, geographical location and sphere of function, and race, created 
a good platform to achieve the objective of this study. That is, to investigate the varied 
contestations and conceptions of LED in the LED debate, and to explain these, from as wide 
and diverse a group as that of the stakeholders in Ekurhuleni Aerotropolis Project. This 
sampling choice also came with an added advantage because stakeholders were involved in 
the same project (aerotropolis), which also served as a common reference point for 
examining their views and perceptions about LED. 
 
Through in-depth conversations with the aerotropolis project stakeholders, I was able to 
uncover rich descriptive data which I interpreted to explore different possibilities in 
addressing the research questions. The use of this method was consistent with Holloway’s 
(1997) observation that the strength of qualitative research, is its interpretive approach to 
social phenomenon. 
 
I purposively selected my respondents from members of mayoral committee, political 
steering committee, technical steering committee, technical working group, and five 
technical working streams. Members of all the listed entities were official stakeholders in 
the project. I conducted face-to-face interviews with the 15 respondents from a total 
population of 35 people. I also purposively selected another category of my respondents 
from civil society. 
 
That is ward councillors, organised business leaders in Ekurhuleni, youth groups and 
community-based organisations (CBO), including specialist consultants of the project. I also 
conducted 34 interviews from the civil society category. All interviews lasted for 90 minutes 
on average. I analysed data using AtlasTI software, which is a qualitative data analysis 
workbench for large sections of text, visual and audio data. The software offers support to 
researchers during the data analysis process, in which texts are analysed and interpreted 
using coding and annotating activities. 
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1.8 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
Consistent with the practice of ethical research and disclosure, the full details of the research 
were explained to the respondents about the purpose of the research.    They were also 
informed about how the findings will be used and communicated. Furthermore, respondents 
were informed that participation in the study was voluntary and that they could stop 
participating at any stage of the project, if they wanted, without consequences. Respondents 
were also informed about their right to request for their identity not to be made known. 
 
Pseudonyms are used to protect the identity of civil society category respondents and 
officials of the operational task team. The identity of respondents such as the Mayor of 
Ekurhuleni, a members of the Executive Committee (MEC) and the Aerotropolis Project 
leader proved difficult to anonymise. This is because I refer to these respondents through 
their offices and their individual capacity and are known to the public. 
 
The respondents signed consent forms to participate in the study in which details about the 
study were explained. Furthermore, the highest ethical standards were observed in handling 
and analysing research data. All data were kept secured in password protected files and 
cross-validation methods were observed for research findings and the analysis thereof. 
Therefore, no manipulation or false representation of data occurred that might suit any 
interest other than the research aims. 
 
1.9 CONTRIBUTION OF THE STUDY 
 
This research contributes to the knowledge on LED in three broad aspects. The first is by 
highlighting the ongoing complexities, uncertainties and contradictions in LED discourse. 
These ongoing problems are responsible for the lack of systematic planning and 
implementation of LED programs. The identification and understanding of these 
complexities, uncertainties and contradiction in LED will allow LED practitioners and 
scholars to mitigate them in future LED planning and practice in South Africa. 
 
The second contribution of this study is that of bringing to the surface the problem of race 
in development, and by suggesting critical race theory (CRT) to be an analytical categor y 
in mainstream development and LED discourse. CRT understands racism as a structural, 
systemic problem that is produced economically, socially and politically (Modiri 2012). 
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Unlike gender which enjoy the status of an analytic category in development, race does not 
enjoy the similar status in development or LED. 
 
The third contribution is establishing variations in the meaning of the words “local economic 
development” and suggesting that the term be spelt with a hyphen, namely L-ED. This 
formulation illuminates the agency of the category local and brings the politics of LED more 
closely. More importantly, highlighting the category of local fosters the need for LED to 
define the concept of local in more specific and concrete terms amid the current spheres of 
government at local, provincial and national level, all of which enjoy varied and sometimes 
overlapping powers and functions. 
 
1.10 LAYOUT OF THE THESIS 
 
Chapter 1: This chapter is introductory and provides a broad overview of the study. The 
chapter provides a brief background about the study and its purpose and justification. Some 
of the contentious issues in LED are identified and discussed and the problem statement is 
presented. The research questions addressed in the study are provided, and the ethical issues 
related to the research are reflected on. 
 
Chapter 2 is the first of two literature-review chapters. It presents a broad theoretical 
overview of the discourse around development. The chapter provides a historiographical 
account of the development discourse over time and reflects on its main challenges and 
critiques to date. 
 
Chapter 3  is  also  part of the  literature review.  This  chapter focuses  more closely on 
literature that specifically looks at the development discourse in South Africa – and LED in 
particular. Here, I provide a historical account of the ideological evolution of the 
development discourse in South Africa and demonstrate how the historical contestations 
about development have continued into the present. I then examine how these contestations 
have played out in Ekurhuleni. 
 
Chapter 4 outlines the methodology used in the study. The research design and the methods 
employed in undertaking the study are described, and the data-collection method and the 
procedures followed for data analysis are outlined. Furthermore, I discuss issues regarding 
the validity and limitations of the findings, including ethical issues considered in the study. 
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Chapter 5 provides the findings of the study. Key issues and themes that emerged during 
the study, based on documentary review and interviews are tabled. The findings are arranged 
according to categories that are consistent with the research questions and help to answer 
them. 
 
Chapter 6 presents a systematic analysis of all the data acquired throughout the study. 
 
 
Chapter 7 presents the conclusion to the research. The study is summarised in detail and 
concluding observations are presented 
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In this chapter, I provide a critical historiographical account of the modern development 
discourse. I do so by reflecting on the historical roots and philosophical foundations of this 
discourse, regarding both the hegemonic narrative and its counter-narrative. Such reflection 
should allow the reader a broad understanding of the critical issues and contestations at play 
within the development discourse. Furthermore, it allows the reader to understand how 
development issues and contestations over those issues have evolved over time, and how 
they have  generally influenced  development  and  LED  discourse,  particularly in  South 
Africa. This is important because the discourse of LED is located within – and is influenced 
by – the broader development discourse. 
 
The chapter starts with a brief reflection on the meanings and interpretations of 
“development” from various schools of thought, and a mapping of the historiography of the 
concept. Here I reflect on development’s philosophical underpinnings and the politics that 
informed mainstream discourse about development at the time of its founding.     I then 
consider some of the main counter-narratives against hegemonic mainstream development 
by various contending schools. This discussion will clarify for the reader the ideological 
roots of the struggle for development discourse and LED practice in South Africa, as 
discussed in Chapter 3. It also clarifies why development discourses and LED practices 
often oscillate ideologically between the various schools. This ideological mapping further 
indicates why Ekurhuleni Aerotropolis Project, as an LED initiative, is experiencing the 
same fate regarding ideological contestation. These reflections are followed by a conclusion 
to the chapter. 
 
2.2 UNDERSTANDING MAINSTREAM DISCOURSE ON DEVELOPMENT 
 
The online Cambridge Dictionary (Anon: n/d) explains “development” as the process in 
which someone or something grows, changes or becomes more advanced. In several online 
Oxford Dictionaries, such as that of social sciences, development refers to transformation 
in an earlier state whether in reference to organisms, psyche, or societies (Calhoun 2002). 
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In the online Oxford public health dictionary, development refers to the process of growth, 
leading to accomplishment of tissue and organ maturity (Last and Porta 2018). According 
to the online Oxford Sports Science and Medicine Dictionary, development is “a process of 
continuous  transformation  in  the  body,  from  conception  and  continuing  through  to 
adulthood (Kent 2016). 
 
A different understanding is provided by the website of the Department of Development 
Sociology at the University of Bayreuth, and many other academic departments at other 
universities. In this context, development moves “beyond poverty reduction, conflict 
prevention, and the sustainable use of natural resources.” It is said that “next to these goals, 
development also implies social change, the transformation of norms and values and the 
introduction of new social, economic, and political structures” (Department of Development 
Sociology n/d). 
 
Based on the above definitions, in my view the literal meaning of the word “development” 
means in principle, at least one thing across all disciplines. That is, a transition from one 
point to another, often marked by progression from a state of immaturity, weakness or 
infancy, to maturity, progress and completion. I believe that on the basis of this literal 
definition of development as a transitory process, the same understanding was presented by 
the United Nations (UN) in 1945. It was also explicitly expressed by US President Truman 
in his inaugural speech in 1949. 
 
These episodes – the formation of the UN and Truman’s speech – are seen by many 
commentators as having initiated the contemporary idea of development or mainstream 
development discourse. This is because the UN, following the devastation of the Second 
World War, set itself to serve as a custodian of international peace and development, as 
stipulated in the UN declaration. The declaration was ratified in 1946 by 51-member states. 
The UN Charter (UN 1945) eloquently reads as follows: 
 
We the people of the United Nations deter mined to save succeeding generations from the scourge 
of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and to reaffirm faith in 
fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of 
men and women and of nations large and small, and to establish conditions under which justice 
and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be 
maintained, and to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom, And for 
these ends: 
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To practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbors, and 
 
 
•     To unite our strength to maintain international peace and security, and 
 
•     To ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed 
 
•  To employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement 
of all peoples, have resolved to combine our efforts to accomplish these aims (Charter of the 
United Nations 1945). 
 
President Truman in his inaugural speech expressed similar sentiments when he said the 
following: 
 
We must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and 
industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas. More than 
half the people of the world are living in conditions approaching misery. Their food is inadequate. 
They are victims of disease. Their economic life is primitive and stagnant. Their poverty is a handicap 
and a threat both to them and to more prosperous areas. For the first time in history, humanity 
possesses the knowledge and skill to relieve the suffering of these people. The United States is pre- 
eminent among nations in the  development of industrial and scientific techniques. The  material 
resources which we can afford to use for assistance of other peoples are limited. But our imponderable 
resources in technical knowledge are constantly growing and are inexhaustible. …With the 
cooperation of business, private capital, agriculture, and labor in this country, this program can 
greatly increase the industrial activity in other nations and can raise substantially their standards of 
living. Such new economic developments must be devised and controlled to the benefit of the peoples 
of the areas in which they are established. Guarantees to the investor must be balanced by guarantees 
in the interest of the people whose resources and whose labor go into these developments. 
 
For Abrahamsen (2000:15) and Rist (1997), the era of Truman’s speech in 1949 was a 
watershed moment in the history of what would become modern development discourse, 
which the UN had established just three years earlier. This era of “development” articulated 
by President Truman (point 4 in his speech) was to command universal legitimacy and 
unparalleled acceptance. Rist stated that the moral appeal of the idea of development, 
consistent with its positivist meaning, constructed the word “underdevelopment” not as its 
binary opposite but as an embryonic stage, which must mature and develop. As mentioned, 
here too, development would be understood in transitive terms. That is, as a transitory 
change from the state of underdevelopment (immaturity) to that of development (progress, 
growth, maturity and sophistication) (Rist 1997). 
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Rist added that the modern understanding of development substituted the coloniser– 
colonised opposition into a development–underdeveloped dichotomy (Rist 1997). The age 
of development presented development as falling outside the realm of the political: it was 
seen more as a technical process, solely dependent on knowledge and scientific enquiry to 
produce growth and expansion (Rist 1997). Development therefore became what Ferguson 
(1990) described as an “anti-politics machine.” 
 
What is significant about the founding of development era was that it depoliticised 
development, and at the same time naturalised itself as an unquestionable “collective project 
of  humanity”  (Rist  1997:78).  Cornwall  (2010)  reflected  on  development’s  capacity to 
seduce and win over hearts and minds, often without question. He stated that “development 
is much more than just a socio-economic endeavour; It is a perception which models reality, 
a myth which comforts societies and a fantasy which unleashes passions”. He continued 
that “these models, myths, and passions are sustained by development’s buzzwords” 
Cornwall  (2010:1).  therefore  views  development  as  a  buzzword  because  of  its  moral 
capacity to charm and please. Rist (2007) also warned that its capacity to charm meant that 
development could be appropriated for abuse, to deceive and to dissuade truth. 
 
What  this  depoliticised  logic  of  development  suggest  is  that  development  –  and  its 
challenges – were, in both theory and practice, universal and ubiquitous. This further 
suggested that developed nations, by virtue of their scientific knowledge and advances 
claimed  by  Truman,  could  aid  poor  underdeveloped  nations  to  escape  their  plight. 
Against this background and the demands for scientific knowledge to foster development 
and to fight poverty, development discourse graduated to the heights of scientific enquiry. 
 
The scientific discipline of development studies produced its first journal, Economic 
Development and Cultural Change in 1952, in Chicago. This was followed by 
Development in 1957, also in Chicago; then by the Journal of Development in 1964 in 
the UK; Development and Change in 1970, in the Netherlands; World Development in 
1973,  in  the  US;  Third  World  Quarterly  in  1979;  the  Journal  of  International 
Development in 1989 (UK); and Progress in Development Studies in 2001 (UK) 
(Corbridge 2007). Within the scientific study of development arose various schools of 
opinions and contestations over the concept. 
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The 1960s saw contestations developing against the technicist development–economics 
fundamentalism of the UN at the time. Greater efforts were made to transform this 
fundamentalism by integrating sociology, politics and other aspects of human social 
activity, in the scientific enquiry of development (Bernstein 2005; Harris 2005). I believe 
the graduates of development studies provided the intellectual resources for the 
International Development Agency (IDA) in 1960 and for the United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP). These graduates were produced in academies, research 
centres, and institutes for development studies across the globe. It was also within these 
institutes that some of development’s fiercest critiques and champions of the counter- 
narrative were produced. 
 
At the time of the founding of the modern development discourse in the 1940s, 
development thinking and practice had always reflected the modernist thinking within 
UN. This paradigm was largely influenced by Rostow’s stages of economic growth thesis 
and complemented the transitive meaning of development. That is the belief that all 
societies are on a transitory continuum from traditional (underdeveloped) to a mature 
modern industrial society that displays high production and consumption – and by 
extension, development (Rist 1997; Rostow 1960). Rostow believed that underdeveloped 
countries could achieve as high a level of development if they would only cease their 
archaic traditions and customs and adapt to embrace modern forms of scientific practices 
and  knowledge  systems.  This  understanding  was  based  on  the  white  European 
supremacist idea that there is only one linear path to development, which passes through 
a transitory route to Western modernity. At that stage, development – in its Eurocentric 
understanding – simply meant economic growth and planning. 
 
Development discourse, soon after the founding of development studies in 1960, departed 
from the old economic planning orthodoxy. The decentring of the economic orthodoxy 
in development thinking was, for example, evidenced b y the Institute of Development 
Studies, which was established in 1966 at Sussex. This institute became responsible for 
the World Bank’s (WB) policy of Redistribution with Growth (Harris 2005). That policy 
would become the precursor to the declaration of poverty as a problem within the WB. 
The latter policies lead further to programmes that essentialised not only the state, as a 
key driver of development, but also integrated rural development and human agency as a 
23  
potential driver for alleviating poverty. This thinking contrasted with the top-down 
technicist interventions paradigm of UN development agencies. 
 
Consistent with the humanist understanding of development, Harris (2005) stated that 
poverty was seen as a rural problem, to be resolved by targeting small farms and linking 
them to markets and credit providers. Commentators such as Harris (2005) argued that, 
because of the centring of poverty and human agency in the development discourse, the 
1960s and 70s were more progressive than the 1980s. 
 
 
In the 1980s, development discourse was defined more by the ascendancy of Thatcherist 
neo-liberal ideas. These ideas relied heavily on modernisation theory and were already 
entrenched within the Bretton Woods institutions, namely the International Monetary fund 
(IMF) and the (WB)2. Thatcherist liberal ideas led to the implementation of the Structural 
Adjustment Programmes (SAP) and the displacement of state-led development. State-led 
development had meant the state played a direct role in development, such as through 
public investment, employment generation, and strong provision of public goods and 
redistributive measures (Bernstein 2005). In contrast, the neo-liberal approach introduced 
the return to classical economics that defined development thinking in the 1940s and early 
1950s. By the 1980s, the market and its internal dynamics were essentialised and 
understood to be effective drivers of development. 
 
The IMF was to chart a neo-liberal framework for international economic cooperation, 
and the WB was to concentrate on long-term economic development and poverty issues 
(IMF, 15 Sept 2010). In this paradigm, measures such as the provision of human basic 
needs and public good services were assigned to non-government organisations (NGOs) 
(Bernstein 2005). According to Bernstein (2005), it was no wonder that the 1980s 
witnessed a proliferation of development NGOs of various types, sometimes acting as 
subcontractors to aid agencies. 
 
Both the IMF and WB served to coercively entrench the SAPs in the 1980s. The term SAP 
(Zawalinska 2004:1) argues, comes from the WB lending policy of the early 1980s which 
offered quick financial help for countries that needed to solve problems with their balance 
of payments. O’Hara (1999, in Zawalinska 2004:5) stated that the help was conditioned to 
 
 
2 The IMF was to chart a neo-liberal framework for international economic cooperation, and the World Bank 
was to concentrate on long-term economic development and poverty issues (IMF 2010). 
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satisfy certain economic criteria, leading to “structural adjustment” programs that would 
embrace the broader neo-liberal economic reforms. This was understood with the rationale 
that SAPs would assist in removing government “failures” that manifested during the 




Bernstein (2005) further stated that the collapse of the Soviet Union also contributed to the 
heightening of the neo-liberal hegemony, and by extension, the scope of development 
studies. For example, the former Soviet Union states admired the hegemonic neo-liberalist 
policy of Britain and sought to reform their development ideologies and practices 
accordingly. Hence development studies programs penetrated the former Soviet states and 
to provide the intellectual and pedagogical resources to support reform in those states. This 
also explains why development studies began to offer programmes modelled on neo-liberal 
subjects (Bernstein 2005). However, the broadening menu on offer in development studies 
since the 1990s was also a result of successful critiques against the neo-liberalism paradigm 
of the 1980s. Efforts to search for new development alternatives helped to widen the scope 
of such studies. This situation meant that the concept of development and its inherent 
hypnotic effect became understood within and mediated through neo-liberal methods. The 
theoretical logic of those methods used modernism as a reference point, and its institutional 
infrastructure (IMF and the WB) was already entrenched. 
 
The SAP period in the 1980s attracted not only political resistance but many intellectual 
critiques from Marxist and post-colonial schools, especially from the third world. The 
critique of neo-liberalism in the 1980s and the search for alternatives was also built on the 
critique of the development thinking of the 1940–50s. Critiques against development in the 
1980s attracted ideas of the likes of Amartya Sen, Robert Chambers, Eturo Escobar, Gunder 
Frank, Samir Amin, Raul Prebisch and many others. These scholars not only injected 
alternative perspectives in development but would become leading architects of different 
schools of thought within it. These schools of thought included the dependency school, post- 
modernist school, and post-development school. In recent times I have also observed the 
rise of the post-colonial and de-colonial perspectives in development theory and practice. 
 
What was certainly noticeable during the 1980s, was a rise of the counter-narrative of 
development, which argued for a more social and humanist development agenda. Some of 
the key issues advocated for at this time were ideas about ecology, sustainable development, 
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basic needs, feminism, Participatory Rural Appraisal, and a Human Development Index 
(HDI). HDI, rather than merely gross domestic product (GDP), was proposed to serve as a 
development barometer (Harris 2005; Rist 1997). 
 
The SAPs was alleged by its critics – such as Aina (1993), Fatton (1992), Ferguson (2006), 
and Chabal and Daloz (1999) – to have been responsible for the rise of inter- and intra-state 
socio-economic inequalities. Poverty was deepening the world over, with the 1980s finally 
declared by observers as the lost decade. During that period, Africa experienced severe 
economic deterioration, social and infrastructural decay, ecological problems, and 
heightening of disaster. The political and social order was gradually crumbling (Leal, in 
Cornwall 2010:90).  The devastating effects of this era (Leal in Cornwall 2010:90) were at 
the centre of the anti-SAP riots in Caracas in 1989, Tunis in January 1984, Nigeria in 1990, 
Morocco in 1990, and the Zapatista uprising of 1994, among many others. The following 
excerpt from the WB captures the situation in the 1980s poignantly: 
 
Sub-Sahara Africa has now witnessed almost a decade of falling per capita incomes and accelerating 
degradation. Per capita food production first fell, then rose, but remains lower than in the 1980s. 
Africa has lost a substantial part of its share in the world market for its exports. Some African 
countries have surrendered some of the gains made earlier in human resources development. … Open 
urban unemployment is a  growing problem in many countries. In the past decade six countries 
Equatorial Guinea, Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria, Sao Tome and Principe, and Zambia – have slipped from 
the middle-income to low income group (as classified in the World Development Report). 
 
WB (in Von Troil 1993:15) 
 
 
This period marked the beginning of greater foreign control of African economies. The 
nationalist struggle and its main projects were betrayed by their heroes (Mkandawire 2005). 
It must be noted, however, that in addition to the alleged structural challenges borne by 
SAPs, corruption and mismanagement, weak civil society and authoritarian rule in most of 
the developing world significantly compounded the challenges of many African states (Aina 
in Von Troil 1993). However, despite Africa’s malfeasance, Aina (in Von Troil 1993) 
insisted that development was doomed to fail because of the faulty framing of the concept. 
He stated that the absence of African indigenous popular definitions and priorities rendered 
the idea lopsided, alienating, and ineffectual. 
 
For some observers such as Lushaba (2009), development was – and continues to be – part 
of the civilizing mission of the colonial imperialist project. Therefore, the concept is not 
26  
innocent and lacks good intentions for the developing world. According to the dependency 
school, development discourse has always maintained a parasitic, dependent capitalist 
system, which benefits wealthy European nations at the expense of the poor developing 
world. Many commentators understand SAPs as a malicious method of development, which 
is systematically aimed at exploiting poor African states. Aina (1993) agrees with Lushaba 
(2009) about developments parasitic character by describing SAPs as follows: 
 
 
SAP should not be seen as  a  treatment prescribed by a  disinterested physician whose primar y 
commitment is to the Hippocratic ideal of saving lives … In the case of the SAP, the doctor will want 
their fees paid, their debts settled, and continuous use of and dependence on their services, drugs and 
instruments. 
 
Great advances have occurred in UN development policies, especially for those who 
subscribe  to  the  human  development  paradigm,  and  who  wish  to  see  development 
broadening its thinking beyond technocratic econometric measures3. This is evidenced by 
the 2015 Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) – signed by 189 states, including 147 
heads of state and government in September 2000 – and the more recent 2030 Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs). The MDGs were derived from the Millennium Declaration, 
and listed the following eight goals, to be achieved by 2015: 
 
 
• To eradicate extreme poverty and hunger 
 
• To achieve universal primary education 
 
• Promote gender equality and empower women 
 
• Reduce child mortality 
 
• Improve maternal health 
 
• To combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases 
 
• Ensure environmental sustainability 
 





























The neo-liberal doctrine rages on and reigns supreme in development thinking and practices in general. The 
reason is that when the MDGs were founded, the leading ideologues evidently insisted on instituting user -pay 
principles for water, health and education for the poor (Saith 2006:1068). 
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The  2030  SDGs  are  meant  to  advance  the  MDGs  further  and  they  also  address 
environmental concerns. The 17 SDGs are shown in Table 1. 
 
 
Table 1: 2030 Sustainable Development Goals 
 
End poverty in all its forms 
 
everywhere 
Ensure        access        to 
 
affordable, reliable, 
sustainable and clean 
energy for all 
Take  urgent  action  to 
 
combat  climate change 
and its impacts 
End   hunger,   achieve   food 
 
security and improved 
nutrition and promote 
sustainable agriculture 
Promote    inclusive    and 
 
sustainable economic 
growth, employment and 
decent work for all 
Conserve and sustainably 
 
use the  oceans,  sea and 
marine resources 
Ensure   healthy lives and 
 






industrialisation and foster 
innovation 
Sustainably         manage 
 
forests, combat 
desertification, halt and 
reverse land degradation, 
and halt biodiversity loss 
Ensure inclusive and quality 
 
education for all and promote 
lifelong learning 
Reduce  inequality  within 
 
and among countries 
Promote just,   peaceful 
 
and inclusive societies 
Achieve gender equality and 
 
empower all women and girls 
Make cities inclusive, safe, 
 
resilient and sustainable 






consumption and production 
patterns 
Ensure  availability  and  sustainable  management  of 
 
water and sanitation for all 




The above goals seem committed to and strove for the idea of human development as early 
as 2005. However, according to Easterly (2009) the Global Monitoring Report, the Blair 
Commission for Africa, the UN World Summit Declaration, the WB, and IMF Global 
Monitoring Report all expressed scepticism about Africa’s capacity to meet any of the 





achievement of the MDGs in Africa was varied, with some countries having achieved more, 
whereas others had failed to achieve much because of their own challenges. Nevertheless, 
the UN prides itself for having achieved some of its goals, especially the reduction of 
poverty;  access  to  primary  education;  gender  equality  and  women’s  empowerment; 




The UN’s MDGs have attracted both political and intellectual critique and resistance. Some 
opinion makers such as Saith (2006), are suspicious about the intentions of the MDGs. They 
redeploy fragments of dependency and post-development critiques to allege that the UN 
acts in bad faith, lacks honesty, and is deceitful, and that it oppresses the poor at a global 
scale. Saith (2006:1167) ironically remarked on the phenomenon of MDGs, as follows: 
 
The Millennium Development Goals are here, there and everywhere. They envelop you in a cloud 
of soft words and good intentions and moral comfort; they are gentle, there is nothing conflictual 
in them; they are kind, they offer only good things to the deprived. They give well-meaning 
persons in the north-west a sense of solidarity and purpose; they provide a mechanical template 
of targets and monitoring indicators aptly suited to the limits of the bureaucratic mind: they form 
ready populist seasoning for politicians; and of course, they provide another gravy train for 
development consultants – and this one is scheduled to run for another decade, cover every country 
and it has meals and targets galore for everyone. No wonder it is a juggernaut for all bandwagons. 
But is the bandwagon big enough to carry a billion poor persons? Who drives the bandwagon? 
Does it have an engine, or is it all band and wagon? How is the price of the passengers to be paid 
for? And if and when it does reach its destination of poverty reduction, into what sort of world 
will the poor alight off the wagon? What might be the societal attributes of this brave new world? 
 
Saith  stated  that  the  MDGs  and  their  targets  were  founded  on  the  false  reductionist 
conceptual assumption of both development and poverty. That is, the false assumption that 
development was only about poverty alleviation. This understanding neglected issues of 
structural inequalities, anti-poor, and anti-labour policy biases (Saith 2006). Saith also 
opposed the idea that poverty can be converted into an indicator that can be specified 
numerically (Saith 2006). In this regard, he suggested that the entire complexity of the 
discourse of development was reduced to the MDGs and their indicators. Doing so 
conveniently neglects to engage with the political questions, about the parasitic economic 
relations between the Global North and the Global South, raised by scholars like Amin 
(1974; 2011) and Saul (1974). For Dussel (1998; 2002), Escobar (2004), and Grosfoguel 
(2011), the questions point to the Euro-American-centric and racist nature of development. 
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Saith (2006:1189) argued that in the MDG paradigm, the solution lies in a simple equation: 
“external assistance + technological fixes + good local governance = poverty reduction”. 
Saith (2006) criticised the MDG barometers suggesting that they deceive because the 
emphasis is on calculability rather than quality. For example, he stated that indicators such 
as educational enrolments are ineffectively mute about the quality of outcome. The 
expenditure on education per student in 1998 was five to ten times higher in the US than in 
several developing economies. Primary-school classes were twice as large in India as the US 
(Saith 2006). He added that the MDG frame of reference did not provide a global agenda but 
postured towards “our” agenda for “them”, and that it neglected the troubling phenomenon 
of   rising   inequality   and   attendant   socio-economic   exclusions.   This   included   the 
undemocratic decision-making in international political, economic, environmental, and 
security-related matters (Saith 2006). He concluded as follows: 
 
The political uni-polarity on the global stage now reflects itself in the development arena starkly, 
and the MDGs arguably provide the framework for stabilising and sanitising the contemporary 
path of capitalism on the global scale. 
 
(Saith 2006: 1190). 
 
 
Although the SDGs were started to include some of the concerns raised by Saith, such as the 
challenge of global inequality, the results are yet to be seen. There seems to be little hope 
for any meaningful and substantive change given the ensuing neo-liberal globalisation that 
has escalated stark racial and other inequalities the world over, especially in large parts of 
the Third World (Saith 2006:1185; UN 2015). The problem of racial inequality in 
development also confirms Kalpana’s (2017) disquieting observation of SDGs. Kalpana 
suggested that SDGs, by omitting the race and racism question in development, simply 
extend the differentials and racialised valuations of life further. 
 
Echoing Saith’s (2006) disquiet about deceitfulness of MDGs and SDGs, Leal (2010) noted 
that development, ever since its founding, has shown a remarkable capacity to legitimise and 
reinvent itself. It does so through the use of morally appealing, emotive words when 
confronted by moral challenges. Leal added that these tactics deceive people into believing 
that change has occurred when things are still the same, and the status quo systematically 
remains intact. Saith stated that over the past 50 years, development has paraded morally 
appealing and seductive terms – such as “community development”, “basic human needs”, 
“integrated rural development”, “sustainable development”, “participatory development”, 
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“capacity building”, “human rights” and “good governance.” To emphasise development’s 
ingenious capacity to revive and deceptively revitalise its own appeal, confirming Saith’s 
observation, Leal drew on the work of Chossudovsky (2003:27). The latter scholar lucidly 
explained the phenomenon as follows: 
 
 
The ‘official’ neoliberal dogma also creates its own ‘counter-paradigm’ embodying a highly moral 
and  ethical  discourse. The  latter  focuses  on  ‘sustainable development’ while  distorting and 
stylising the policy issues pertaining to poverty, the protection o f the environment and the social 
rights of  women. This ‘counter-ideology’ rarely challenges neo-liberal policy prescription. It 
develops alongside and in harmony rather than in opposition to the official neoliberal dogma. 
 
Leal argued that the hegemony of the Western and European modernist thinking in 
“development” was illustrated by its capacity to subvert to its own terms, even the most 
radical and counter-hegemonic approaches against it. For example, despite the radical 
conceptualisation of participation being about fundamental social transformation of power 
relations, community empowerment and the entrenchment of democracy (Arnstein 1969; 
Cavey 2004; Duraiappah, Roddy and Parry 2005; Hanley and Hossain 2010), the idea of 
participation has been subverted, manipulated and abused by development practitioners 
against  its  principles  to  serve  the  neo-liberal  interests  (Ruiter  2005).  Many  large 
development  projects  involving  government  and  TNCs  like  the  aerotropolis,  use  the 
language of community participation only for legitimation and to create an impression that 
communities  are  involved  in  decision  making  and  stand  to  benefit  from  the  project. 
However, very often, communities are excluded from any meaningful participation and 
engagement in the projects. Instead communities tend to sufferer the deleterious impact of 
projects such as the aerotropolis such as environment degradation, forced removals, 
gentrification, unfair business competition against local businesses and restricted movement 




Methodological packages and techniques such as participatory rural appraisal, participatory 
learning and action, appreciative inquiry, community-based needs assessment, and 
stakeholder analysis are often to legitimate such projects. These methods are manipulated 
and deployed in ways that serve corporate and private interests, and do not serve the 
foundational   principles   of   community   participation,   which   is   about   community 
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empowerment and entrenchment of democracy of the community (Arnstein 1969; Cavey 
 
2004:13; Duraiappah, Roddy and Parry 2005). 
 
 
In all the foregoing cases for and against MDGs and SDGs, the stark reality of inequalities 
between and within states remains clear and is acknowledged in the 2015 MDG report (UN 
2015). This global inequality pandemic, acknowledged by scholars such as Piketty (2014) 
and Harvey (2004), is so rife that Portes (in Sassen 2016:62(a)) argued that it has produced 
a flourishing industry based on exposing it. According to the 2016 Oxfam Report (Oxfam 
2016:1), the gap between rich and poor is ever increasing to new extremes. The richest 1% 
have more wealth than the rest of the world combined. Oxfam reported on the spate of global 
inequality by 2015, as shown in Figure 1. The graph shows that 62 individuals possessed the 
same wealth as 3.6 billion people – the “bottom half” of humanity. The wealth of the richest 
62 people rose by 45% between 2010 and 2015, whereas that of the bottom half fell by 38% 
in the same period. Oxfam reported that since the turn of the century, the poorest half of the 
world’s population has received just 1% of the total increase in global wealth; the other half 
has gone to the top 1% of people. The average annual income of the poorest 10% of people 
in the world has risen by less than $3 each year for almost a quarter of a century. Their daily 
income has risen by less than a cent every year (Oxfam 2016). 
 
 








Oxfam (2016) also reported that not only do wages fail to provide adequate pay for workers, 
but also fail to meet people’s income needs. In Europe, 9% of people in employment are at 
increasing risk for poverty, and this phenomenon is worse in the developing world (Oxfam 
2016:9). In the Third World, even when working overtime, factory workers still cannot 
afford housing, food, and medicine (Oxfam 2016). The inequalities are also intrastate, and 
where such strong inequalities exist, women and blacks, or racialized people are the worst 
affected Power (2006), 
 
Many commentators attribute the challenge of inequality to issues like technological 
changes, which is creating a demand for particular skills for high-value services and wages. 
Others ascribe it to trade globalisation and financial globalisation (IMF 2015). However, 
key among the causes of inequality are market liberalisation and neo-liberal globalisation, 
which continually produce skewed distribution of resources and rewards in favour of the 
rich, who are mostly white, and to the exclusion of poor people, who are mostly black, the 
world over (Saith 2006). 
 
The idea of the aerotropolis and the global city is the most recent phenomenon in the 
intensification of neo-liberal globalisation (Sassen 2016). As also confirmed by the 2017- 
2022 National Framework for LED (CoGTA 2017(b), this is because “Cities have become 
primary engines of global economic activity” (Joss, Cook, and Dayot, 2017:9) and their 
geographic expansion into regional and global entities is expected to make global economic 
activity more efficient. 
 
According to Sassen (2016:77(a)), a global city is not a city in the traditional sense of a 
landmass on which a city is built. It is a particular formation that re-articulates spatiality in 
new ways. It is a site of production and implementation of various functions for global 
corporations, which work together across the world to intensify global capitalism. A global 
city is formed at the intersection of various emergent global economic circuits, in which 
professionals and executives from many nations and knowledge cultures interact. These 




Sassen  further  stated  that  the  global  city  is  not  necessarily  framed  by  national  or 
international law or by visible legal markers, even if such cities use specific national 
institutions, laws, and courts (Sassen 2017; 2016(b)). 
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These are globally recurrent operational spaces. They can be understood as new forms of 
cross-border “geographies of centrality”, which produce de facto transnational geographies 
that connect strategic spaces of production across the globe, even as they construct their 
own bordering within countries Sassen (2017). 
 
For global cities to function, Sassen states that they require material infrastructure, such as 
dense concentration of buildings and digital infrastructure – the mainstay of the city. This 
is often beyond the level of other cities. They also require high-level talent and lower wage 
workers (Sassen 2017:7; 2016). She stated that optimal performance of such cities depends 
on an enabling work environment for high-income talent, unencumbered by poorly paid 
tasks such as low-level office work and low-wage household work. Those tasks are 
systematically meant to be handled by the least “talented.” Global cities also need transport 
infrastructure. The aerotropolis offers aviation. As stated earlier, according to Kasarda, 
aviation is today’s state-of-the art mode of transport that meets the demand for speed in 
commerce, be it for the timely delivery of health products to hospitals, perishable goods, or 
software and hardware ICT infrastructure in many regions of the world (Kasarda and Linday 
2011). Through the speed of aviation transport and the surroundings infrastructure for 
business operation in the precinct, the aerotropolis serve as a hub for facilitating interactions 
of a network of global cities. This is confirmed by Kasarda (2018) when he states that the 
aerotropolis is the hub where the global meets the local in international production flows of 
the modern capitalist age (Kasarda 2018). 
 
Because the global city is a specific space of production, it has the capacity to organise its 
own low-wage workers, precisely because it is focused on maintaining the strategic space 
(Sassen 2016 (b)). The homes of top-level staff are therefore an extension of the corporate 
platform for which such staff work. For Sassen, the global city phenomenon is predicated 
on the logic of extraction and systematic expulsions of anything the city does not need 
within its spatial circuits. These could be people, undesirable land, or cultures (Crichlow 
20016; Sassen 2017; Sassen 2016 (a)). Often, the people expelled from its circuits are poor 
and racialised, those who lose their jobs for various reasons, including the changing urban 
division of labour. These jobless populations – often with outdated skills and unable to get 
back into the system – are forced into poverty or casual work and the informal economy. 
Most  are  systematically,  physically expelled  from  the  urban  centres  (Crichlow  20016; 
Portes 2016) which are the “nerve centres” of the global city. Their removal makes way for 
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office  space  for  corporations,  including  huge  residential  complexes  for  their  workers. 
Sassen (2015) argued that the global city functions as a frontier to enable the spread of 
global corporate capitalism and its actors into various national economies. These then act 
as the catalyst of global inequality. 
 
We believe that the aerotropolis generally functions within the orbit of the global city, to 
facilitate speedy global movement of goods and services, and to provide infrastructure 
support for TNCs within the precinct. This is particularly so because aerotropolis are 
generally known to attract TNCs through various form of offers such as tax incentives to 
locate to their precinct (Bridger 2015). Furthermore, we note that the development of 
aerotropoli precincts also involve expropriation of land which often leads to forced removals 
or expulsion of people from their land to make up space. For example, the development of 
Taoyuan Aerotropolis in Taiwan, saw 46 000 residents displaced (Bridger 2015). 
Furthermore Bridger (2015) also states that local small and medium size enterprises do not 
benefit much from the aerotropolis because it serves the growth and profits of TNCs. On 
basis of the foregoing, we can therefore also argue that the global city and the aerotropolis 
are mutually reinforcing sides of the same coin. They are marked by what Bridger (2015) 
calls turbocharging global corporate dominance. They are also marked by extraction and 
systematic expulsions, and the reproduction of  inequalities  between and within nations 
which also take on racial patterns. 
 
In light of these properties of a global city, especially its reliance on digital infrastructure 
and its global flows of trade networks, I believe that such a city is also a smart city. This is 
because it is driven by data and information. It is a techno city, which relies heavily on 
information communication technology (ICT) for functioning (Hespanhol 2017). According 
to Castells (2010), smart cities are a 21st-century phenomenon. They mark a shift from 
industrial  society  to  an  informational  one,  with  its  attendant  informational  economy 
(Castells 2010) and cyber economy (Popkova and Haabazoka 2019). According to Popkova 
and Haabazoka (2019) stages of digital modernisation for the economy based on 
technological advancement progress from information economy, digital economy, and to 
cyber economy. 
 
The smart city is drawn closer to other cities by fibre-optic cables and jet aircraft and is 
often imagined in terms of communication systems and the application of ICT, to stimulate 
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The phenomenon of the global city and the smart city will do more than redefine the nature 
of flows of trade and management of these cities (Rodrigues-Poze 2008). They will also 
reconfigure the idea of space and belonging, including ideas about citizenship and rights 
(Joss et al 2017:5).  These cities will generate new forms of subjectivities and communities, 
as is common with infrastructural development (Ruiters 2005). 
 
It is clear from the preceding sections that mainstream development thinking has challenges. 
These challenges include contradictions and outcomes of development, which produce 
inequalities. These inequalities also take on racial and gender forms and cut across all 
nations. The nature of development challenges are articulated in some detail in the counter- 
narrative in the following section below. 
 
However, among some of the most obvious racialist tendencies in development is the fact 
that development continues to be understood, actioned, and articulated through Western 
value systems. The West has arrogated itself as the site of untrammelled knowledge to 
civilise the rest into modernity and development. This signifies the deep and serious forms 
of epistemic racism at the heart of the development enterprise. I reflect on the broad counter- 
narratives to mainstream development thinking that arise from various vantage points. 
 
2.3 UNDERSTANDING THE COUNTER-NARRATIVE: WHAT IS 
DEVELOPMENT? 
 
Without necessarily reflecting on all counter-narratives of development, I reflect here on a 
few main critiques for the reader’s appreciation of various ideological strands within 
development discourse. This exercise also clarifies the philosophical roots of LED within 
the myriad contentious ideological and philosophical traditions of this discourse. 
 
Among some of the critiques and contending schools of thought in development I chose to 
reflect on are, the dependency school, the post-development or anti-development critique, 
and the post-colonial and de-colonial schools. I chose these because I believe they are the 
theoretical base from which all other development critiques against modernity have 
germinated, especiall y the dependency and post-development schools. 
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These critiques share disquieting concern about the nature and form of mainstream 
development thinking and practices. They challenge the fact that development discourse is 
dominated by parasitic Euro-American-centric logics, which are often enforced to benefit 
the rich Western world at the expense of poor Third World countries. 
 
This historic dominance of the Western world over Third World countries has persisted 
overtime in the long history of development discourse and continues to do so to this day as 
shall be discussed here below. This historic systemic domination and oppression of the Third 
World by the western world, and on racial basis, which the dependency and post 
development critiques articulates - which we discuss here below – is now also transposed 
and continued into the current era of development. This era is marked by hyper-modernit y 
(Lushaba 2009), hyper capitalist systems such as corporate capitalism, global cities and 
aerotropolis (Bridger 2015; Kasarda and Lindsay 2011; Sassen 2015) and informational 
economy and cyber economy (Castells 2010; Popkova and Haabazoka 2019). As I have also 
mentioned, this modern era of development is still reproducing the same discriminatory 
outcomes against Third World countries and along racial lines, as was the case at the 
formative years of development discourse. Hence, I believe the various critiques of 
development discourse to remain somewhat relevant even to this day. 
 
I believe that critiques of development often share more ideological roots and similarities 
than differences yet suffer undue fragmentation. For example, the dependency school of 
thought was influenced by Marxists in the US, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Africa 
(Rist 1997). Such thinkers would suggest a reading of world systems theory, especially the 
global political economy and  the skewed and  dependent parasitic relations between its 
actors. Against this background, particularly the reading of world systems theory, I argue 
that post-colonial and post-development critiques found solid ground on which to bolster 
and further their arguments. 
 
It is my view that the reading of the world system’s theory suggests that the aerotropolis, 
global cities and smart cities are the modern frontiers of exploitation, extraction and 
reproduction of inequalities (Bridger 2015; Crichlow 20016; Portes 2016; Sassen 2017). 
These new forms are responding to the 21st  century demands for trade such as speed and 
information, with ICT being the lifeblood of the modern economic system. These new 
frontiers are rearticulating power relations between the state and corporations on the one 
hand, and between nations and within them on the other hand. This is marked by the 
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intensification of corporate dominance over the state, which Kasarda suggests being long 
overdue (Kasarda and Linday (2011), and the growing inequality between Third World 
countries and the Western world, on the one hand. Inequalities within nations themselves 
often also take on racial patterns. The efficient functioning of these frontiers often mean 
forced removal of people from their land and destruction of biodiversity and environment 
to make space for the aerotropolis or global cities; exploitation of low paid workers by TNC 
who enjoy protection from labour law adherence; unfair competitive advantage of TNC to 
local enterprises due to tax concessions offered to them to locate in the aerotropolis precinct; 
and  unfair  subsidization  of  TNC  operation  through  public  funds,  pension  funds  and 
resources  (Bridger 2015; Pleumarom 2017 Scheepers (2012). 
 
While the Marxist and dependency schools provided a global political economy critique, 
post-colonial and post-development schools added a socio-politico and cultural critique of 
development and modernity. In addition, the de-colonial critique not only introduced the 
neglected race question that Marxists often overlooked; it also critiques the moral and 
epistemic foundation of the hegemony of Western civilisation and argues for pluriversality. 
The de-colonial school does not necessarily engage directly with the question of “race”, that 
is to engender a critical engagement with the complexities of race and racism (both vertically 
and horizontally in its varied articulations in various spatial forms). Rather, the de-colonial 
school, together with the post-colonial school, offer a critique against Eurocentrism and not 
necessarily racism in development (White 2002). 
 
The dependency school has been criticised for not providing alternative suggestions to the 
development paradigm. However, this school has a long-established critique of development 
which is best captured by the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis. The hypothesis deals with the 
unfair or skewed economic power and trade relations between the rich First World countries 
and the poor Third World, which are propelled by development. Dependency advocates such 
as Raul Prebisch and Gunder Frank, among others, argued that these skewed relations keep 
third-world countries dependent on the First World in an unending cycle of parasitic 
networks in trade relations (Amin 1974; Cardoso and Faletto 1979). 
 
Third-world precious minerals are extracted in exchange for a few manufactured goods. 
These often leave countries poor and without much gain from their raw materials. In the 
modern day of hyper-modernity, corporate capitalism and informational economy, Third 
World countries find themselves still dependent on technological advances in the Western 
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world for much of their survival. It is my view that the dependence of Third World countries 
on Western technology continues to hold them prisoner to parasitic relations between the 
two. These relations are now also most evident through the intensification of corporate 
capitalism through SEZ to which the aerotropolis is part. 
 
Although the idea of SEZ was formalized only in the last 60 – 70 years, according to Saggers 
(2015) it has existed for centuries as a means of external trade, where traders secure strategic 
locations and ports to store and to exchange their goods. According to Stagger (2015) the 
initial SEZ in the 1970s operate like countries, isolated to the coastal areas and now, the 
strategy developed to shift in the heart of the country and expanding into large regions and 
towns. In this respect, China has launched SEZ on a far greater scale before and provided a 
platform for attracting FDI which, according to Saggers (2015), supported its export- 
oriented manufacturing sector and the development of China into an economic power house. 
According to Saggers (2015) a 2008 study suggested that African countries began using the 
SEZs to shift their economic focus from import substitution to export-led growth in the late 




Investment in African zones is predominantly in agroprocessing and other natural resource- 
based production. The challenge in the successful operation of the SEZ to attract FDI is to 
sustain the zone. That is to attract TNCs and MNCs to the zones through various incentives 
such as tax concessions and tax breaks (Bond 2002; Bond 2003, Rodriguez-Pose and 
Tijmstra 2005; Saggers 2015). Recent trends involve the zone moving away from traditional 
EPZ  to   the   direction   of   becoming  broader   wide   SEZs   as   multiuse   development 
encompassing  industrial,  commercial,  residential  and  even  tourism  activities;  or  the 
direction of specific high-end services like ICT and bio tech (Saggers 2015). 
 
Improvement plans of SEZ resonate with the aerotropolis plans. This is because the 
aerotropolis not only stimulates business opportunities but is also a place for leisure, play 
and entertainment (Kasarda 2018; Rogerson 2018). It is our view that such development 
also come at a huge cost to the host communities through labour exploitation, loss of tax 
revenue and unfair advantage MNCs and TNCs over local enterprises of the host country, 
amongst other challenges (Bond 2002; Bond 2003; Rodriguez-Pose and Tijmstra 2005; 
Saggers 2015; Scheepers 2012). 
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The removal of minimum wage requirements and basic working condition requirements 
resulting in poor working conditions is also major concern in SEZ (Saggers 2015). 
 
The post-development or anti-development critique draws its mantle from the thought 
traditions of the dependency and Marxist schools and shares striking similarities with the 
post-colonial and de-colonial schools too (Amin 1974, 1997, 2011; Dussel 1998; Grosfoguel 
2011). These critiques elevate their analysis to the world system and reject mainstream 
development discourse on account of its Western hegemonic entrapments. They argue that 
the definition of development and progress, and solutions thereto, are framed within narrow 
interests of the Western world. Western views are then forced indiscriminately onto the rest 
of the non-Western world (Pieterse 2000). In the age of hyper-modernity, corporate 
capitalism and informational economy, progress mean modern age of living. As such, 
according to Kasarda, the aerotropolis is the next form of living that will define and 
reconfigure people’s use of space and how we exist within specific spaces in the 21st century 
(Kasarda and Linday 2011). This point further highlights the fact that development also has 
an intrinsic racial and cultural chauvinism, which requires critical examination. 
 
 
Furthermore, the post-development critique also decries development’s neo-liberal capitalist 
economic model of Western modernity. This critique is advanced more particularly by the 
degrowth and the post-growth schools, both of which are inspired by post-development 
theory (Singh 2019). Both the degrowth and the post-growth schools also share similarities 
even when they are also marked by some differences. One such common attribute they share 
is that, they are both rooted in a post-capitalist era and are varyingly opposed to the idea of 
economic growth and seek alternative ways of being in a post-capitalist society 
(Chertkovskaya 2017; Koch 2020; Singh 2019). Both these schools believe that the demise 
of capitalism is immanent and that a post-capitalism era is foreseeable due to capitalism’s 
rapacious extractive forces and its deleterious impact to the ecosystem and, its generation of 
inequalities in society (Bluhdorn 2017; Singh 2019). Bluhdorn (2017) states that the 
declining growth rates since the 1970s and international banking crisis and the subsequent 
politics of austerity, points to the fact that capitalism is in critical condition, more than at 
any time since the end of the Second World War. Both the degrowth and post-growth school 
thus offer alternatives to a post-capitalism era, which is founded on the satisfaction of human 
needs and conservation of the ecosystem, rather than capitalism’s promises of mass 
consumption and wealth accumulation. 
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According to Chertkovskaya (2017) and Singh (2019) degrowth highlights that growth is 
undesirable and comes at high costs such as ecological degradation and that it also comes 
with  social  injustice  and  exploitation,  which  is  inherent  to  the  current  growth  driven 
capitalist system. The degrowth school therefore argue for multiple ways of being within 
the overarching goal of social justice, ecological sustainability and human flourishing 
(Chertkovskaya 2017). Small scale, local level alternatives and non-profit driven 
collaborative economy serving social needs, are hallmarks of degrowth (Bluhdorn 2017; 
Chertkovskaya 2017). According to Bluhdorn (2017), degrowth is a liberation from excess’ 
and embraces voluntary simplicity, which is believed to facilitate a lifestyle that is more 
fulfilling. In the degrowth school, the idea of growth is rejected. 
 
The post-growth school advocates for a shift from a monetary growth or exchange value 
orientation to a bio-physical and use-value as a foundation of driving the economy, and 
where the economic system is subordinated to ecological limits (Kock 2020). In a post- 
growth economy, production and consumption do not exceed environmental limits, and 
limits of economic and social inequality are defined. Furthermore, the economy ensures 
provision of adequate need satisfiers and encourages ecological and social transformation 
(Kock 2020). According to Kock (2020), post-growth school does not imply abandoning 
growth in all sectors of the economy but an overall deprioritisation of economic growth in 
policy making. 
 
On the basis of the forgoing, it is reasonable to argue that both degrowth and the post-growth 
schools are opposed to the mode of development inspired by the aerotropolis, which is about 
facilitation of global corporate capitalism and FDI attraction, along the growth model. It is 
driven more by a combination of private business imperatives and state power and caters 
mostly for the privileged air passengers and TNCs (Pleumarom 2017). Aerotropolis projects 
do not encourage participatory democracy and civic empowerment. Bridger (2015) also 
notes that aerotropolis projects often mean building over farmland, forests and wildlife 
habitats, and evictions of rural communities and loss of fertile soil and food production. 
 
Post-development scholars therefore reject development and also argue that it has failed 
because of its universalist ambitions – the wish to implement Western forms everywhere, 
disregarding the socio-economic, political and cultural clashes that often militate against 
Western modernity. Within this school, development is accused of cultural imperialism and 
for being complicit in neo-colonialism and coloniality (Amin 1974, 1997, 2011; Bergesen 
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and Wallerstein 1983; Dussel 1998, 2002; Escobar 2004; Grosfoguel 2011; Hopkins and 
Wallerstein  1980).  Post-development  advocates  such  as  Arturo  Escobar  and  Gustavo 
Esteva, challenge the ideological concept of development as articulated in the Western 
tradition   of   modernisation   theory.   They  advocate   searching   for   an   alternative   to 
development  –  that  is,  opening  the  idea  of  development  to  other  interpretations, 
formulations, perspectives and influences beyond the Eurocentric frame. The words of 
Kasarda explaining the ‘universality’ and ‘replicability’ of the aerotropolis the world over, 
using New Songdo as his template, is incisive in this respect when he states: 
 
““There’s a pattern here, repeatable,” each [city] will be built faster, better, and 
more cheaply than the ones that came before. “It’s going to be a cool city, a smart 
city!”...We start from here and then we are going to build twenty new cities like this 
one, using this blue print. Green! Growth! Export!”” 
 
(Kasarda and Linday 2011:5) 
 
 
The forgoing words by Kasarda confirm the concerns of post-development scholars about 
the  racial  and  cultural  chauvinism  and  imperialism  of  development  discourse,  which 
Kasarda has now come to represent. As stated earlier, for Kasarda, aerotropolis represents a 
modern universal way of living which must not only be adopted everywhere but must also 
follow a template which he designed. 
 
Development’s complicity with racism, neo-colonialism, and coloniality was exposed in the 
 
1940s with the UN Charter and President Harry S Truman’s speech. It is thus vital to decode 
salient points in extracts, to decode this supremacist notion of development. I mentioned 
earlier that epistemic racism  was at the heart of the development enterprise. Truman’s 
speech animated the Eurocentric supremacist thinking of the 1884–1885 Berlin Conference. 
Only European nations had been summoned to that conference, which aimed – among others 
– to devise ways to “save” Africans from themselves. 
 
 
The contradiction here was that the conference would usher in “the scramble for Africa” 
that set Africa’s slide to underdevelopment. In an invitation letter authored by Otto von 
Bismarck, the chancellor of Germany and chairman of the Berlin Conference in Germany 
in 1885, 14 major Western powers of the world were called to negotiate to end the confusion 
over the control of Africa. Many scholars argue that this conference began a process of 
imperial domination that was to open Africa, its peoples and natural resources to untold 
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Committee delegate: The Conference Commission requests your immediate presence in Germany as a 
delegate to the Berlin Conference. You and your delegation, experts in the areas of economics, 
geography, ethics, military history, and international negotiations, have been appointed by your 
government to represent them in this process. Each nation present will be allowed to participate in a 
three-day review and deliberation to determine the fate of the African Continent. Your timely presence 
in Berlin by 15 November 1884 will allow your country to be heard. As Chairman of the Berlin 
Conference, I assure you that your task will be difficult, but of supreme importance to the future of 
Africa, Europe, and the entire world. 
 
(Von Bismarck 1884) 
 
 
The forgoing words in Von Bismarck’s letter to European nations displays Eurocentric 
supremacist thinking in the same way that Kasarda conceives the aerotropolis to be 
universally resonant and potentially beneficial for South Africa. This supremacist idea is 
rested on is the belief that Euro-American -centric or western epistemology can resolve 
African  development challenges. The  generally poor community participation in 
aerotropolis projects observed by Bridger (2015) is also telling in this respect. The 
Eurocentric supremacist sentiment in development is also evident in the following passage 
from President Truman’s speech stated earlier: 
 
Their (subalterns) food is inadequate. They are victims of disease. Their economic life is primitive 
and stagnant. Their poverty is a handicap and a threat both to them and to more prosperous areas. For 






A careful reading of the above excerpt also highlights epistemic racism in development 
through what de Sousa Santos (2007) called “abyssal line thinking”. He explained that 
abyssal line thinking divides social reality into two realms, the realm of “this side of the 
line” which is the Eurocentric, and the realm of “the ‘other’ side of the line”. He explained 
that the division is such that “the other side of the line” vanishes as reality becomes non- 
existent and is indeed produced non-existent in any relevant or comprehensible way of 
being. De Sousa Santos further explained that whatever is produced as non-existent is 
radically excluded, because it represents the “other” (de Sousa Santos 2007). 
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This assertion situates Truman’s thinking in what Argentinian sociologist Enrique Dussel 
(1998) calls a Eurocentric paradigm. Here, Europe is believed to have the exceptional 
international characteristic of rationality which is universal, to justify its superiority over 
“the other”. This Eurocentric underpinning of Truman’s speech hides the point which de 
Sousa Santos’s “abyssal line” illuminates, namely the epistemological racism embedded in 
his thinking. That is, the presumption of the non-existence or incapacity of “these people” 
on the “other side” to know what is best for themselves. Truman’s speech in 1949 was a 
continuation and re-affirmation of the 19th century racist colonial “construction” of the 
subaltern as people who lacked rationality. It also constructed an essentialism of – and 
absolutized – Eurocentrism, under the guise of development and globalisation and now 
through Kasarda’s aerotropolis (a neo-colonial apparatus). 
 
The abyssality of development therefore circumscribes alternative epistemologies from 
influencing development or ideas about the aerotropolis. In this sense, development is thus 
understood only within the strict parameters of Western modernity and epistemology, and 
as understood by Kasarda, the founder and lead expert and consultant on aerotropolis 
planning the world over. 
 
Based on the forgoing score of continuities of old paradigms into “new” ones, the more 
radical post-development thinkers – such as Lushaba (2009) – want to believe that 
development is not a phenomenon beginning in the 1940s and 1950s. Instead, Lushaba 
traced it back to the colonial “civilising” mission era. He suggested that development is a 
colonial project and is part of the “civilising” mission crusade, for regions of the world that 
had remained “outside of history.” He cautioned that development should therefore be 
understood to be intricately linked to the evolution of European societies, mainly starting in 
the enlightenment era of the 15th  century when science and reason triumphed over faith. 
This was the era of knowledge and reason that would not only record scientific laws of 
nature but also rules governing the entire enterprise of knowledge production (Lushaba 
2009:7). According to him, these transformations generated a body of “universal” 
knowledge, now referred to as the discourse of modernity or modern social theory of 
development. These theories account for history and progress, with Europe held up as a 
universal exemplar to the rest. Mitchelle (2000) explained how Eurocentric modernism 
established itself across time and space, as follows: 
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The modern age presents a particular view of geography, in which the world has a singular centre, 
Europe... that imagines itself a continent in reference to which all other regions are to be located; and 
an understanding of history in which there is only one unfolding time, the history of the West, in 
reference to which all other histories must establish and receive their meaning. 
 
For Mkandawire (2005), the above extract suggests that development means modernising 
and modernity – which rested only in Eurocentric epistemology, as was proudly claimed in 
Truman’s speech (cited earlier). Against this background of development as a synonym with 
modernity, certain radical post-development thinkers have illuminated continuities of 
colonialism within the modernist discourse. All of these are said to serve the same 
Eurocentric influences and interests. 
 
Mitchell, in an endeavour to locate Africa’s underdevelopment within the larger project of 
modernity (in Lushaba 2009), demarcated modernity into three epochal moments: 
 
 
• The era of early modernity or “mercantile capitalism” (15th to 18th century); 
 
• Modernity proper or “capitalist modernity” (18th to mid-20th century); and 
 
• The era of late or hypermodernity (late 20th century). 
 
 
These eras, according to Mitchell (2000), should not be read as mutually exclusive. In each 
of them are to be found elements, processes, and structures that also characterise the other 
periods. In the era of early-modernity (mercantile capitalism), the main aim was to construct 
Africa and its peoples as inhuman, mysterious, barbaric, backward, uncivilised and in need 
of rescuing and enlightenment. Civilisation was the marker of development and modernity 
(Mkandawire 2005). This discourse tried to morally legitimise the imposition of colonialism 
in Africa. Especially important were the processes of mercantile capitalism’s slave trade 
and the expropriation of surplus value and minerals for Europe’s own development, free of 
moral  inhibitions  (Lushaba  2009).  In  simple  terms,  enlightenment  necessitated  itself 
morally in Africa, while clearing a way for mercantile capitalism to launch and to plunder 
the natural resources of Africa. 
 
According to Lushaba (2009), the early modern and mercantile capitalist process reached 
its peak coincidentally at the time of the changing European society in the 18th  century. 
These changes led to industrialisation and capitalism as new markers of modernity or 
development. He added that the capitalist mode of production – a distorted, dependent 
capitalism – and its evolving social and political systems were spreading into the rest of the 
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colonial world, as part of the colonial “civilising” mission. In the process they destroyed all 
other forms of existence that were different or averse to Western forms of modernity. 
 
The era of hyper-modernity - mid-20th  century- which is marked by corporate capitalism, 
global cities and aerotropolis (Bridger 2015; Kasarda and Lindsay 2011; Sassen 2015) and 
informational economy and cyber economy, as we have stated earlier, is no different from 
the preceding ‘development’ eras. He states that this era also superimposed hegemonic 
capitalist principles of exchange value in areas that had remained outside it, such as 
intellectual property rights (Lushaba 2009). Lushaba claimed that a strong correlation still 
exists between the current global capitalism, neo-liberal development discourse, and the 
enlightenment discourse of modernity. Global capitalism and neo-liberalism are also driven 
by the Rostowian market fundamentalist rationale, which also views Eurocentric modernity 
as the panacea for Africa’s development. What remains constant is the false, epistemically 
racist assumption that Western modernity, in whichever forms it declares itself universally, 
means development. 
 
Western forms of knowledge and standards injected only themselves forcefully, into 
development, and excluded other forms. Abrahamsen (2000) correctly argues that 
“development” was not negotiated but rather enforced on the global South through 
coloniality of power. With the understanding that development is both a power and political 
determinant, she lucidly explains thus: 
 
The problematisation of a particular aspect of human life “development” is not natural or inevitable, 
but historically contingent and dependent on power relations that have already rendered a particular 
topic a legitimate object of investigation. 
 
Following this logic and understanding of the uneven North–South power relations, 
Abrahamsen  proposed  that  scientific  enquiry  –  that  is,  “development”  –  should  be 
understood in the context of the prevailing balance of forces at the time of their formation 
(Abrahamsen 2000). 
 
It is no surprise therefore that everything in the name of “development” or mainstream 
development is understood, explained, and fashioned within the Western-centric and 
Eurocentric modernity. Aina (1993) explained this Eurocentric modernisation as the process 
of social change, in which undeveloped countries acquire characteristics common to more 
developed societies. 
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With all the foregoing accounts of the ensuing debates in development discourse, I wish to 
highlight that the contestation continues to this day. The contestation is between the 
hegemonic form and practices of development that are led by the UN and its various 
agencies, versus those who are against it, for reasons mentioned earlier, namely 
Eurocentrism, imperialism, inequality and racism. On this score, I believe that the struggle 
for development finds itself contested. That is a contestation within development itself 
which is between the neo-liberal school and the popular humanist-oriented development 
thinkers – who do not reject development per se but want to see it reformed to serve popular 
interests. However, there is also a contestation from the anti-development protagonists, who 
are fundamentally opposed to the idea of development itself and advocate for a complete 
overhaul of development thinking. 
 
Furthermore, race theory is also making inroads into the development discourse, with race 
scholars providing a race critique of development (Kalpana 2017; Kothari a2006; b2006; 
Power 2006 and White 2002). This is as a result of the denialism of the problem of race in 
development discourse in general (Kalpana 2017). Kalpana (2017) reinforces some of the 
critiques of development such as the post-development and de-colonial critiques referred 
earlier. He stated that mainstream development, by its interventionist  projects and neo- 
liberal capitalism, including the denigration of colonialism and racism as regrettable 
experiences of “the past”, delegitimizes the question of global inequalities. According to 
Kalpana this also obfuscates how inequalities are structured by and articulated through race 
(Kalpana 2017). He stated that the universal neo-liberal emphasis on development neglects 
the question of the extractive and accumulative aspects of global capitalist processes that 
occur  within  development   itself.  Furthermore,   development   hides   its   own  role  in 
reproducing and intensifying both inequality and differences across space (Kalpana 2017). 
 
For Power (2006), the racist logic of development is also visible in the global distribution 
of poverty. According to Power, in the US poverty affects people of colour more than 
whites. He thus understands development not simply as a phenomenon concerning 
“underdeveloped” and “developed” regions of the world, in which the former areas must 
developed, but rather as  a race essentialist enterprise (Power 2006). Power decried the 
silence of the problem of race in development, and states that it is unjustified, given the 
overt racial character of development and its material distribution. 
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Also decrying the elision of the race issue in development, White (2002) insisted that racism 
in development is foregrounded by its very silencing. She stated that the contrast with 




There is virtually no analysis of development institutions by race, showing how many people of what 
racial origin occupy which places in the hierarchy. There are very few programmes of anti-racism or 
racism awareness training. There is no analysis of differential outcomes of development policies b y 
race. Race is rarely even mentioned in development studies… Even the powerful critiques of 
‘Eurocentrism’ or ‘neo-colonialism’ in development rarely address issues of race directly (p.407). 
 
 
She further stated that race relations and their material outcomes are propounded through 
development’s complicity with global racial capitalism. She opined that global racial 
capitalism continually sustains global racial inequalities between countries in the global 
North versus those in the South, with white people being privileged (White 2002). The same 
inequalities are also evident within a single country. 
 
The South African development discourse finds itself in this milieu of continued struggle 
over development, and the ensuing ideological contestations over it politically and 
intellectually, on the one hand, and the problem of racialised inequality and poverty in wider 
society on the other hand. Within this contentious ideological and political environment, 
South Africa had to chart its own development trajectory after 1994 when it emerged from 
the democratic transition, haunted by apartheid’s racialist past. Much of the racial spatial 
design of South Africa remains the same today (Maharaj, Khan and Desai 2017). Mbeki 
(1998) confirmed this point in his two nation-state addresses in the National Assembly. He 
stated that the end of apartheid and the transition to democratic rule did not bring much 
socio-economic transformation for most black people. The rural areas or rural municipalities 
– former Bantustans – continue to be largely black and are still grossly underdeveloped and 




It is no surprise that South Africa’s development discourse was, and still is, a subject of 
fierce political contestation. This started in the 1990s with the contestation over the 
macroeconomic development strategy of South Africa. The conflict was between the 
Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP) introduced in 1994 and the Growth 
Economic Development and Redistribution (GEAR) introduced in 2006. It is my view that 
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the ideological conflict over development in South Africa between GEAR and the RDP, is 
representative of the ideological contestations in development discussed earlier. I further 
argue that this contestation continues to this day and has lodged itself within LED discourse 
in South Africa, even after the RDP was abandoned as a policy. In the context of this study, 
the remaining question is how will the aerotropolis project playout over the existing 
development  problems  in  South  Africa  or  Ekurhuleni  in  particular,  such  as  racialised 
poverty and inequality, unemployment and as suggested by Burger (2009), state corruption. 
Whose interests is being served by the aerotropoli project in light of the said problems is 




In this chapter I have provided a critical reflection on the broad history of development, 
including the main issues confronting development discourses in general. I have critically 
historicised development and articulated its mission over time, while also reflecting on its 
counter-narrative. It is clear from the preceding pages that development discourse continues 
to be defined, understood and practiced within the Eurocentric-American-centric epistemic 
paradigm that founded it. Western modernity is therefore the code name for development. 
The aerotropolis is thus a marker of development which is transposed by modernity into the 
modern age of corporate capitalism, informational economy and cyber economy. The aim 
of the aerotropolis is to invigorate corporate capitalism by providing the infrastructure that 
supports global trade flows to meet demands for trade speed in the 21 century. It is also 
clear that these developments by modernity are marked by racism, epistemicide, corporate 
dominance and erosion of popular community participation in development governance. 
They continually reproduce inequalities between and within nations and along racial lines. 
The aerotropolis is thus shooting modernity into the future. It is thus also clear in this chapter 
that development is sitting, at the very least, on an ideologically and politically contested 
terrain. This terrain is also marked by contradictions from which development has failed to 
exorcise itself. 
 
Development  discourse  continues  to  reflect  only  Western  value  systems  and  interests 
through epistemic racism. In the process, it turns a blind eye to the veritable super-category 
of systemic racism that underlies its founding and operations. Furthermore, in its racialist 
practices development it produces parasitic relations between the global North and the 
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global South in favour of the former. Global south still struggles not only to influence the 
discourse, but also to resolve the reeling challenge of poverty it inherits from development. 
 
As I have also made clear in this chapter, racism in development and its inherent 
contradiction of producing uneven development between and within nations, has attracted 
criticism. The critics range from reformists who would rather have development 
democratised and “pluriversalised,” to those who reject the concept outright. The latter 
deem it a colonial civilising mission project aimed at deceiving and plundering the global 
South. 
 
Many of the contestations within general development discourses, which i discussed in this 
chapter, have greatly influenced many of the ongoing debates about development in South 
Africa. South Africa itself a victim of colonialism and apartheid, is confronted with these 
persisting challenges of development such as disproportionate distribution of development 
amongst its citizens along racial line and racialised poverty and inequality. These challenges 
continue to persist at the time when South Africa is undertaking the development of 
aerotropolis projects, which are said to be catalysts for stimulating economic development. 
 
In the next chapter, I reflect on development discourses in South Africa and on LED 
specifically. This will allow the reader a clear picture of how discourses on LED in South 
Africa fit into and are influenced by the broader global hegemonic discourses of 
development and their contestations. 
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In this chapter I look closely at the general development discourse in South Africa, and 
specifically at how this discourse plays out through LED theory and practice. This chapter 
maps how the general body of the development discourse discussed in Chapter 2, has come 
to define development and LED thinking and practice in South Africa. The purpose is to 
identify both continuities and discontinuities in mainstream development thinking, and to 
show how these play out in development thinking and practice in South Africa. 
 
The chapter begins by framing the broad development discourse in South Africa and its 
internal issues and debates. Following that, I focus on LED discourse and reflect on certain 
key issues in the thinking and practice of LED in South Africa, including contestations 
within the field. Following these reflections, I briefly discuss LED discourse in Ekurhuleni. 
This  exercise  allows  the  reader  clarity  about  how  the  broad  development  and  LED 
discourses in South Africa have come to inform LED ideas and contestations within the 
LED debate.   Following those reflections, I present the general debates on the idea of the 
aerotropolis for further reference to LED. This is followed by a conclusion. 
 
3.2 DEVELOPMENT DISCOURSE IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
I argue elsewhere that in Africa and South Africa in particular, the genealogy of modern 
development discourse dates to the liberation struggle against colonialism and apartheid, if 
not earlier (Plaatjie 2013 (a)). That struggle was for the emancipation of Africans from 
colonial occupation and oppression to achieve self-determination. I have also argued that 
African nationalism and decolonisation constituted the development agenda for Africa and 
South  Africa  (Plaatjie  2013   (a)).  The  objective  of  this  development   agenda  was 
encapsulated in 1967 by Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere’s doctrine of Ujamaa – African 
socialism – and self-reliance as a developmental blueprint for Africa (Nyerere 1967; 1987). 
That development agenda would be one that was originated and charted by Africans 
themselves free from colonial and imperial forces. 
 
I have also argued that liberation and decolonisation were cardinal elements that would 
prepare the ground from which an African development discourse was to arise (Plaatjie 
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2013 (a)). I further note that the triumph of the nationalist movement over colonialism, and 
the achievement of independence for many African states – beginning in the late 1950s and 
concluding  with  the  democratic  transition  of  South  Africa  in  1994  –  was  met  with 
coloniality (Plaatjie 2013 (a)). Coloniality, despite the end of colonial rule, continues to 
define  much  of  the  development  discourse  to  this  day.  Maldonado-Torres  (2007:23) 
clarified the difference between colonialism and coloniality when he wrote that: 
 
 
While the former (colonialism) denotes a political and economical relation in which the sovereignty 
of a nation or a people rests on the power of another nation, which makes such a nation and empire, 
(coloniality) instead, refers to long-standing patterns of power that emerged as a result of colonialism, 
but that define culture, labor, intersubjective relations, and knowledge production well beyond the 
strict limits of colonial administration. 
 
During the political transition of South Africa in 1994, the government of the day, which 
was led by the ANC, found itself having to contend with two streams of ideological heritage. 
That is, the liberation struggle’s ideological heritage on the one hand, versus the prevailing 
forces of coloniality and the modernist hegemonic forces of Euro-American-centric 
paradigms. I argue that both these influences have shaped, in various ways, the nature of 
development discourse in post-1994 South Africa. This includes the nature of contestations 
over development. For example, the liberation struggle’s ideological blueprint of the ANC 
came to be understood and echoed by the Freedom Charter from 1955 onwards. The 
Freedom Charter declared its objectives as follows: 
 
 
• That people shall govern 
 
• That all national groups shall have equal rights 
 
• The land shall be shared amongst those who work it 
 
• Equality before the law 
 
• People shall share in the country’s wealth 
 
• All shall enjoy equal human rights 
 
• There shall be work and security 
 
• There shall be houses, security and comfort 
 
• Doors of learning and culture shall be opened 
 























(Congress of the people 1955). 
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The Freedom Charter’s call for the mineral wealth, banks and monopoly industry to be 
restored to the ownership of people, including the right to education and housing, drew 
much ideological debate from the broader tradition of the socialist struggle. The Freedom 
Charter stood averse to western hegemonic forms and conception of development at the 
time, which as I have stated earlier was influenced by neo-liberalism and Rostow economic 
growth model (Rist 1997; Rostow 1960). I believe that the socialist ideological orientation 
of the Freedom Charter was later also echoed by the RDP in post-apartheid South Africa. 
 
Shortly after South Africa’s transition to democracy in 1994, the ANC government shifted 
and substituted the socialistic ideological traction of the Freedom Charter (expressed by 
RDP) into the neo-liberal trajectory.  This trajectory resonated with  western hegemonic 
forms and conceptions of development and was eventually expressed through GEAR. These 
changes were the result of the pressures of ascendency of neo-liberal globalisation which 
started to intensify in the 1980, and the international financial institutions and development 
agencies (Bond 2002).  This ideological shift from the socialist  RDP to the neo-liberal 
GEAR began a long ideological feud within the ANC. It was a source of tension between 
the ANC and its alliance partners, Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) and 
the South African Communist Party (SACP), which almost led to a split of the alliance in 
2002 (Matjila 2010; Pillay 2006). These ideological rifts between the popular socialist and 
participatory people-centred development forms of the RDP and the macroeconomic-centric 
development forms of GEAR, continue subtly to this day and manifest in the development 
discourse in South Africa, especially through LED. 
 
The RDP was based on an integrated socio-economic policy framework. This was based on 
the following six principles: 
 
 
• People building process, 
 
• An integrated and sustainable program, 
 
• Nation building, 
 
• Peace and security, 
 





The idea behind the philosophy of the RDP was to transform the state to serve the interests 
of all people, with the state as the principal entity guiding the economy and society. 
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According to Cosmos (2006) the state itself was supposed to foster ‘representative, 
participatory and direct democracy in partnership with civil society on the basis of informed 
and empowered citizens. Cosmos (2006) further adds that, the idea about the RDP was for 
the state to develop the democracy necessary for ‘popular development through state- 
controlled corporatist institutions. The same idea was held by the freedom charter. GEAR, 
by contrast, articulated the discourse of development within the thought-tradition of the 
liberal school (Bond 2003; 2010). That is, the idea of a symbiotic relation of cause and effect 
between economic growth and development, and the trickledown theory. That is to say, 
economic growth leads naturally to development for all. 
 
GEAR meant a radical shift from redistribution to fiscal austerity (SAHO 2014). According 
to Cosmos (2006) GEAR represented an ideological shift from state developmentalism - 
with people at the centre - to market-led growth.  For GEAR, the aim was attracting foreign 
investment and this was done by impressing the IMF and WB by adhering to their free- 




• Government  budget  cuts  and  increase  in  user-fees  for  public  services  and 
privatisation of state enterprises; 
• The lifting of price controls, subsidies and other distortions of market forces; 
 
• Liberalisation of currency control and currency devaluation; 
 
• Higher interest rates and deregulation of local finances; 
 
• Removal of import barriers (trade tariffs and quotas); and 
 
• An emphasis on promotion of export, above all other economic priorities. 
 
 
As stated earlier, to this end, South Africa has shown significant effort to respond to the 
forgoing listed dictates of the neo-liberal order in various ways. Key amongst these was the 
establishment of SEZ and or IDZ in Port Elizabeth (Coega IDZ), East London (ELIDZ), 
and Richards Bay (RBIDZ) (Tang 2008), amongst others. According to Luthuli and 
Houghton (2019(a)) these SEZs remove barriers for international trade and promote FDI 
attraction by offering corporations tariff-free trade zones. The aerotropolis, as stated earlier, 
is one such another infrastructure. 
 
Under GEAR policy, some mile stones such as fiscal deficit and inflation and government 
consumption targets were slightly met, with figures of 2.2%, 5.4% and 18% respectively 
54  
reported in 2000 (SAHO 2014). According to SAHO (2014) the most visible success of 
GEAR regarding GDP was seen the reduction of the negative growth rate of the early 
nineties. However, despite GEAR’s achievements, private investment, job creation and 
GDP growth indicators were low and social challenges of the country such as poverty 
reduction, employment creation, and inequality remained (SAHO 2014). 
 
Nonetheless, the period from 2006 to 2011 registered some improvement with the reduction 
of poverty and hunger (Lehohla 2014; Mbatha 2014; Paton 2014). According to Paton 
(2014), a study by Statistics South Africa (StatsSA) found that the percentage of South 
Africans living below R620 per person per month declined from 57% in 2006, to 46% in 
2011. Paton (2014) added that the study showed that the proportion of people in absolute 
deprivation dropped from 27% to 20%. However, Mbatha (2014) warned that 
notwithstanding the improved poverty and hunger statistics, the gap between the poor and 
the rich had not improved. He stated that the Gini coefficient – a measure of inequality with 
zero meaning total equality – was 0.69 in 2011, compared with 0.7 in 2009 and 0.72 in 2006. 
 
Mbatha (2014) suggested that the improvement in poverty and hunger reduction in the 
 
2006–2011 period was also due to income grants for the poor. Despite their aim of relieving 
short-term hunger, such grants have become a source of livelihood in South Africa. 
 
There are now an estimated 16.6 million beneficiaries which is an increase from 2.6 million 
in 1997, to 16.6 million in 2012, and stands now at 17 million in 2020 (Anon 2019; Mbatha 
2014; Paton 2014). For Mbatha (2014) this means more people receive grants than have 
jobs in South Africa. There are many reasons to explain this slight improvement in the 
reduction of hunger and poverty during the period 2006–2011. The general consensus is 
that the reduction is attributable to government’s expanded social welfare grants, such as 
payment of monthly stipends to children, pensioners and disabled (Lehohla 2014; Mbatha 
2014; Paton 2014). Another factor contributing to the improvement could be AsgiSA. This 
was government’s strategy aimed at mitigating the failure of the macro-economic strategy 
of GEAR, in the hope of reaching government’s objective to reduce poverty by 2010, and 
halving unemployment by 2014 from 28% in 2004 to 14% by 2012 (SAHO 2014). 
 
According to  Van  der  Walt  (2007) AsgiSA’s  intervention  to  address  the challenge of 
poverty and unemployment meant aiming to achieve 6% economic growth by 2010. This 
was to be achieved in two stages: 4.5% average annual growth rate from 2005 to 2009, and 
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6% between 2010 and 2014. She added that this growth rate was to be achieved through 
macro-economic programmes, infrastructure programmes, industrial strategies, skills and 
education initiatives, second or informal economy intervention, and public administration 
issues. However, AsgiSA did not depart much from GEAR’s thrust of neo-liberal ideology, 
except when they involve “Black Economic Empowerment” (BEE) measures (Van der Walt 
2007). According to Van der Walt (2007), BEE contradicts neo-liberalism to the extent that 
it privileges black capitalist; however, he further states, BEE and neo-liberalism can also be 
partly reconciled through measures such as privatisation and outsourcing state operations to 
BEE companies. 
 
It is my view that during this period, BEE became the language of a transformative 
development discourse in South Africa – couched in terms related to “race” and “social 
justice.” Regretfully, BEE took on a political and nepotistic character that did not translate 
into the economic empowerment of masses, but only a select few (Nzimande 2007; Roger 
and Roger 2008). Thus, the mobilisation of “race” and “social justice” for BEE was 
successful in creating a small “black political middle class” and those closely associated 
with them (Roger and Roger 2008:699). Against this background of GEAR clearing and 
fertilising the ground, through deregulation and privatisation and acquisitions of state 
enterprises, BEE emerged. It was not a popular and mass-based economic-empowerment 
phenomenon but a degenerate class project of the political elite, as it was generally referred 
by (Nzimande 2007). Interestingly, the emphasis on “race” and “social justice” by 
government in advancing BEE did not cascade into development or LED discourse in the 
communities. 
 
As I will illustrate, government has been silent on the question of “race” and “social justice” 
in LED, if not deliberately demobilising those categories in that respect. However, both 
categories of race and social justice remain resilient in LED discourse in communities.  I 
thus believe that the BEE and AsgiSA programmes have become largely ineffective, with 
AsgiSA’s shared growth rhetoric also proving a pipe dream. Economic growth has failed to 




Under the Zuma administration, what became the developmental trajectory is found within 
the New Growth Path (NGP). An excerpt from Zuma’s State of Nation Address in June 
2009 qualifies this assertion. It reads: 
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It is my pleasure and honour to highlight the key elements of our programme of action. The creation 
of decent work will be at the centre of our economic policies and will influence our investment 
attraction and job creation initiatives. In line  with our undertakings, we have to forge ahead to 
promote a more inclusive economy. 
 
Zuma further stated that: 
 
 
There is growing consensus that creating decent work, reducing inequality and defeating poverty can 
only happen through a new path … to improve its [SA’s] performance in terms of labour absorption 
as well as the co mposition and rate of growth. 
 
(Economic Development Department (EDD) 2011) 
 
 
The NGP came into being in 2009 in response to the persistent challenge of unemployment 
and poverty. In 2010, South Africa still ranked among the ten countries with the worst 
unemployment in the world (Department of Development 2011:14). According to the NGP 
Framework, government aimed to curb the challenge of unemployment by generating five 
million jobs by 2020. 
 
This job creation was to be achieved through a combination of macro- and microeconomic 
policies that would create a favourable environment for supporting labour-absorbing 
activities. In addition, such policies would target economic sectors with the potential for 
mass labour absorption (EDD 2011). 
 
In terms of the macroeconomic policy, the Framework stated that government would be 
guided by a looser monetary policy and more restrictive fiscal policy, backed by 
microeconomic measures to contain inflation pressure and enhance competitiveness. These 
microeconomic measures meant the following: 
 
 
• Aiming for low and stable inflation and reducing investment costs through low 
interest rates; 
• Purchases of foreign currency; and 
 






Regarding the microeconomic policy, the Framework stated that policy at this level should 
involve  programmes  to  control  inflation  pressures  and  inefficiency,  combined  with 
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proactive   strategies   to   support   an   inclusive   economy,   social   equity  and   regional 
development. It further stated that government should support skills development and small 
business. Furthermore, government should intervene in the labour market to reduce red tape 
and bureaucratic delays (EDD 2011). As far as job creation was concerned, the Framework 
highlighted key job-absorbing sectors such as infrastructure, the agricultural value chain, 
the mining value chain, the green economy, the manufacturing sector, and tourism. Each 
sector had its own set targets for employment creation and job drives (EDD 2011:26). 
 
In addition to the NGP, in 2011 the Zuma administration introduced the National 
Development  Plan  (NDP)  “Vision  2030”.  This  was  a  plan  produced  by the  National 
Planning Commission, which was headed by the Minister in the Presidency, Trevor Manuel. 
The language of the NDP draws on the erstwhile RDP’s community-centred discourse of 
capacity building, skill development, poverty eradication, job creation, and inequality 
reduction.  All  these  points  were  to  be  achieved  through  GEAR  methods  such  as 
deregulation. 
 
The NDP, however, emphasises its core focus on enhancing human capabilities and those 
of the country, and on creating opportunities to eliminate poverty and reduce inequality by 
2030 (Manuel 2011). According to the NDP, human capabilities include education and 
skills, decent accommodation, nutrition, safe communities, social security, transport, and 
job creation. In addition, the NDP insists that to achieve its goal of eliminating poverty and 




• Increasing  exports,  focusing  on  areas  with  comparative  advantage  (mining, 
construction, agriculture, tourism, etc.). 
• Ensuring closer alignment with companies operating in sectors consistent with 
growth strategies. 
• Assisting the economy to absorb more labour. 
 
• Supporting small businesses, and developing finance institutions and public private 
incubators. 
• Improving skills base through better education and vocational training. 
 
• Increasing investment in social and economic infrastructure to lower the costs. 
 
Raising productivity and bringing more people into the mainstream economy. 
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• Reducing regulations in sectors where private sector is the main investor, such as 
broadband internet connectivity. 






Furthermore, according to the NDP report the NGP aligns with the NDP and spells out the 
actions required to realise the objectives of the NGP (Manuel 2011). The main difference is 
that the NDP covers a longer period and emphasises catalysts for development, and action 
plans that may differ from those of the NGP. 
 
While not discounting the positive intensions of both the NGP and the NDP, especially the 
call for a developmental state and its potential contribution to reducing hunger and poverty, 
Nattrass (2011) stated that the NGP was a utopic vision rather than a systematic plan of 
action. Nattrass stated that the NGP is confronted with the challenge of getting the buy-in 
of organised labour and business. For example, she stated that in contrast to the Asian 
developmental state model, the NGP is full of social democratic discourse akin to the Nordic 
social democratic model. 
 
There, constructive stakeholder representatives partnered with capital and gave workers 
greater voice, even when this meant keeping wage growth in line with productivity, to avoid 
squeezing profits or employment. Nattrass (2011) was sceptical about the possibility of this 
phenomenon ever coming to fruition in the context of South Africa. She stated that in this 
country, “trade unions are hostile to social democratic compromises and are quick to evoke 
a discourse of class struggle” Nattrass (2011:8). Furthermore, she stated that business would 
not approve of the idea of restraining executive pay. In support of Nattrass’ argument, I 
believe that the ambition of the NGP falsely assumes South Africa to be a post-dialectic 
utopia, which has transcended capital, race and class dichotomies (Plaatjie 2013(b)). As 
stated earlier, much of apartheid’s distribution of development and underdevelopment, and 




The NGP’s emphasis on macro-economic growth as a precursor to development (EDD 
 
2011) makes the NGP not radically different from GEAR. The NGP is therefore potentially 
incapable of delivering on its “radical economic transformation” mantra, for the wider 
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society. The “radical economic transformation” mantra has since, rapidly shoot off to new 
lows of alleged state capture. 
 
As I have mentioned elsewhere, the NGP stresses some values of the Freedom Charter. It 
would thus follow that the NGP should also echo the RDP. However, the RDP is not 
mentioned in the NGP, and redistribution occurs only “in the context of sustained growth” 
(Plaatjie 2013 (a)). In simple terms, this means that the NGP uses the same tools as those 
used by GEAR, namely growth and development nexus. 
 
The  NGP,  although  cloaked  with  certain  progressive  humanist  ideals  of  the  Freedom 
Charter, is located within and furthers the grand philosophical tradition of the hegemonic 
mainstream development thinking (referred to in Chapter 2) through GEAR. I argue that in 
principle, the NGP follows the dictates of the Washington consensus, the IMF and the WB. 
Together, these institutions advance a development agenda that is often viewed as the source 
of underdevelopment in the developing world and an engine for the reproduction of 
inequalities between nations and within in them, and along racial lines. It was no surprise 
therefore that the Zuma administration disappointed many people, especially those who 
espouse centre-left politics. They had thought that the Zuma administration would bring a 
radical ideological shift from the former president Thabo Mbeki’s Thatcherite centre-right 
politics in South Africa (Plaatjie 20 (a)). 
 
What is striking about the development discourse in South Africa though, from RDP to 
GEAR and through NGP and NDP, is that the triple challenges – poverty, unemployment 
and inequality – are worsening. In 2018, 27.5% of the population was unemployed (Henry 
2018; Daniel 2018). According to Wilkinson (2018), inequalities in South Africa are today 
more racially defined than before, as shown in Table 2 below. 
 
Table 2: 2015 Poverty by population group in SA 
 
Number of people living in poverty in SA by population group 
Population group Number % of population group 
African/Black 28,267,530 64.2% 
Coloured 1,989,304 41.3% 
Indian/Asian 79,460 5.9% 
White 47,494 1% 
60  






The table shows the disparities in the distribution of poverty. In 2015, nine out of every 10 
poor people in South Africa (93%) were black (Wilkinson 2018), which points to the 
racialised character of poverty. What is also interesting though is the silence on the question 
of race or racism, especially in academic development discourse in South Africa. This 
despite statistics confirming the racial character of inequality in South Africa, which 
continues into the present (Manuel 2011: Plaatjie 2018). That a country with such 
grotesquely racial past such as South Africa could elide, silence and not engender race in its 
mainstream development thinking and planning remains a curious contradiction of purpose 
for LED (Plaatjie 2018). 
 
This neglect of the race issue in development thinking and planning in South Africa, also 
confirms the observations of (Kalpana 2017; Kothari a2006; b2006; Plaatjie 2018; Power 
2006 and White 2002). These authors, as discussed in Chapter 2, are concerned about the 
conspicuous neglect of the question of race or racism in the development discourse in 
general. Race is important in development precisely because of the racialised histories from 
which development itself arose. In addition, development applies itself unequally over 
racialised spaces and beings. 
 
The silence about race or racism within the development discourse in South Africa confirms 
the  proclivity  of  development  to  generall y  depoliticise  development  (see  chapter  2). 
Development employs technical methods and instruments such as LED, in the hope that 
they will address social problems that are fundamentally racial in nature. 
 
Modiri (2012) also observes the problem of race denialism in South Africa, which he 
suggests a bulwark to many socio-political problems of South Africa. However, contrary to 
Kalpana (2017); Kothari (2006a; b2006b); Power (2006) and White (2002), who argue for 
mainstreaming race in development discourse, Modiri advocates for mainstreaming CRT in 
intellectual discourse, and by extension, to development discourse. 
 
CRT emerges from law. It started in the 1980s as a breakaway from critical legal studies 
scholarship which rested mainly on liberal ideology and principles such as color-blind 
equality and opportunity, and technocratic measures to eradicate racial bias (Gotanda 1995). 
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Accordingly, CRT arose to challenge the race-neutral ideal of color-blindness and the 
corollary principles of formal equality, opportunity, and merit (Bell 1995). It argues that the 
liberal canon produces a civil rights rhetoric of good faith that appears race-neutral, 
apolitical, and integrationist, when race is an inescapable intrinsic element in the practice, 
application, and enforcement of law. For CRT, race is socially significant category of 
perception and representation that must be confronted. They argue that the silencing of race 
in legal discourse risk to perpetuate narratives expressly concentrated in racial, and racist 
ideology (Gotanda 1995). Hence CRT advocated for race-consciousness to overturn the 
continuation of racial, and racist ideology in law. 
 
CRT understands racism and white supremacy as two sides of the same coin. It also 
understands racism as a structural, systemic problem that is produced economically, socially 
and politically and which, must be confronted in those terms. Racism is not an outcome of 
individual prejudice and hostility, which places the law as an apolitical mediator of race 
conflict, as suggested by liberals (Modiri 2012). It is structural and systemic. For Modiri, 
the problem of racism and the question of why blacks remain the underclass in a country 
with such a “progressive” Constitution signifies the need for CRT. The fact that even the 
“progressive” Constitution cannot undo the challenges such as poverty, illiteracy and 
joblessness disproportionately affect black people more, is a case in point. Modiri added 
that while the notion of formal racial equality is celebrated by privileged whites and black 
elites – assumed to be “the black middle class,” it remains a distant illusion for most blacks. 
The majority of black people find themselves trapped in open-air prisons of poverty and in 
the squatter settlements and townships of South Africa. 
 
I  want   to   underscore   my  agreement   with   Michael   Omi’s   and   Howard   Winant’s 
understanding of racial formations presented in White (2002). Omi and Winant understand 
“racial  formation”  as  a  socio-historical  process  which  arises  from  historically situated 
“racial projects”. These projects link and embed race within social structures (White 2002). 
I also agree partly with Omi and Winant that, a racial project is often aimed at reorganizing 
and redistributing resources along specific racial lines and that racial projects are not 
necessarily racist. They become racist only if they produce racial structures of domination. 
 
However,  I  differ  slightly  with  Omi  and  Winant’s  their  understanding  of  racism  as 
something that can also be ethnic. I understand racism as formulated in CRT discussed 
earlier. I also understand racism to be purely anti-black and enjoying the full support of 
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what Dladla (2017) calls historical power. That is, the enduring force and power of the 
violent history of institutionalized racist discourses, which deemed black people inferior. 
These discourses are historical reference points which make the inferiorisation of blacks 
more concrete and real, even when such representations are grotesquely absurd. I also 
understand racism to be based on the doubt over the humanity of the racialised people 
(Dladla 2017 and Magubane 2007). 
 
I make this distinction to avoid de-historicizing racism. De-historicizing racism can easily 
lead to reductionism of racism by conflating it with discrimination as racism’s moral 
equivalent. White, and Omi and Howard’s understanding of racism therefore does not make 
a distinction between racism and discrimination on moral grounds.  Such moral equivalence 
is often drawn precisely to avoid racism’s historical anti-black character. Such problematic 
formulations of racism, according to Modiri (2012), open the door to even more perverse 
and absurd forms of racism, such as colour-blind racism or, if I may add, even anti-white 
Jewish racism. Such problematic formulations have seen opinion makers such as Grosfoguel 
(2011) also declare Islamophobia a form of racism. These perverse and problematic 
formulations of racism unfortunately continue the disavowal of the recognition of fullness 
of the anti-black character of racism, and its oppressive structural operations against its 
victims particularly in development. 
 
Using Omi and Winant’s understanding of race formations, colonialism and apartheid were 
racist “racialist projects” of white domination. As White (2002) stated, they have imbedded 
race within social structures to continue racial domination and white privilege. This 
domination remains unchanged even under black rule (Dladla 2017 and Modiri 2012). LED 
discourse therefore also find itself confronted by the problem of race, and which manifests 
itself through racial distribution of development. The 1994 post-racial myth created in South 
Africa has perpetuated the denial of the operations of race and racism in South Africa. 
According to Modiri (2012), this myth falsel y assumed that race is a thing of the past and 
no   longer   matters   in   the   new   democratic   dispensation.   Accordingly,   this   myth 
systematically forces social, political and academic discourses such as LED in to colour- 
blindness, in the name of post-racialism and reconciling past racial differences. However, 
structures  of  race  and  racism  continues  to  define  much  of  development  outcomes 
emblematic through racial inequality. 
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It is my view therefore that, even when LED discourse appears to be a new phenomenon in 
the development discourse in South Africa, it ought to be understood against the background 
of the ideological evolution and tensions in development thinking in the broader 
development discourse, and in the South African development discourse in particular. It 
spans  from  the  ideological  blueprint  of  the  Freedom  Charter  to  the  post-1994  RDP 
paradigm, and later GEAR, which articulates itself through NGP and NDP, and the problem 
of racial inequality and racialised poverty persistence. These ideological tensions continue 
to this day, even when RDP is no longer an official government macro-economic 
development policy strategy. These unresolved ideological tensions in development 
discourse in South Africa have also extended themselves in LED thinking and practice. In 
the process they have caused confusion and lack of policy clarity on LED thinking and 
planning, and poor strategy for South Africa to deal with its development problems amongst 
which is unemployment, poverty and inequality. 
 
For the above reasons, LED is pulled in either direction of its competing schools’ 
methodological approaches and sometimes in the directions of both models simultaneously 
(Bond 2003; Patterson 2008). LED also continues to be confronted with the neglected 
problem of race, or racial inequality. This tension causes even more confusion and conflict 
across municipalities in South Africa. The lack of clarity about LED direction has led many 
to believe LED is a political rhetorical device which is appropriated to serve private rather 
than  collective  interests  (Rodriguez-Pose  and  Tijmstra  2004).  Others  suggest  that  the 
rhetoric of LED seduces communities into the idea that communities participate and have 
power in LED initiatives when this is not the case, especially with large project such as the 
aerotropolis (Pleumarom 2017; Ruiter 2005). In the next section, I reflect on the discourse 
of LED in South Africa. 
 
3.3 UNDERSTANDING LED IN SA 
 
The foregoing background of the genealogy and evolution of the development discourse in 
South Africa, enhances for the reader, the full understanding of LED discourse in South 
Africa (Plaatjie 2014). I argue that reading LED outside of this context incurs the risk of 
misreading LED as a new phenomenon that is detached from the broader doctrinaire of 
mainstream development thinking. As mentioned in Chapter 2, this doctrinaire was founded 
in the late 1940s or, even earlier. As stated earlier, this is the doctrinaire that suggests that 
western modernity amounts to development and that neo-liberal economic principles are the 
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route to achieving it.  In addition, misreading LED as a new phenomenon in South Africa 
risks obfuscating the continuities of the past into the present namely, the global power 
relations and hegemonic ideologies that define LED theory and practice. I argue that a 
careful reading of LED dictates that we should conceive it as a phenomenon of the grand 
narrative of development. It stretches from 14th-century Christian civilisation and the 
enlightenment era to the modernist era of 19th-century capitalism, and the current UN 
development  paradigm  (Kothari  2005;  Lushaba  2009  and  Rist  1997).  Ever  since  its 
founding in the 14th-century, to the present, development has continually produced 
inequalities between the global North and South countries and within nations (and also on 
racial lines), poverty and epistemic racism, which many post -development thinkers have 
lamented it about. 
 
 
By understanding LED within the broad mainstream development discourse, the concept 
can be appreciated as a recent dogma in development’s rhetoric tradition. LED becomes the 
new entrant into development’s arsenal of buzzwords such as “community development”, 
“basic human needs”, “rural development”, “sustainable development”, “participatory 
development”, “capacity building”, “human rights”, and “good governance”.   The use of 
these seductive phrases in the language of development is often hypnotize the unsuspecting 
and obfuscate and depoliticise development to conceal its insidious operations and failure 
in the 20th century (Plaatjie 2014). 
 
Notwithstanding, the finesse of LED remains resolute and has gained widespread popularity 
in the political, intellectual, and public social arenas of development issues (Plaatjie 2018; 
Rogerson 2005). It has become a new language and a “philosophy” of development, - a pre- 
requisite condition for addressing current development challenges (Bond 2003; Mbeba 
2014; Rodriguez-Pose and Tijmstra 2005). LED thinking is often said to respond positively 
to economic crises (Nel 2001). Rogerson (1997) argues that it serves specially to avert local 
economic decline. The seductive notion of ‘developmental local government’ – on which 
LED is expected to model itself - also popularises its alleged plausibility to address 
development challenges by invoking sentiments of a people-centred caring government. As 
stated earlier (see chapter 1) a developmental local government is a local government that 
is committed to working with citizens and groups in the community, to find sustainable 
ways to meet their social, economic and material needs and to improve the quality of their 
lives (Department of Provincial and Local Government 1998). 
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It is also no surprise that LED thinking has become the core development philosophy of the 
post-1994 South African government’s development agenda. This commitment to LED 
agenda started in the early 1990s with the Stutterheim LED project. As stated earlier, this 
period was marked by popular participatory democracy and the RDP as the ideological 
thrust of development in South Africa, with the state as the principal entity guiding the 
economy and society. The project was flagged as a successful story of LED in South Africa 
and as a model for all to follow (Mcwabeni in Bond 2000). This was despite the unresolved 
challenges of a lack of conceptual clarity about LED thinking and practice mentioned in 
earlier (see chapter 1). Some of these challenges evidently became manifest within the 
Sutterheim LED project, and almost caused it to fail. Commenting on the challenges 
confronted by the Stutterheim LED project, Mcwabeni (in Bond 2000) noted that the land 
redistribution process experienced serious tensions within the community. The tension was 
marked between the youth who were active in community structures and elderly people who 
were quit renters in Sutterheim (Mcwabeni in Bond 2000). For Mcwabeni (in Bond 2000), 
the Sutterheim LED matter would stand a chance of success only if there were radical 
changes to power relations, institutional forms, planning and consultation processes, 
municipal budgeting, and ideological vision. These challenges appear to be a direct result 
of the ideological contestations and complexities found within LED. 
 
For Bundy (1988 in Bond 2007), the Stutterheim LED initiative was bound to fail, due to 
structural problems of colonialism and apartheid inherited by the post 1994 South Africa. 
Bundy reminded readers of the unequal structure of the global political economy which 
continue  to  define  the  unequal  economic  relations  between  African  countries  and  the 
western world and which, critics of development have always highlighted (see chapter 2). 
Bundy stated that Sutterheim was not separate from but was rather an integral part of the 
national and global capitalist system and the global division of labour in which women – 
and people of colour - continue to supply cheap labour, with women supplying unpaid 
reproductive labour, to reproduce the male labour force in urban centres. Bundy added that 
this reproductive structure of inequality remained unchanged by both the post-1990 
“Sutterheim Experience” and the post-1994 dispensation. 
 
Notwithstanding, South Africa’s commitment to LED philosophy remains irrevocably 
beyond question. This, even when LED is confronted with unresolved ideological 
complexities and race problems referred in Chapter 1 and 2, which had also manifest in the 
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Sutterheim LED project, in the early 1990s. The government has since officialised LED as 
its apex development strategy, without much regard to structural problems of racial 
inequality, poverty and unemployment in South Africa. As stated earlier for example, 
Mathibe and Croucamp (2019) note that black women-owned small businesses in South 
Africa are confronted with challenges such as lack of managerial expertise and experience, 
access to finance, lack of technology, and punitive regulatory framework, and inadequate 
infrastructure that impede their success. They state that many black women-owned startup 
sme are unable to provide minimum collateral to qualify for credit schemes and that many 
owners lack Education and professional qualifications, which are also highly valued and 
greatly considered by public institutions for grating businesses credit (Mathibe and 
Croucamp 2019). LED however, represented a neutral racially blind technical mechanism 
which  was  meant  to  undo  systemic  raciall y inspired  problems  such  as  poverty,  racial 
inequality and underdevelopment. 
 
Pieces of legislation established in terms of the 1996 Constitution of South Africa were 
nonetheless put forward by government to fossilize LED (Rogerson 2009). Among these is 
section 151 of the South African Constitution, under which municipal powers and functions 
are described. The municipality has “the rights to govern, on its own initiative, the local 
government affairs of its community, subject to national and provincial legislation, as 
provided for in the Constitution” (RSA 1996). Section 152 provides for the functional 
mandate of municipalities, which includes: 
 
 
• To provide democratic and accountable government for local communities; 
 
• To ensure that provision of services to communities is in a sustainable manner; 
 
• To promote social and economic development; 
 
• To promote a safe and healthy environment; and 
 
• To encourage the involvement of communities and community organisations in 









• Structure and manage its administration and budgeting and planning processes to 
give priority to the basic needs of the community, and to promote the social and 
economic development of the community; and 






In addition to section 153, the Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998 and the Municipal 
Systems Act of 2002 are relevant. The latter gave way to the Integrated Development 
Plan (IDP). According to Triegaardt (2003:3), IDP planning refers to: 
 
A participatory approach to integrate economic, sectoral, spatial, social, institutional, environmental 
and fiscal strategies in order to support the optimal allocation of scarce resources between sectors 
and geographical areas and across the population in a manner that provides sustainable growth, equity 
and the empowerment of the poor and the marginalized. 
 
 
According to section 34 of the Municipal System Act 2000, all municipalities are required 
to conduct annual reviews and amend their IDPs in accordance with changing demands, and 
to engage with LED policy (Gunter 2005). The main aim of the Municipal Systems Act was 
to “provide for the core principles, mechanisms and processes that are necessary to enable 
municipalities to move progressively towards the social and economic upliftment of local 
communities” (Rogerson 2009:16). 
 
The second body of legislation was the 1998 White Paper on Local Government, which 
provided the moral code for LED discourse, known as developmental local government. 
Developmental local government is defined as “local government committed to working 
with citizens and groups within the community to find sustainable ways to meet their social, 
economic and material needs, and improve the quality of their lives” (RSA 1998:23). This 
definition must be read within the framework of the repertoire of un-problematised politics 
of the transition in 1994, which elided confronting the problems of racial inequality and 
racism, in the distribution of the materiality of development. The racial issues were avoided 
so as not to frustrate efforts to build a new “rainbow nation” and reconcile racial tensions 
that had defined the pre-1994 political discourse in South Africa. This notwithstanding the 
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stark racial inequalities that were generated by apartheid, between blacks and whites in 
South Africa, which persisted on the ground. Large sections of blacks suffer from 
underdevelopment, poverty and unemployment, whereas most whites exist on the privileged 
side of development. 
 
To further buttress LED, the Department of Provincial and Local Government (DPLG) in 
 
2001, produced an LED policy paper called Refocusing Development on the Poor. In 
addition, the 2002 draft LED policy document argued that LED activities should be 
developmental and should be pro-poor in nature (Rogerson 2009). I argue that this LED 
approach revitalised the ethos of the erstwhile RDP, which was more socialistic and pro- 
poor, as stated in Chapter 2. According to Rogerson (2009), the document rejected 
“orthodox” LED practices, which were reflecting corporate dominance, and which are 
generally  championed   by  such   projects   as   the   aerotropolis,   instead   of   bottom-up 
community-based LED approaches. Bond (2002) (in Rogerson 2009) stated that the report 
advocated for programmes of municipal community-service-based LED aimed to broaden 
access to infrastructure and services; to foster greater gender parity; improve health; reduced 
the scale of racial segregation; and improved social capital. Furthermore, the report defined 
local government as the main driver of LED. 
 
According to Rogerson (2009), the period starting in 2005 to 2007 marked an important 
moment in the history of LED policy framework in South Africa. After 10 years of LED 
being a statutory requirement for local authorities, the DPLG released the LED framework 
in 2006. This framework distanced government from the responsibility of driving LED, as 
was proposed by the 2002 Draft LED policy document. The 2006 LED Framework offered 
a vision for promoting inclusive local economies and exploiting local opportunities through 
addressing local needs and contributing to national development objectives (Rogerson 
2009). The Framework listed among others, the following guiding principles: 
 
 
• Through a developmental approach, government has a decisive and unapologetic 
role to play in shaping the economic destiny of our country. 
• Creating an environment in which the overall economic and social conditions of the 
locality are conducive to the creation of employment opportunities is the 
responsibility of local government. 
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• Local economic development is an outcome of actions and interventions resulting 
from  local  good  governance  and  the  constant  improvement  and  integration  of 
national priorities and programmes in local spaces. 
• Inward investment from the state or private sector will only be effective where the 
potential and competitive advantages of each area are known and exploited. 
• Promoting robust and inclusive local economies requires the concerted, coordinated 
action of all spheres and sectors of government centred on the application and 
localization of the principles espoused in the National Spatial Development 
Perspective (NSDP). 
• Locally owned appropriate solutions and strategies must emerge to support national 
frameworks in both rural and urban local spaces and should promote sustainable 
development and sustainable human settlements. 
• South Africa competes in a global and increasingly integrated world economy whose 
threats must be minimised and whose opportunities must be exploited. 
• Private companies, including social enterprises and cooperatives, form the heart of 
the economy and have a crucial role to play as partnerships with public and 
community role players that will ultimately stimulate robust and inclusive local 
economies. 
• People are the single greatest resource and including all citizens in development and 
increasing their skills leads to increased opportunities for stimulating local 
economies. 
• Local initiative, energy,  creativity, assertive leadership and skills will ultimately 




The objectives of the Framework are described as follows: 
 
 
• To shift towards a strategic approach to the development of local economies and 
overcome challenges and failures in respect of instances where municipalities 
themselves try to manage a litany of non-viable projects or start-ups. 
• To support local economies in realising their optimal potentials and making local 
communities active participants in the economy of the country. 
• To elevate the importance and centrality of effectively functioning local economies 
in growing the national economy. 
70  
• To wage the national fight  against  poverty more effectively through local level 
debates, strategies and actions. 
• To improve community access to economic initiatives, support programmes and 
information. 
• To    improve    the    coordination    of    economic    development    planning    and 
implementation across government and between government and non-governmental 
actors. 
• To build greater awareness about the importance and role of localities and regions 
which globally are playing an increasingly significant role as points of investment 
facilitated by supportive national policies. (DPLG 2006:7). 
 
Rogerson (2009:18) stated that several other policy initiatives that would impact on LED 
 
were put in place in addition to the framework. These included the following: 
 
 




• The five-year Local Government Strategic Agenda and Implementation Plan which 
appeared in 2006 (DPLG 2006b); 
• Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative (DTI 2005); 
 
• The National Spatial Development Strategy (NSDP) (The Presidency 2006); 
 
• The Draft Regional Industrial Development Strategy (RIDS) (DTI 2006); and 
 
• The National Industrial Policy Framework (DTI 2007). 
 
 
With the forgoing objectives of the 2006 LED framework, it is clear the framework 
encourages greater co-operation between the public and the private sector to work together 
towards achieving LED milestones. One such an avenue is also through Public Private 
Partnerships  (PPPs). PPP  is  defined  as  long-term  contractual  arrangement  between  the 
public and private sector where mutual benefits are sought and where the private sector 
provides operating services and/or puts private finance at risk, with government only setting 
programmatic infrastructure investment objectives and approving new projects (Farrugia, 
Reynolds and Orr 2008). PPP often involve the private sector financing, procurement, 
maintenance, operation and disposition of infrastructure assets, including roadways, ports, 
airports, power plants, water systems, public buildings, schools and hospitals (Farrugia, 
Reynolds and Orr 2008). According to Farrugia et al (2008) five (5) to (six) 6% of South 
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Africa’s public infrastructure and service delivery programs was undertaken through PPP 
agreements amounting to 20 PPP deals worth a combined value estimated at $5.5 billion. 
The Ekurhuleni Aerotropolis Project is part of this initiative to which the City has 
contributed R570 million for the implementation of the Aerotropolis Master Plan in 2020, 
in addition to other support measures (James 2019). 
 
The forgoing policy instruments policy instruments aimed at advancing LED interests – and 
which indeed having achieved some milestones – have at times intensified complexities in 
LED theory and practice in South Africa. For example, the NSDP stated that principles and 
methodology of the NSDP should inform the development plans, policies and programmes 
of all spheres and agencies of government, as a matter of policy (Oranje et al 2009; The 
Presidency 2006 in Rogerson 2008). Mohammed (in Rogerson 2008) commented that the 
NSDP insisted on government spending on fixed investment and proposed that investment 
should be concentrated in areas of economic growth and potential. 
 
This logic of “economic growth potential” in government’s determination to provide 
infrastructure investment would simply exacerbate existing territorial inequalities. The same 
argument was made by Rodriguez-Pose and Tijmstra (2005). This means that resourceful 
and powerful urban municipalities have greater competitive advantage for preferential 
national government infrastructure investment, over poor rural municipalities. Rural areas 
face various limitations, from skills and infrastructure challenges to basic services such as 
water and electricity access problems. Marais (2016) made a similar observation of 
municipal inequalities when commenting on LED in secondary cities. He stated that 
secondary cities stood no chance of emerging as the winners when competing with 
metropolitan areas. 
 
In addition to the said government initiatives to support LED, there is also the revised 
 
2014–2019 National LED framework which also supports LED. Like its predecessor, it 
distances local government from job creation and reiterates that, the state’s responsibility is 
not to create jobs, but rather to  create an  enabling environment  for business  and  job 
creation.  That  occurs  through  unlocking  economic  opportunities,  leading  LED  and 
allowing for collaboration and linkage in partnerships among key role players (Department 
of Cooperative Governance 2017). The main objectives of the 2014–2019 framework is 
listed as follows: 
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• To launch a more effective fight against poverty,  inequality and unemployment 
through the development of innovative and inclusive and competitive economies; 
• To  support  the  potential  of  local  economies  to grow  and  develop  the  national 
economy; 
• To   raise   greater   awareness   of   the   significance   of   regions,   metropolitan 
municipalities and localities as focal points in generation national prosperity; 
• To intensify the support of local economies in realising and building their economic 
potential, their diversity, levels of employment and the creation of decent work for 
their communities; 
• To strengthen international coordination of economic development planning and 
implementation and between government and non-governmental sectors. 
 
(Department of Cooperative Governance 2017) 
 
 



















According to Table 3, the roles of municipalities in LED are understood to include the 
following: 
73  
• Strategic planning by means of the IDPs; 
 
• Participation in the formulation of the district economic development plans; 
 
• Participation in the implementation of economic projects through special purpose 
vehicles that are established including local government established development 
agencies; 
• Responsible   for   the   formulation   of   local   municipal   economic   development 
initiatives and the alignment and integration thereof with the district development 
initiatives; and 
• Local municipalities, as the owners of land and assets, are responsible for local 
economic development project implementation. 
 
 
Van Niekerk and Bunding-Venter (2015:) further stated that, this framework entrusts a 
Local Economic Development Agency to play a key role in LED, and further describes their 
role as follows: 
 
 
• Implement LED Strategies approved by Council 
 
• Implement LED programmes and projects 
 
• Facilitate local partnerships for implementation of projects 
 
• Mobilise funding for LED projects 
 
• Market the municipal area and mobilise business investment into the municipality. 
 
 
Many of the 2014–2019 LED framework objectives do not differ much from those of its 
predecessor, apart from the emphasis on regions and metropolitan municipalities as focal 
points in generating national prosperity. These objectives are expressed in verbatim in the 
2017-2022  LED  framework  Department  of  Cooperative  Governance  (2017(b)).  Van 
Niekerk and Bunding-Venter (2015) and Luthuli and Houghton (2019(a)) make the similar 
observations. In my view, such emphasis – especially on regionalism in the 2014 LED 
framework – was a response to the changing forms and methods of globalisation and global 
capitalism. For the smooth flow of goods, capital investments and money capital at the 
global scale, the changing modes of global capitalism require new spatial configurations. 
These include global cities, smart-cities, major city regions, and inter-regional cooperation 
(Jessop 2013). As suggested by Bridger (2015), the aerotropolis, in this scheme, is the 
infrastructure.  It  provides  the  physical  infrastructure  to  turbocharge  corporations  by 
attracting  them  to  aerotropolis  precincts,  as  is  already the  case  with  the  Ekurhuleni 
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Aerotropolis. And, as Kasarda also suggests, it allows corporations to respond effectively 
to the 21st-century trade demands by globalisation, including the ascendency of information 
communication technology (ICT) and associated increases in the mobility and liquidity of 
capital (Kasarda and Linday 2011). 
 
 
The nature of the global capitalist  system  has  reconfigured  spatial  flows  of economic 
activity and has also penetrated cyberspace because of smart technology (Jessop 2013). 
LED planning is thus increasingly broadening into region-wide economic activity. This 
LED planning has already taken root in the US and UK (Valler, Phelps and Wood 2002). 
According to Valler, Phelps and Wood (2002) and Boyel and Meyer (2002), this trend 
represents a shift from the earlier localism of the 1980s. The localism of the 1980s believed 
that LED could be unlocked through revitalising economically inactive cities and towns. 
 
 
The new region-wide LED model assumes that better and more strategic coordination of 
regions will create economic growth. In South Africa, this has also led to a growing number 
of local and regional economic development partnerships between neighbouring 
municipalities (Van Niekerk and Bunding-Venter 2014). It is no surprise that LED planning 
in South Africa is becoming region-wide. The Gauteng City Region (GCR), the Joint 
Planning Initiative, the South Cape Economic Partnership, and the West Coast Economic 
Development Partnership are examples of region-wide LED initiatives (Luthuli 2019; Van 
Niekerk and Bunding-Venter 2015; Wray 2015). 
 
In Gauteng, the GCR initiative, responding to the paradigm of region-wide planning, has 
manifested in the integration of clusters of Gauteng cities, towns and urban nodes into the 
following categories. Together, these regions support each other and function as one 
regional economic entity: 
 
 
• Central  Development  Corridor,  which  will  be  anchored  around  the  City  of 
 
Johannesburg as the hub of finance, services, ICT and pharmaceutical industries; 
 
• Eastern Development Corridor, which will be anchored around the economy of the 
 
Ekurhuleni Metro as the hub of manufacturing, logistics and transport industries; 
 
• Northern Development Corridor, which will anchored around Tshwane as South 
Africa’s administrative capital city and the hub of the automotive sector, research, 
development, innovation and the knowledge-based economy; 
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• Western Corridor, which encompasses the economy of the West Rand district and 
the creation of new industries, new economic nodes and new cities; and 
• Southern Corridor, which encompasses the economy of the Sedibeng district and the 




In the Western Cape, various forms of regional economic co-operation and integration exist 
between municipalities, businesses and other role-players. These links are aimed at 
addressing regional challenges and benefitting the regional econom y (Van Niekerk  and 
Bunding-Venter 2015). According to Van Niekerk and Bunding-Venter (2015), regionalism 
offers a co-operative model for relations between neighbouring local governments. By 
contrast, in traditional approaches, local governments compete for various reasons. 
Regionalism has thus brought in the idea of local and regional economic development (L- 
RED). Van Niekerk and Bunding-Venter (2015:4) warned, however, that institutions that 
implement region-wide strategic development plans in specific localities often lack proper 
institutional frameworks for regional and local integration, in economic development. 
 
Pennink (2014) also warned that regional economic development efforts often involve 
leadership, entrepreneurship and institutions – but omit communities who live in those 
regions from contributing to the economic development process. Jessop (2013) stated that 
R-LED has the capacity to form new spatial or regional inequalities because territorial logic 
can increase the wealth and welfare of one territory, at the expense of others. The same point 
was noted by Marais (2016) regarding South Africa. Regionalist thinking in LED planning 
is potentially also problematic, especially in metropolitan municipalities that are known to 
be centres of global capitalist flows. This is because regional economic planning in 
metropolitan municipalities tends to be about mega projects that are aimed at national 
macro-economic development strategies. 
 
Beyond the potential regional inequalities that R-LED may create, R-LED also has the 
potential to alienate poor communities even within metropolitan municipalities, from 
actively participating in LED activity. Such communities depend on survivalist small-scale 
and semi-formal small medium micro enterprises SMMEs, and or pro-poor LED initiatives. 
In South Africa, LED thinking and practice is somewhat haphazardly hybridised. It is 
actioned by various entities of various scales, all of which compete for dominance in 
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mainstream development practice (Bond 2003; Mbeba 2014; Nel and Rogerson 2005; 
Patterson 2008; Rodriguez-Pose and Tijmstra 2005). 
 
For example, The Dube Trade Port project around the King Shaka airport in the eThekwini 
Municipality, and the recently launched aerotropolis project at OR Tambo airport in the 
Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality, are examples of mega LED projects in metropolitan 
municipalities (see City of Ekurhuleni Report 2013; Gauteng Provincial Government and 
Ekurhuleni Metro Municipality 2013; Houghton  2016). Furthermore, especially in rural 
areas of South Africa (former Bantustans) most LED projects do not go beyond the micro- 
scale of localised skills development, job creation and business support programmes 
(Houghton  2016).  Patterson  (2008),  Bond  (2003),  Nel  and  Rogerson  (2005)  and  Van 
Niekerk and Bunding-Venter (2015) all observed that the discourse of LED in South Africa 
is pulled in different directions by various government entities, and that it is also based on 
conflicting paradigms. 
 
According to Nel and Rogerson (2005), a cross-sectional study of LED in South Africa’s 
urban centres conducted by the WB–Netherlands Partnership programme found that, 
Johannesburg endorsed a pro-growth posture and understood economic development as a 
catalyst for “creating a conducive climate for investment. In contrast, Kroonstad in the Free 
State Province supported a pro-poor approach and sought to alleviate poverty through job 
creation (Nel and Rogerson 2005). The study also found that Ethekwini (Durban) undertook 
the middle-road vision of building a globally competitive region for the benefit of all. 
Mangaung (Bleomfontein) had embraced both the pro-poor and pro-market initiatives (Nel 
and Rogerson 2005). 
 
The LED types referred in the above do not exist exclusively within the metropolitan or 
rural municipalities. Elements of both categories can be found even within one municipality. 
This occurs where several informal and semi-formal, small-scale survivalist business 
activities and mega projects run LED simultaneously, in one municipality. Such forms 
reflect  or  mirror  the  racial  legacy of  the  geopolitics  of  apartheid  (Plaatjie  2018).  For 
example, in townships – which generally lack service delivery – LED is driven largely b y 
the informal and semi-formal enterprises, including government programmes and few 
successful SMMEs. It is estimated that to date, 2.9 million people are employed in the 
informal economy in South Africa and that therefore, one in six South Africans is employed 
in this sector (Khumalo, Mthuli and Singh 2019). 
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Furthermore, according to Khumalo et al (2019), in South Africa, 70% of people who start 
informal business are driven mainly by unemployment, and this sector is growing with the 
rate of unemployment, as people seek ways to sustain themselves economically. In city 
centres and former white suburbs, LED is driven more by formal industry, business 
enterprises and SMMEs of various types and sizes. In the rural areas, LED takes the form 
of skills- and capacity-building, and various community-based development projects of 
differing scales and impact. 
 
The cause of this ideological conflict appears to be partly a lack of clarity or consensus 
about what LED is about, and how it should be undertaken. This confusion about the 
meaning of LED is reflected in the various conceptions of LED presented below. For 
example, the WB defines LED as follows: 
 
The purpose of local economic development is to build up the economic capacity of a local area to 
improve its economic future and the quality of life for all. It is a process by which the public, business 
and nongovernmental sector partners work collectively to  create better conditions for  economic 





The International Labour Organisation (ILO) understands LED as follows: 
 
 
[A] participatory development process that encourages partnership arrangements between the main 
private and public stakeholders of a defined territory, enabling the joint design and implementation 
of a common development strategy, by making use of the local resources and competitive advantage 
in the global context, with the final objective of creating decent jobs and stimulating economic 
activity. 
 
(ILO 2006:2 in Rogerson 2009:14) 
 
 
According  to  Bartik  (2003)  in  Rogerson  2009:13),  LED  represents  “local  economy’s 
capacity to create wealth for residents.” Helmsing and Egziabher (2005) viewed LED as a 
partnership between local government, NGOs, community-based groups and the private 
sector, which is aimed at managing existing resources, creating jobs and stimulating the 
economy of a defined territory. For Rodriguez-Pose and Tijmstra (2005), LED refers to 
development strategies that are territorially based, locally owned and managed, and is aimed 
at increasing employment and economic growth. Blackely and Leigh (2010) understood 
LED to strive to increase the community’s standard of living, based on the principles of 
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equity. For the Local Government Turnaround Strategy (RSA 2009), LED refers to the 
approach that a municipality and region takes to encourage investment by big business, 
including to stimulate small local business development, tourist industries or large sector 
economy management in mining, manufacturing or farming. 
 
It is clear from the forgoing varied definitions that, even where ideological similarities in 
LED conception exist especially about the meaning of development, other elements in the 
definitions are ideologically or methodologically antithetical. For example, there is 
conceptual clash around whether LED means poverty relief or an enterprise- or business- 
development initiative, on the one hand (Bond 2003; Nel and Binns 2003); or on the other 
hand,  whether  LED  is  a  territorial  or  sector-based  phenomenon,  as  highlighted  by 
Rodriguez-Pose and Tijmstra (2005). 
 
Rogerson  (2009)  suggested  that  the  many  definitions  of  LED  are  merely  different 
approaches and entry points for starting LED processes of different growth dimensions. 
These range from infrastructure, small medium enterprises (SMEs) and skills training, to 
attracting FDI, fostering territorial competitiveness, strengthening local institutions, and 
better management of development process. Indeed, the many definitions of LED reflect the 
lack of a specific theory of LED (Rowe 2009). Mqedlana (2014) suggested that LED should 
be understood broadly in three different ways, as follows: 
 
1.   As a process, and as an economic development intervention, 
 
2.   A locality and geographically based development intervention, and 
 
3.   As a collaboration of key stakeholders. 
 
 
However, although Mqedlana’s (2014) observation is useful, his categories are not without 
their own unresolved ideological tensions – which are also partly the result of the absence 
of a general theory of LED. For example, if LED is a spatially based development 
intervention, then what are its spatial parameters of inclusion and exclusion in each space? 
This question is particularly relevant in the context of the legacy of racialised poverty and 
inequality in South Africa. There is also the question of the categories of spatial or territorial 
inclusion and exclusion in a globalised world, which has connected world economies more 
than before (Nel and Rogerson 2016(a); Rogerson 2009). 
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Also, unresolved, are the contradictions and ideological conflict in LED discourse in South 
Africa, between the pro-poor and the pro-market approaches. The pro-poor approach 
prioritises mostly the development interests of blacks, whereas the pro-market approach has 
a strong corporate bias (Nel and Rogerson 2005). I reflect on these two approaches below. 
The ideological tension within LED in South Africa is intensified by the prevailing order of 
the de-politicisation of both development and LED discourse. This de-politicisation of both 
development and LED buttresses the resilient legacy of racialized inequalities and poverty, 
which painfully persists into the democratic dispensation. 
 
3.4 THE PRO-MARKET APPROACH 
 
The pro-market approach to LED is also called pro-growth or smokestack chasing. It is 
generally understood to focus on large projects or infrastructure investments such as the 
aerotropolis project and the Dube Trade Port project. In addition, it attracts MNCs to invest 
in certain localities to attract FDI. In this approach, incentives such as tax concessions, cheap 
land, reduced rates and even direct financial rewards are provided in return for investors to 
relocate in specific areas (Bond 2002, 2003; Rodriguez-Pose and Tijmstra 2005). 
Establishment of SEZ is also a key strategy in the pro-growth development paradigm 
(Saggers 2015; Scheepers 2012). Rodriguez-Pose and Tijmstra (2005) stated that this 
approach has always favoured a sectoral approach to development. 
 
The arguments in favour of SEZ is that FDI can generate jobs, thereby growing the tax base 
which can be used for service delivery for all. According to Bond (2002) this paradigm of 
LED rests on strategies such as entrepreneurial-competitive, urban efficiency and 
progressive-competitive, which according to Van Niekerk and Bunding-Venter (2015) are 
well underway in South Africa. These categories are understood generally as follows: 
 
 
• Entrepreneurial-competitive  prioritises  local  competitive  advantages  and  small 
business in job creation. Local authorities identify potential growth sectors and 
support local businesses, both technically and financially. 
• Urban efficiency prioritises investment attraction by making a place attractive for 
business. Some of the key strategies in this category are lowering the cost of living 
and doing business in a locality, cutting taxes and service charges, and privatising 
services where possible. 
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• Progressive-competitive  advocates  for  human  resource  development  support  for 
LED through local training bodies or a focus on the activities of national training 
agencies in local areas. There is an understanding that low skill levels, especially 





Patterson  (2008)  stated  that  the  pro-market  approach  seeks  engagement  with  global 
economic forces through enhancing competitive advantage. Patterson argues that the 
approach is thus outward-looking. The thrust of spatial development initiatives, industrial 
development zones and export processing zones thus appears to fall largely within the pro- 
market paradigm, and its attempt to attract FDI to South Africa (Bond 2002; Rodriguez- 
Pose and Tijmstra 2005). As stated earlier, this type of LED approach is in tandem with the 
idea of the aerotropolis and is more prevalent in Category A (metropolitan municipalities) 
due their industrial capacity and diversity of economic activity. 
 
Bond (2002) stated that these smokestack-chasing methods are managerialist and top-down; 
they are anti-developmental and the cost of creating a single job is very high. He stated that 
the government’s tax incentives and subsidies offered to MNCs to attract them to invest in 
certain areas has pitted municipalities against one another, in the struggle to have companies 
relocating to their regions (Rowe 2009). This has resulted in the replacement of 
unemployment in one area with that in another. It can also create unsustainable, low-skilled 
and short-term jobs, as companies hop from one municipality to another in the search for 
the cheapest place from which to operate (Bond 2002). Bond further stated that pro-market 
approaches lack inter-relationships with both downstream and upstream industries. Finally, 
they have adverse prospects for women especially due to labour law deregulation in the 
SEZ. 
 
Rowe (2009) was even more critical about the pro-market LED approach and stated that 
rather than creating jobs, they announce them in futuristic terms based on marketing 
campaigns for FDI. He further criticised the smokestack-chasing methods by suggesting 
that they are opportunistic and lack creativity and are only meant to deceive the public that 
something is happening when nothing is. Quoting Loveridge Rowe (2009), stated that it has 
often become politically easier to garner support for FDI marketing programmes than to 
develop an entrepreneurial culture. 
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The alleged incapacit y of smokestack-chasing to confront the challenge of unemployment 
and poverty in South Africa could not have been affirmed better than by Thabo Mbeki, 
former President of South Africa. Mbeki made the following observations: 
 
Notwithstanding some specific problems in some developing countries and especially African 
countries, there are many among these countries that have and continue to have stability and are at 
pace with themselves, countries that have responded positively, even under very difficult 
circumstances, to  the  prescriptions of both the  prospective investor as  well as  the  multi-lateral 
institutions. Many of these countries have created the necessary climate conducive to investment, for 
example by liberalising their trade, privatising state-owned enterprises, reforming their tax systems 
and generally adhering to the prescribed injunctions, all done in an attempt to attract the necessar y 
investments. The response from the development countries, to these attempts by especially many 
African countries to stay within the confines of the rules, has been to treat the African continent as 
one country, and therefore, to punish a country on the one end of the continent for the deeds of another 
on the other end. In our own country we have been assured that our economic fundamentals are 
correct and sound. We have developed a stable and effective financial and fiscal system. We have 
reduced tariffs to levels that are comparable to the advanced industrial countries. We have reformed 
agriculture to make it least subsidised of all the major agricultural trading nations. We have 
restructured our public sector through privatisation, strategic partners and regulation. We have an 
equitable and sophisticated system of labour relations that is continually adjusting to new 
developments. We play an active role in all multilateral agencies in the world. Yes, the flow of 
investment into South Africa has not met our expectations while levels of poverty and unemployment 
remain high. 
 
(Mbeki 2000b in Bond 2002:5) 
 
 
The above passage, by a proud and self-confessed neo-liberal – an unwavering Thatcherite, 
if anything – justifies post-development theorists’ suspicions about the hypocrisy of 
development (see chapter 2). Indeed, the forgoing observation by Mbeki could validate their 
suspicions. 
 
3.5 THE PRO-POOR APPROACH 
 
The pro-poor LED approaches are community-based strategies that are in line with 
sustainable LED regimes, which prioritises poverty alleviation over corporate interests. 
However, the pro-poor approach is not necessarily in line with any of the post-capitalist 
critiques discussed earlier, such as the post-growth and certainly not degrowth, even when 
the  pro-poor  approach  shares  some  common  elements,  especially  with  the  former. 
According to Bond (2002, 2003) the pro-poor model is more progressive than the pro- 
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growth approach. Given the racialised past of South Africa, this approach generally benefits 
the very poor, most of whom are black people living in townships and rural areas (former 
Bantustans). The establishment of skills training entities, national training agencies in local 
areas, and advocacy for government to work directly with low-income communities and 
their organisations, are some of the methods employed by the pro-poor LED approach 
(Bond 2002, 2003; Nel and Rogerson 2005). Community organisations in this case include, 
for example, community development trusts and credit unions or development co- 
operations. 
 
The pro-poor approach stands opposed to the aerotropolis’ pro-growth inspired approach 
which prioritised FDI attraction. It resonates with Amartya Sen’s (1999) development as 
freedom thesis and therefore falls within the sustainable livelihoods framework. The 
sustainable livelihoods framework places a high premium on social capital and human 
capacity-building in development. The framework is founded on the understanding of 
people’s livelihoods and their assets as their primary resources to combat poverty, and as 
constitutive elements of their own development (Haughton and Allmendinger 2010; Moree 
and McNamara 2013). These livelihood assets are understood to comprise of five domains, 
shown in Figure 2 below. 
 
 

























Source: Moree, McNamara, and Acholo 2009 
 
 
As reflected in Figure 2, livelihood assets comprise five intricately and mutually reinforcing 
domains. These are human capital, comprised of skills, knowledge, labour, good health and 
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physical capability; natural capital, which includes natural-resource stock and the 
environment;     financial capital, such as cash, credit/debt, savings, and other economic 
assets; physical capital, which includes infrastructure, production equipment and 
technologies;     and social capital, such as networks, social claims, social relations and 
affiliations and associations (Krantz 2001; Moree, McNamara and Acholo 2009). For 
example, a person must be physically fit and healthy to be socially and financially active. 
The condition of health is contingent on a good unpolluted environment, skills acquisition, 
labour, economic assets, and social networks. 
 
Affirming and advancing the above social ideological orientation of LED, Sen (1993) stated 
that LED should strive for the preservation and increase of the standard of living, through a 
process  of  human  physical  and  development,  based  on  the  principles  of  equity.  To 
emphasise the significance of this point, which complements Bond’s advocacy for pro-poor 
LED initiatives, Sen explained his conception of development lucidly as follows: 
 
 
Development requires the removal of major sources of unfreedom: poverty as well as 
tyranny, poor economic opportunities as well as systematic social deprivation, neglect of 





In other cases the unfreedom links closely to the lack of public facilities and social care, 
such as the absence of epidemiological programs, or of organized arrangements for health 
care or education facilities… and in other cases… imposed restrictions on the freedom to 





This approach is based on the understanding that, while investment and economic growth 
are necessary, communities and their organisations are essential. They must participate in 
planning, monitoring and implementation of new developments; if they do not, benefits are 
unlikely to accrue to them (Bond 2002; Sen 1999). 
 
According to Bond (2002) in South Africa, the thrust for a community-led approach is 
underscored by six cardinal pillars. These are community-based development, linkage, 
human capital development, infrastructure and municipal services, leak-plugging in local 
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economy, and retaining and expanding local economic activity. These categories are 
described as follows: 
 
 
• Community economic development suggests that municipalities must work directly 
with low-income communities. They should engage with community cooperatives 
and businesses, “local exchange trading and trading systems”, savings schemes and 
informal lending arrangements – including community-based environmental 
management and maintenance schemes, and community development experiments. 
• Linkage  means  linking  profitable  growth  to  redistributive  development.  For 
example, linking of a profitable geographical to an impoverished area, in which the 
former invests in the latter, through affordable housing for instance. 
• Human  capital  development  emphasises  the  need  for economic  development  to 
create social benefits that would allow communities to earn “living wages”. This in 
turn will allow for human capital development and productivity. 
• Development  and  maintenance  of  infrastructure  and  services  –  such  as  water, 
electricity, sanitation, and roads – is understood to have multiplier developmental 
effects. 
• “Plugging the leaks” in the local economy suggests the use of local resources and 
the encouragement of people to buy local goods. Other aims are supporting and 
building periodic markets, providing infrastructure using local labour and locally- 
manufactured material, and creating networking enterprises in the local area to 
prevent outflows of money from poor areas. 
• Retaining  and  expanding  local  economic  activity  is  aimed  at  assisting  local 
businesses  to  improve  their  productivity and  increase  their  market  share.  They 
should advance to sophisticated higher-value-added levels in the production value 
chain (RSA 2001 in Bond 2002:11). 
 
 
The pillars are spatially determinist and emphasise territory over a particular sector, as a 
core consideration in LED thinking and practice. This point was highlighted by Rodriguez- 
Pose and Tijmstra (2005:5). 
 
 
The relationship between pro-poor LED and sustainable livelihood approach discussed in 
the preceding sections, hold community participation in development in high regard. The 
two  - pro-poor  LED  and  sustainable livelihood approach  - reaffirm  the centrality of 
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participation or participatory development inscribed in section 152 of the South African 
Constitution. As stated earlier, section 152 requires government “to encourage the 
involvement of communities and community organisations in matters of local government” 
(RSA 1996). This constitutionally entrenched principle is also echoed in the philosophy of 
developmental  local  government,  which  also  requires  local  government  to  work  with 
citizens  and  groups  in  the  community,  to  find  sustainable  ways  to  meet  their  social, 
economic and material needs, and to improve the quality of their lives. The centrality of 
community participation for pro-poor LED and the sustainable livelihoods framework is 
borne from understanding the potential capacity of community participation to foster social 
cohesion in communities, and ultimately to empower the community. It is no surprise 
therefore that Khumalo et al (2019) also believe that LED can be also realised through the 
informal economy and can sustain many livelihoods especially of those in rural areas. 
 
 
Participation is also praised for democratising public discourse and for its potential to unlock 
the political unfreedoms suffered by those who are most vulnerable in communities (Sen 
1999).  The  significance  of  participation  in  development  thinking  has  therefore  also 
generated much scholarly interest. This has consequently given rise to many definitions 
ascribed to the term “participation” or “community participation” and methodological 
approaches to it. Mashego (2015:26), provides some of the core principles of participation 
from various contributors: 
 
 
• “Participation  includes  people’s  involvement  in  decision  making  processes,  in 
implementing programmes, their sharing of benefits of development programmes 
and their involvement in efforts to evaluate such programmes” (Cohen and Uphoff 
1997:19). 
 
• “What gives a real meaning to popular participation is the collective effort by people 
concerned to pool their efforts and whatever other resources they decide to pool 
together, to attain objectives they set for themselves” (ACC Task Force 1978:79). 
• “People’s participation is essentially to do with economic and political relationships 
within the wider society; it is not just a matter of involvement in projects but rather 
the process by which rural people are able to organise themselves and, through their 
own organisation, are able to identify their own needs, share in design, implement, 
and evaluate participatory action” (FAO 1982:18). 
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• “Community participation is an active process by which beneficiary or client groups 
influence the direction and execution of a development project with a view of 
enhancing their wellbeing in terms of income, personal growth, self-reliance, or 
other values they cherish” (Paul 1987:43). 
• “Participation  is  “involvement  by  a  local  population  and  at  times  additional 
stakeholders in the creation, content and conduct of a program or policy designed to 
change their lives” (Midgely 1986:18). 
 
According to Duraiappah, Roddy and Parry (2005:6), the Institute for Sustainable 
Development has additionally described the various types and degrees of participation 
highlighted by Arnstein (1969), as follows: 
 
Manipulation: this is where the public is convinced that a pre-defined project is best. 
 
 
Passive participation: this is about telling people about what is going to happen or 
what has happened already. 
 
Participation in information giving: this is where participation occurs through 
answering questions posed by extractive researchers. Participants are informed of 
their  rights,  responsibilities  and  options,  but  are  not  given  the  opportunity  to 
influence the process. 
 
Participation by consultation: this is a two-way flow of information in which the 
community is consulted and can express their views and concerns. However, their 
inputs may or may not be used at all or as originally intended. External agents define 
solutions and problems and are under no obligation to take on people’s views. 
 
Participation for material incentives: this is where people participate by providing 
resources in exchange for material incentives. 
 
Functional participation: this is where people participate by forming groups to 
meet predetermined objectives related to the initiatives. Local people’s participation 




Interactive participation: people participate in joint analysis, which leads to action 
plans and establishment of local institutions and strengthening of those already in 
existence. It is a multi-perspective approach, which allows local people to take 
control over the decision-making process. 
 
Partnership:  this is where power is redistributed between local people and power 
holders in an equitable manner. Decision making takes place between equal 
participants working towards a common goal of optimizing the well-being of all 
concerned. 
 
Self-mobilization and active participation: This is where people take initiative, 
independently of external institutions, to change systems. They apply for external 
support and resources but retain control over how the resources are used (Arnstein 
1969; Duraiappah, Roddy and Parry 2005:6). 
 
 
While  there  are  various  schools  of  thought  and  interpretations  about  participatory 
community development, and different expectations thereof – including different degrees 
of its application and methods of achieving specific objectives, there is certainly also some 
consensus, about its main purpose as evident in the forgoing accounts. That is, participation 
is fundamentally based on the principle of community empowerment and the entrenchment 
of democracy (Arnstein 1969; Cavey 2004; Duraiappah, Roddy and Parry 2005; Hanley 
and  Hossain  2010; Solesbury 2003). To this end, Midgley (1987 in Mashego 2015:29) 
listed the key principles that should inform participation, or which participatory processes 
require, as follows: 
 
 
• Voluntary and democratic involvement of people; 
 
• To contribute to development effort; 
 
• Sharing equitably in the benefits derived; 
 
• Decision making in respect of goal setting and policy formulation; and 
 
• Planning and implementing economic and social development programmes. 
 
 
Furthermore, according to Midgley, community participation is achieved when projects that 
are desired and utilized by the community are effectively sustained by them, after all 
external support has been phased out. What is evidently undisputable in the foregoing 
account is that, participation or participatory community development thinking is centrally 
linked to the sustainable livelihood framework, and to Sen’s idea of development as 
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freedom. Achieving development requires no restrictions but rather unfettered freedom for 
people to participate in the social, political and economic life of the community, as a 
principle of justice and democratic practice (Sen 1999). 
 
Participation can therefore significantly improve the social capital of community members 
through networking and skills sharing. This can also significantly enhance the community’s 
capacity  to  demand  services  from  government,  and  to  develop  financial  schemes  to 
stimulate LED activity to improve their financial capital (Krantz 2001; Moree, McNamara 
and Acholo 2009). 
 
It must be noted however, that community participation has also been victim to abuse, in 
development planning and project management (Ruiter 2005). This is especially the case 
with mega development projects such as aerotropolis projects (Bridger 2015). Very often 
manipulation, passive participation, participation in information giving, and participation 
by consultation, are carried out in communities in the name of participation, to legitimate 
development projects. These methods offer very little power or empowerment to 
communities  compared  to  the  thorough  going  Interactive  participation  methods.  Key 
amongst the former is the appreciative inquiry (AI) method. 
 
AI is a participatory development method that prides itself by being problem solving and 
focusing on a community’s achievements instead of its deficits (Grant and Humphries 
2006). That is, AI studies moments of creativity and innovation that arise from within the 
community and fosters those efforts into positive action. Generally, the AI method begins 
with a grounded observation of the “best of what is” (Duraiappah, Roddy and Parry 
2005:21).  Duraiappah et al. (2005) explain the essence of AI as – 
 
 
The cooperative co-evolutionary search for the best in people, their organisations, and the world 
around them. It involves the discovery of what gives life to a living system when it is most effective, 
alive, and constructively capable in economic, ecological and human terms. AI involves the art and 
practice of asking questions that strengthen a system’s capacity to apprehend, anticipate, and heighten 
positive potential. The inquiry is mobilized through the crafting of the ‘unconditional positive 
question’ often involving hundreds or thousands of people. AI interventions focus on the speed of 
imagination and innovation-instead of the negative, critical, and spiralling diagnoses commonly used 
in organisations. The discovery, dream, design, and destiny model links the energy of the positive 
core to changes never thought possible. 
 
(Cooperrider, Whitney and Stavros 2003:3, cited in Duraiappah, et al. 2005:21). 
89 
 
According to Duraiappah et al. (2005) and Clouder and King (2015), AI proceeds through 
four key stages, diagrammatically represented in Figure 3 below. 
 
Figure 3:  The Appreciative Cycle 
 
 









As evident in Figure 3, the constitutive elements of AI are discovery, dream, design and 
delivery. Generally, AI is known to strengthen people’s ability to understand and appreciate 
their capabilities, and to develop positive visions for the future and to foster a culture of 
constructive action that enhances the quality of life. However, the AI method has its 
drawbacks and challenges. The success of the method depends mainly on the facilitator’s 
ability to inspire a positive attitude among participants. In addition, AI has the potential to 
repress important conversations by avoiding critical examination of phenomena, including 
its tendency to encourage avoidance of known problems (Clouder and King 2015; 
Duraiappah, Roddy and Parry 2005; Grant and Humphries 2006). 
 
As the appreciative cycle dictates, the first stage is that of discovering a phenomenon that 
“is” – in other words, something that already exists (Clouder and King 2015). This is 
followed by dreaming and envisioning the impact of a particular phenomenon. This method, 
evidently, does not allow community the power to decide for themselves the type of project 
they want first. It also does not afford the community the option to propose an alternative 
project to what they have been presented with, or even the right to reject it outrightly. The 
community is expected to participate only within the parameters of project that is already 
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determined elsewhere, and are expected to be positive and appreciative, even amid the 
possibility of dissenting opinions. Earlier, I indicated that both the pro-poor and pro-market 
LED approaches are intricately linked to contestations about the macroeconomic strategy 
of South Africa in the 1990s, between RDP and GEAR. In the next section, I critically make 
these connections explicitly to show how the contestations between RDP and GEAR are 
ongoing, and how they feature in LED discourse. 
 
3.6 UNDERSTANDING THE CONTOURS OF THE PRO-POOR AND PRO- 
MARKET LED CONTESTATION IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
The competing views on LED in South Africa are tied to – and are consistent with – the 
broader competing ideological positions on macroeconomic development strategy between 
the RDP and GEAR. The political contestations between the two ideological positions 
continues to date, although RDP has been substituted by GEAR and is no longer official 
government  policy.  These  policy  contestations  continue  to  define  the  politics  of  the 
Tripartite Alliance government which led the ANC. Nel and Rogerson (2005) and Patterson 
(2008) argued that the implicit reference by the RDP to the notion of support for community- 
based development and locally based initiatives, was in line with the pro-poor LED model. 
The same pro-poor principle also applies to the Urban and Rural Development Frameworks 
in 1997 Nattrass (2011). For example, to promote urban economic development the RDP 
prioritised the interests of the poor and states this as follows: 
 
In order to foster the growth of local economies, broadly representative institutions must be 
established to address local economic development needs. Their purpose would be to 
formulate strategies to  address job  creation and  community development (for  example, 
leveraging private sector funds for community development, investment strategies, training, 
small business and agricultural development, etc.). If necessary, the democratic government 
must provide some subsidy as a catalyst for job-creation programs controlled by 
communities and/or workers, and target appropriate job creation and development programs 
in the most neglected and impoverished areas of our country. Ultimately, all such projects 
should sustain themselves. 
 
(Mayekiso, Miller and Swilling 2000:355) 
 
 
The NDP also emphasises certain pro-poor elements listed above such as striving to enhance 
human capabilities through education and skills; decent accommodation; nutrition; safe 
communities; social security; transport and job creation. However, NDP remains committed 
to the growth paradigm. This confirms the lack of political–ideological clarity on LED in 
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South Africa. Nattrass (2011) suggested that the NDP was more a vision than a systematic 
plan  implying  that  the  spirited  emphasis  on  pro-poor  interests  was  only  rhetorical. 
Mayekiso, Miller, and Swilling (2000) noted the corporate bias of LED practice in South 
Africa. Nel and Rogerson (2005) posited that pro-poor LED models are entrenched in policy 
rather than in practice. 
 
Reflecting on the ideological complexity within development discourse in South Africa, 
Mayekiso, Miller, and Swilling (2000: 342) cited a Business Day editorial, commented on 
the growth and developmental strategy as follows: 
 
The correct marketing strategy is a  difficult one, as government has to  please the  markets, the 
unemployed, foreign investors and organised labour – all at the same time… that makes for vague 
language and a wish list that no one will attack. It also usually makes a failure of analytical nerve. 
 
Rogerson (2009) argued that LED in South Africa has always mimicked Western models 
which are well documented for their market approach. However, observers such as 
Rodriguez-Pose and Tijmstra (2005) suggest that pro-poor approaches to LED – in South 
Africa – tend to focus on the social dimensions of LED, which are detrimental to economic 
aspect. They are more focused on achieving social goals than economic goals (Rodriguez- 
Pose and Tijmstra 2005). These commentators motivate the importance of economic growth 
methods rather than social pro-poor welfare approaches to LED practice. They state that 
welfare indicators – such as life expectancy at birth, literacy and mortality rates – are 
correlated with income levels. 
 
Although economic development methods such as enterprise development in communities 
can indeed lead to improved livelihoods and look more methodically sound than LED 
strategy in general, the reality on the ground is different. The racial character of poverty and 
inequality is such that poor people, especially in former Bantustans and townships, remain 
outside meaningful economic activity. They continue to suffer neglect regarding basic 
services and have weak social capital. 
 
Bond (2002) posits that infrastructure development – especially electricity, water and 
housing – is crucial for pro-poor LED particularly due to its multiplier effects for better 
health and education, and for small and micro enterprises. Bond demonstrated how the 
social side of LED is as developmentally focused, if not more so, than the economic and 
corporate-led form. This is true especially for rural areas and townships of South Africa, 
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which desperately seek to correct the past. Bond posited that according to Eskom, for every 
 
100 households that are supplied with electricity, 10 to 20 new economic activities are 
started. He added that these economic activities range from those who need refrigerators to 
store meats, cold drinks and other perishable food products, to welding and carpentry (Bond 
2000, 2002). He also illustrated how water supply for small-scale irrigation could allow 
smallholder farmers to increase their crop production and improve food security and 
household income. Furthermore, Bond explained the multiplier economic benefits of 
infrastructure service such as sewerage service and water drainage, as well as water 
treatment, for the environment and health. This includes their contribution – together with 
skills training – to the productive capacity of poor communities (Bond 2000). 
 
These ideas, contestations, and challenges of LED theory and practice in South Africa, 
generally play out within the prevailing challenges of racialised poverty, unemployment and 
inequality, and state ineptitude and corruption, at the local government level. For the case 
of this study, that is the Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality, the home of the aerotropolis 
project, which is briefly discussed below. 
 
3.7. LED IN EKURHULENI 
 
Ekurhuleni is a category A municipality (Metropolitan Municipality). It therefore enjoys 
high population density; an intense movement of people, goods, and services; extensive 
development; and multiple business districts and industrial areas and is a center of economic 
activity with a complex and diverse economy.   In Ekurhuleni, LED thinking and practice 
are  informed  by  the  inconsistent  and  haz y  understanding  of  LED  described  earlier. 
However, Ekurhuleni, more than other metropolitan municipalities, represents an advanced 
pro-poor LED agenda from a policy perspective, with the theme of a “people-centred 
economy” (Nel and Rogerson 2005; Rogerson 2005). According to Rogerson (2005) and 
the Ekurhuleni Local Economic Development Framework (EMM 2003), the Ekurhuleni 
vision  is  to  create  an  inclusive  wealth-generating  economy  that  will  facilitate  an 
environment where all can participate in wealth-generation of the local economy. This 
transformative endeavour is emphasised by ideas such as self-reliance; BEE; support for 
disadvantaged  groups;  empowering  women  and  youth;  and  the  development  of  co- 
operatives (Rogerson 2005). According to Rogerson (2005:74), the Ekurhuleni LED policy 
framework has ten policy thrusts which are listed as follows: 
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• Local production for local need 
 
• A cooperative movement to represent community-based interventions in the local 
economy 
• A skills development network 
 
• Develop and sustain urban and commercial agriculture to build food security 
 
• Promote waste recycling and reusable energy 
 
• Build local development capital 
 
• Ensure participatory and integrated planning 
 
• Maintain linkages with the industrial base 
 
• Facilitate and grow SMMEs 
 
• Affirm local procurement. 
 
 
The above policy objectives are based on the following eight developmental principles: 
 
 
• A people focus of putting the poor first 
 
• Recognition of differences within communities 
 
• Recognition of the holistic nature of people’s lives 
 
• Linking the micro with the macro 
 




• State-led  partnership  approaches  between  communities,  labour and  the  private 
sector 
• Learning to listen. 
(EMM 2003:5; Rogerson 2005:74) 
Rogerson noted that this LED framework includes the Economic Strategy which highlights 
the economic capacitation and reorganisation of the metro to improve service delivery, 
particularly for the smooth operation of business. It also includes the LED policy and 
implementation strategy, which details the key performance areas for LED. With regard to 
the latter, he states that many strategies have been proposed, such as the following: 
 
 
• A focus on administered pricing and tariffs to ensure wider affordability of services; 
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•   Ring-fencing of  revenue  from  electricity,  water,  sewage  and  refuse  removal  to 
ensure that surpluses improve the reach and range of these services; 
•  Development zones to be established to cover to entire region of Ekurhuleni with no   
area left out; 
 
• Harnessing  conditional  grants  for  supporting  infrastructure,  public  works,  skills 
development, transport and tourism; 
• Mainstreaming the informal economy and women; 
 
• Procurement needs to be local and in support of economic growth with set targets to 
ensure 20% of all procurement is with start-up businesses; 
• Levels  to  business  and  industry linked  to  retention  plans  –  quality of  services 
provided to     business and industry is to be “directly linked to the willingness to 
remain in the region”; 
• Establishment of a register of all formal and informal businesses; 
 






It is clear from the forgoing that, the Ekurhuleni LED policy conceptualises LED mainly as 
a poverty alleviation measure. However, the economic strategy into which it is also built, 
focuses more on macro-economic development issues in the economy of Ekurhuleni, as 
Rogerson (2005) also suggested. 
 
According to Rogerson (2005), only in 2002 did Ekurhuleni start to engage seriously with 
its economic base, the manufacturing sector, and explored ways in which the municipality 
could improve job creation and production. This approach departed from the old form of 
economic development strategy of the 1990s through individual towns and cities of the old 
East Rand. 
 
The previous approach was geared to smokestack-chasing and neglected the needs of 
established industrial entities already operating in the metro (Rogerson 2005). The 
municipality’s LED department launched a study in partnership with the Corporate Strategy 
and Industrial Development Research Project based at the School of Economic and Business 
Sciences at Wits University, to assess the economy and to chart a long-term economic 
strategy (Rogerson 2005). The understanding was that Ekurhuleni industry would naturally 
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create  an  enabling  environment  from  which  local  government  could  facilitate  local 
economic development. The study found and recommended inter alia as follows: 
 
 
• The local economy of Ekurhuleni is dominated by relatively labour-intensive rather 
than capital-intensive industries. Historically, national industrial policy has focused 
on the strategic needs of the latter and neglected the development of downstream 
manufacturing, which represents the predominant industrial base of Ekurhuleni. 
• The existing local strengths to be built upon are in sectors or niches within plastic 
products, foundries and mining machinery. 
• Employment growth and output are strongest in a group of dynamic or successful 
firms, the majority of which are medium-sized. 
• Key features of successful firms include a tendency to export, to focus on quality 
and delivery time for competitiveness, and to invest in improving their capabilities 
in terms of both upgrading machinery and equipment as well as investing in training, 
accessing the national skills development levy and using other government 
incentives. 
• Education  and  skills  levels  in  the  local  economy  are  of  concern  and  skills 
development is viewed as a strategic priority. The most dynamic firms are building 
production  capabilities through  training and  are  not  held  back by the  apartheid 
legacy of poor education levels. 
• The core support requirements from local government are identified (especially b y 
better  performing firms)  as  the  improvement  of  public transport  (to  allow  split 
factory shifts) and more reliable public services (especially uninterrupted electricity 
supplies). 
• The need for local technical centres under the Advanced Manufacturing Strategy 
points to an important coordinating role to bring together industry and relevant 
branches of government to identify suitable locations. 
• Technical  centres  would  strengthen  the  local  capacity  of  enterprises  to  take 
international products and flexibly reverse engineer them such that they are South 
African appropriate. 
• The level of national government capital spending on infrastructure is a critical 
determinant of the local economic health of especially the metal products and 
machinery sectors. 
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• For machinery and equipment firms, a partnership needs to be coordinated by local 
government to ensure coordination of national industrial policy and the Mining 
Charter with plans for local sector and technology support centres. 
• A critical challenge for local government is to provide appropriate institutions to 
support firm learning, skills upgrading and technological development. 
• Specific support is required to nurture the existing sectoral strengths in Ekurhuleni’s 
industrial economy with “interventions to support firm capabilities, training and 
collective  learning  in  these  sectors,  in  conjunction  with  the  building  of  more 






Regarding the recommendations of the said study, Rogerson pointed out that by 2005 LED 
interventions had begun to unfold. Ekurhuleni had fostered the development of 25 
cooperatives throughout 10 of its industrial hives. Additional support for SMMEs was 
provided through preferential procurement procedures that were aimed at sourcing 60% of 
products and services from these enterprises (Rogerson 2005). Regarding the study’s 
recommendation to strengthen the local industrial base, the National Casting Technology 
Centre was a priority that was planned to bring together research and development. Testing 
activities  were  linked  to  foundries  close  to  mainstream  national  centres  of  casting 
operations. The skills base within the industry was supported through skills development 
programmes. 
 
Rogerson   stated   that   other   planned   development   projects   involved   the   potential 
development of a base-metal incubator in Springs. This incubator would provide 
infrastructural support for small businesses to enter the metal industry value chain, which 
would further buttress the small manufacturing industry. However, many of the objectives 
of LED as a poverty alleviation measure have not been significantly achieved. Joblessness 
and poverty continue to rise, as does urban migration; the manufacturing industry has 




The municipality’s future plan, however, is to create more employment, to stimulate LED 
and to improve the lives of the people of Ekurhuleni through leveraging its strategic road 
and rail networks, which connect with Gauteng and the entire South Africa, and beyond 
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(Rogerson 2005). The purpose here was to develop Ekurhuleni into the largest transport hub 
in Africa, through the Johannesburg International Airport (JIA), now called OR Tambo 
International Airport. An additional aim was to develop an SEZ, which would attract various 
activities such as aerospace and defence, jewellery manufacturing, ICT, electronics and 
avionics, pharmaceuticals and bio-medicals, and chemicals and plastics and associated 
activities. 
 
The development of OR Tambo, together with the Gautrain Rapid Rail Link Project (which 
links Pretoria, Sandton and Johannesburg to OR Tambo) was said to have the capacity and 
potential to stimulate local economic growth and job creation in Ekurhuleni. The expected 
result was to have all these efforts, amongst others, to coalesce in to an aerotropolis, with 
Ekurhuleni as the central hub that would see it transform into a “mega-city” or a global city 
region of Gauteng (Rogerson 2005). The aerotropolis would thus be the engine to stimulate 
LED and improve the lives of the people in Ekurhuleni, and beyond. 
 
3.8. UNDERSTANDING THE AEROTROPOLIS DEBATE 
 
The “aerotropolis” is a phrase coined by John Kasarda, a professor at the University of North 
Carolina’s Kenana-Flagler Business School, and advisor and consultant on aerotropolis 
planning in cities the world over. The aerotropolis is a new design for cities – an airport- 
integrated region - that is geographically situated around an airport spreading as wide as 
60 km from the inner cluster of hotels, offices, distribution and logistics facilities. It is made 
up of functional form, spatial form, and connections and linkages (Kasards 2018).   The 
functional form of the aerotropolis is largely non-spatially defined and often unobservable. 
It consists of firms and regular air travellers whom maybe widely dispersed from the airport. 
Its spatial form consists of physically observable development around the airport precinct 
and along its connecting surface transport corridors that can stretch far wider. Connections 
and linkages afforded by the aerotropolis’s internal and externally oriented transport 
infrastructure, integrate its spatial and functional forms (Kasarda 2018). According to 
Kasarda (2018) the aerotropolis serves as a hub, and the area around it serve as the concreate 
interface where the global meets the local, in international product flows. 
 
The aerotropolis is thus not an airport city as sometimes assumed but a city in its own right, 
with an airport as its core (Kasarda 2018; Kasarda and Linday 2011). According to Kasarda, 
the aerotropolis is the next form of living that will define and reconfigure people’s use of 
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space and how we exist within specific spaces in the 21st century. For Kasarda, the 
aerotropolis provides the next logical step in the historical progression of commerce and 
evolution of towns and cities. It provides an apposite response to globalization’s demand of 
the 21st   century, for the speedy movement and delivery of goods and services for 
international trade (Kasarda and Linday 2011; Luthili 2019). 
 
 
In the current phase of globalisation’s network of markets and trade flows, competition 
according to Kasarda, is no longer between individual companies but their supply chains. 
That is, companies compete to supply far-flung links in the chain in the shortest time 
possible. It is no longer about how far but how fast firms connect to their suppliers, 
customers, and enterprise partners locally, nationally and globally, states Kasarda (Kasarda 
2018:2). He thus also adds that time itself has become a valuable product in trade, and that 
the aviation industry is currently the fastest mode of transport through which commerce can 
leverage “the econom y of time” (Kasarda and Linday 2011). 
 
 
Kasarda quoted Joel Garreau to emphasise the centrality of aviation and the aerotropolis in 
the modern age.   He stated that cities are always formed around whatever transportation 
mode that exists at any given time. Garreau described this as follows: 
 
 
When the state of the art is a shoe leather and donkey, the result is the hilly path of Jerusalem. When 
it’s men on horseback and sailing ships, it’s the ports of Lisbon, Hong Kong, or Boston, and the 
canals of Venice and Amsterdam. The birth of railroad produces Kansas City, Omaha, and the 
stockyard of Chicago. And the mass production of the Model led first to Los Angeles and latter to 
Levittown. Today, the modern combination on the ground is the automobile and internet… Soaring 
above them all are jet aircrafts at the set of the Jet Age – collapsing Dallas and Dubai as effortlessly 
as the Internet nodes connecting them… Because of the airport… it’s possible to imagine a world 
capital in a place that was once an absolute backwater. 
 
(Garreau in Kasarda and Linday 2011:11) 
 
 
Kasarda therefore posits that the aviation industry is today’s state-of-the art mode of 
transport, which meets the demand for speed in commerce, be it for the timely delivery of 
health products to hospitals, perishable goods, or software and hardware ICT infrastructure 
in many regions of the world (Kasarda 2018; Kasards and Linday 2011; Rogerson 2018). 
According to Kasarda and Linday (2011), the principle underlying the aerotropolis is 
understanding where you are in the product cycle, how much you add, and where you can 
harness speed to raise productivity and cut costs. 
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He further states that borders no longer matter in the modern age of trade and that supply 
chains have been redefined as value chains, in which each link is required to add value to 
the finished product. Kasarda and  Linday (2011) also states that to survive and thrive, 
regions would be compelled to outcompete each other for the most lucrative links, which 
are mostly determined by innovation and incubation capacity. 
 
According to Kasarda and Linday (2011), the combination of the death of distance and just- 
in-time delivery has changed not only how firms compete, but also how cities compete as 
well: cities are willing to put aside civic pride, national heritage and executive prestige when 
pitted against falling trade barriers, cross-border conglomerates and quicksilver liquidity. 
Cities and their hinterlands also go head-to-head for the most lucrative links in the chains. 
 
Furthermore, Kasarda also postulates that the world is a network and that cities now connect 
more easily to each other than to towns and villages that lie just beyond their borders, or to 
their national capitals (Kasarda and Linday 2011). The unrestrained ability to move people, 
goods and ideas in and out as quickly as possible requires state-of-the-art connectivity and 
that, “if that means the Internet and the 747, then the cities need broadband and a hub 
(aerotropolis) if they hope to stay in the mix” (Kasarda and Linday 2011:167). New cities 
will be built around airports and many corporations will be attracted to move to their offices 
and warehouses within the aerotropolis zone to leverage time value and speed of the 
movement of goods and services (Luthuli and Houghton 2019(a)).  Hence Kasarda believes 
the airport to be the 21st  century’s nerve centre in new forms of urban and city planning 
design. 
 
According to Kasarda and Linday (2011) the need for speed will demand plenty air services, 
even  for  the  heaviest  industries,  and  for  this  to  materialise  Kasarda  proposes  the 
aerotropolis. The essence of which is an infrastructure superconductor promising no friction 
or resistance to anyone wanting to set up shop there, which also include provision of tariff- 
free trade zones or as suggested by Luthuli and Houghton (2019(a)), Special Economic Zone 
to attract MNC and TNCs. South Africa houses amongst others, the following IDZs in Port 
Elizabeth (Coega IDZ), East London (ELIDZ), Richards Bay (RBIDZ) and Gauteng (OR 
Tambo International Airport (Tang 2008). 
 
According to Kasarda (2018), an increasing number of aviation-oriented business and their 
associated residential developments are already clustering near airports, bringing about the 
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much-needed stimuli for economic activity. For example, Amsterdam Zuidas, hosts the 
headquarters of international banking giants ABN AMRO and ING, while Las Colinas 
houses  the  world  headquarters  of  nine  of  the  Fortune  1000  corporations.  Songdo 
International Business District is also the home of the United Nations Green Climate Fund, 
while he Zhengzhou Airport Economic Zone is currently the world’s largest single site for 
smartphone  production.  Foxconn  (Apple’s  original  equipment  manufacturer)  assembled 
over 100 million iPhones there in 2016, representing 70% of all iPhones sold globally. More 
than a dozen other smartphone manufacturers produced another 150 million handsets in the 
airport economic zone that year (Kasarda 2018). 
 
Closer to home, according to the Durban Aerotropolis Masterplan, the Durban aerotropolis 
project has offered prime land for industrial activity within a reasonable distance to King 
Shaka International Airport, as the Special Economic Zone. This is Zone is under the 
auspices of the Dube TradePort Corporation, which forms part of the Durban Aerotropolis 
(Luthuli and Houghton 2019(a)). The establishment of the 30 km wide Special Economic 
Zone around OR Tambo Intranational Airport is also a case in point, in the context of the 
Ekurhuleni Aerotropolis Project (Anon 2018). 
 
According  to  Kasarda,  the  many  firms  that  have  gravitated  towards  the  aerotropolis 
precincts  include  sectors  such  as  auditing,  architecture  and  engineering,  consulting, 
corporate law, international finance, and marketing, whose executives and professionals 
frequently travel to distant sites or who bring in their clients by air for meetings (Kasarda 
2018). Furthermore, he states that firms in high tech and advanced manufacturing sectors, 
are also attracted to the aerotropolis precinct because they are often heavily reliant on 
suppliers and customers in other parts of the world than in those in their vicinity, and the 
aerotropolis offers them leverage. The aerotropolis’s speedy long-distance networks and 
connectivity assist these firms to raise product quality, while cutting costs and expanding 
their market reach, thereby improving the economy of the host city and their performance 
in the global market (Kasarda 2018). 
 
It clear from the forgoing that the aerotropolis is meant to respond to the 21st-century trade 
demands for speedy movement and delivery of goods and services spawned by globalisation 
and its attended informational economy (Castells 2010). This includes the ascendency of 
information communication technology (ICT) and associated increases in the mobility and 
liquidity of capital, and demands for new forms of urban redesign, which complement rapid 
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urbanisation taking place at the global scale. The demand for speed in the delivery of goods 
and services for global trade to stimulate economic growth, which is offered by the 
aerotropolis, is thus in tandem with the neo-liberal understanding of development (Bond 
2003:147; 2010:15). In this respect, the aerotropolis project is accordingly trying to 
resuscitate the capitalist system which, according to the degrowth and post-growth theorists 
such  as  (Chertkovskaya  (2017), Koch  (2020)  and Singh  (2019), is  a  fading economic 
system. 
 
Kasarda and Lindsay emphasise that the aerotropolis is inherently a smart city (Kasarda and 
Lindsay 2011:5) – or at least a phenomenon thereof. Any aerotropolis that is a smart city 
should easily be able to become a global city. This is because the smart city (Gardner and 
Hespanhol (2017) and the global city (Sassen 2017) share common interests and mutually 
reinforce  one  another  in  creating  connections  and  linkages  between  the  cities.  These 
linkages reduce the distance and time of doing business between cities, and enhance trade 
efficiency within, and between them. This is because cities have become primary engines 
of global economic activity (CoGTA 2017(b); Joss, Cook, and Dayot 2017). 
 
As mentioned earlier (see chapter 2), the smart city is driven by data and information, which 
is imagined in terms of communication systems and the application of ICT to stimulate 
economic development and urban management. Ekurhuleni City Planning Department, 
before the introduction of the aerotropolis idea, was already planning to build a smart city, 
according to Ekurhuleni Growth and Development Strategy 2025 (EMM 2005). Ekurhuleni, 
in partnership with Hauwei (a leading global ICT company) was already transforming 
Ekurhuleni into a digital city through broadband connectivity and installation of close circuit 
television and smart  meters.  All  this  was  done to  create a conducive  environment  for 
business activity and for better and efficient management of the city in the networks of 
global flows of trade (Savious Kwinika, CAJ News: 2016). 
 
The thrust of the smart city and its enhanced efficiency for trade and city management 
through technology, complements the philosophy of the aerotropolis, hence the two are 
closely related. As mentioned earlier, this philosophy is to create an enabling environment 
to facilitate greater efficiency in delivering goods and services and trade flows in and 
beyond South Africa. 
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For Luthuli and Houghton (2019(a)) the aerotropolis idea is also increasingly introducing a 
shift in local government planning and implementation of projects from local economic 
development, to regional economic development (RED), or what others prefer to call R- 
LED. According to Luthili and Houghton (2019(a)) RED offers a more strategic economic 
development approach which outweighs community focused endeavours. It fosters greater 
cooperation for inter-local relations Collaborative effort and cooperative governance are 
and facilitates coordination of mutual sharing of resources and information (Luthili and 
Houghton (2019(b)). According to Luthili and Houghton (2019(b)) RED is more of a 
generative economic activity through collaborative multi-stakeholder relationships, 
productive networks and mutually reinforcing relationships leveraging on key economic 
assets and infrastructure that contribute to the general economic prosperity of region. LED 
on the other hand is inward-looking and can lead to competition between cities in seeking 
to attract resources and investment from MNC (Luthuli and Houghton (2019(a), (b)). 
 
He states that as the KwaZulu-Natal Department of Economic Development, Tourism and 
Environmental Affairs (EDTEA) promoted the Durban Aerotropolis as a powerhouse for 
regional economic development with the role of stimulating regional economic 
interconnectivity, job creation and growth. 
 
The increasing shift in local government planning and implementation of projects from local 
economic development, to regional economic development (RED) postulated by Luthuli 
and Houghton (2019(a)) also explain why the Ekurhuleni Aerotropolis was preferred by 
some to take on a more regional scope to be a RED project of the Gauteng City Region 
(GCR). This view recognises the fact that the bigger the player (city) in the global market, 
the better chance it stands to survive in a competitive globalised world (Rodriguez-Pose 
2008). Accordingly, Gauteng Province has competitive advantage, due to its large size, to 
leverage the global flows of trade and investment better than the EMM acting alone. The 
newly elected Ekurhuleni Mayor Mzwandile Masina, confirmed this understanding as 
follows: 
 
This programme (aerotropolis) is a deliberate growth trajectory that aims to reposition and enhance 
the value proposition of the Gauteng City Region, with a particular emphasis on the Ekurhuleni 




It must be noted also, as mentioned in the Master Plan (EMM 2015), that the GCR is also 
understood to be a “global city region,” which will trade with other global cities and regions, 
in the competitive global market. This RED approach rests on the belief that the economic 
success of the entire Gauteng region will naturally trickle down and disperse into other 
smaller cities and towns, and the hinterland functionally linked to the GCR network. 
 
As stated earlier, Kasarda and Linday (2011) and Luthuli and Houghton (2019(a)) suggest 
that the aerotropolis can stimulate positive competition between firms in the global market, 
and also lead to greater economic growth for the host cities and regions. In this scheme of 
thinking, Rogerson (2018) points attention to tourism as another potential segment of 
aerotropolis-linked  economic  development.  He  states  that  with  global  economic 
restructuring and de-industrialisation, tourism is increasingly becoming important for 
stimulating LED for many cities. Rogerson (2018) further states that many cities and 
destinations  such  as  Ekurhuleni  stand  a good  chance  to  greatly stimulate  LED  and  to 
improve the lives of the people through the aerotropolis led tourism. According to him, 
tourism is the core base for planning of place-based LED. He further states that EMM, due 
to the competitive advantage of OR International Airport as a point of arrival for 
International travellers, can, with better tourism planning, attract tourists to stay in the metro 
and create a successful tourism industry (Rogerson 2018). 
 
However, Rogerson (2018) notes that Ekurhuleni is a non-traditional tourism destination 
for Visiting Friends and Relatives travel (VFR). He states that with the aerotropolis’s 
attractions for leisure, play and entertainment, and business opportunities for the locals, 
Ekurhuleni would be able to also attract local tourists to visit, thereby further stimulating 
the local economy of Ekurhuleni. Furthermore, he also states that tourism, especially in 
Ekurhuleni has potential to offer inclusive development goals and spread the benefits of 
aerotropolis-linked economic development (Rogerson 2018). 
 
Much as advocates of aerotropolis idea celebrate its novelty and its assumed capacity to 
respond to demands of the modern age of globalisation, and to stimulate economic growth 
and development, critics are unimpressed about it. Many of the critics such as Michael 
Charles, Paul Barnes, Neal Rayan, Julia Clayton, Anita Pleumaron, and Rose Bridger paint 
a negative outlook about the aerotropolis idea. 
104  
For example, Charles, Barnes, Ryan and Clayton (2007) challenge the sustainability of 
aviation as the best mode of transport for the future to facilitate international flow of goods 
and trade, due to energy sustainability problems. These scholars highlight the fact that in 
1998, the European Union Commission argued that the current aviation trend was inherently 
unsustainable because aircraft propulsion will remain dependent on the depleting fossil fuel 
for the foreseeable future. 
 
According to Charles et al (2007) ships can operate through sail power or oars, and also by 
means of coal – or wood-fired combustion engines including nuclear reactors, as is evident 
with military vessels, such as aircraft carriers. To the contrary, there has been no technology 
to develop an effective and economically efficient fuel resource for aircrafts that can operate 
without hydrocarbon-base fuel source: Even the early Zeppelin airships which were filled 
with  hydrogen  gas,  required  internal  combustion  engines  that  operated  on  based  fuel 
(Charles  et  al  2007).  The  current  generation  of  jet  engines  requires  highly  refined 
petroleum-based fuels to operate. Alternative sources of energy therefore appear far more 
problematic for jet engines when compared to maritime transport and other existing 
automobile, which can be adjusted to alternative energy sources without the need to modify 
their engines. 
 
Rising oil prices and the threat of the end of oil production – estimated to peak by 2061 - is 
also of major concern for the sustainability of aviation. Charles et al (2007) therefore 
conclude that the oil-fuelled aerotropolis of today and the immediate future, as presently 
envisaged by Kasarda, represents an investment in an unsustainable mode of transport, 
powered by an unsustainable fuel source. Furthermore, the critics of the aerotropolis’ oil- 
fuel  dependent  energy,  Bridger  (2015)  and  Charles  et  al  (2007)  raise  environmental 
concerns associated with aviation dependency of the aerotropolis, which they posits will 
inevitably increase fossil fuel consumption and worsen the climate crisis. According to 
Charles et al (2007) in UK alone, 15-20% of greenhouse gas emissions are aviation related. 
 
Charles et al (2007) also states that the aerotropolis’s transformation of the airport from a 
mere transport facility to a critical commercial, industrial and logistical hub, lead to 
concentration of critical infrastructure in one area. This poses several risks to the economy 
of the host country, which may arise from natural disasters and terrorist attacks, in particular. 
The attacks by Israel on Hezbollah forces in Lebanon in 2006, in which Beirut International 
Airport was the target, is a case in point. 
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According to Charles et al (2007) Lebanon transport system was brought to a standstill and 
took the lifting of the port blockage to allow movement out of the country. Even a threat 
arising from a temporary closure of an airport or carriageways linked to the airport can 
potentially have a cascading negative impact with serious economic consequences. The 
costly delays in 2005 when Adelaide’s new airport in Australia commenced operations, is 
also a case in point (Charles et al 2007). 
 
For Pleumarom (2017) the aerotropolis is not a city designed to enhance the lives and 
livelihoods of ordinary urban citizens, and to provide a space to invite participatory 
democracy and civic empowerment. It is a city driven more by a combination of private 
business imperatives and state power, and it caters mostly for the privileged air passengers 
and TNCs, which want to ship their products to customers around the world (Pleumarom 
2017).  It is no surprise Bridger (2015) also states that host communities of the aerotropolis 
are  often  excluded  from  governance  of  project,  since  foreign  investors  are  major 
shareholders in most cases, placing the project even further away from control of the 
community. 
 
In  most  cases  aerotropolis  projects  are  allocated  tracks  of  land  far  exceeding  their 
operational needs. This allows them ‘non-aeronautical revenue’ from facilities on this land 
through leases and concession for airlines, to encourage them to use the airport Bridger 
(2015). Kuala Lumpur serve as a good example where the airport owns 100 square 
kilometres of land, Denver Airport in the USA with 137 square kilometres, and Dubai’s 
new airport, Al Maou allocated 140 square Kilometres (Bridger 2015). Often times this 
mean building over farmland, forests and wildlife habitats, and evictions of rural 
communities and loss of fertile soil and food production. For example, according to Bridger 
(2015), New Songdo City in South Korea, which is regarded as an exemplary aerotropolis 
by Kasarda, was built on inter-tidal mudflats adjoining Seoul’s Incheon Airport and led to 
irrevocable loss of unique habitats for vulnerable species of birds such as Mongolian Gulls 
and Black-faced Spoonbills. And Taiwan, plans expropriation of 37 square kilometres of 
highly fertile land to make way for Taoyuan Aerotropolis, which will displace 46 000 
residents Bridger (2015). This further confirms observations by Crichlow (20016); Portes 
(2016) and  Sassen  (2017) highlighted  earlier that,  the  global  city (aerotropolis)  expels 
people from its spatial circuits. 
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Bridger  (2015)  further  states  that  the  aerotropolis  projects  claim  to  act  as  “economic 
engines” for stimulating growth in the wider region, while the projects’ insidious goal is to 
maximise activity only within the aerotropolis zone. This is because development on 
aerotropolis sites are selected on the basis that they will use the aviation services to increase 
the airport’s passenger and cargo throughput (Bridger 2015). While Bridger also admits that 
the  aerotropolis  may well  stimulate  economic  growth,  she  states  that  local  small  and 
medium size enterprises stand no chance to benefit, because the aerotropolis serves the 
growth and profits of TNCs. Aircraft manufacturers, airlines, oil companies, construction, 
concrete and tarmac firms, security firms and global retail chains selling global brands, are 
also the biggest profit winners (Bridger 2015).   This, even when in the developing world 
these projects are often funded by public pension funds and taxes, to offset the risk involved 
(Pleumarom 2017). 
 
It is no wonder the aerotropolis precinct often has economic zones which offer various forms 
of support – tax breaks and unparalleled connective infrastructure - to their tenants, giving 
them an unfair advantage over other businesses. Bridger (2015) states that these tax break 
erode the general tax  base for the benefit of community. The £ 275 000 business rate 
discount granted to qualifying tenants of the Enterprise Zones at Manchester Newquay 
Airports in the UK, is a case in point (Bridger 2015). Hence Pleumarom (2017) opines that, 
the aerotropolis must be understood in the context of the global trend to financialise 
infrastructure, with airport projects being converted by the financial sector into assets that 
guarantee private investors high returns. 
 
The SEZ at OR Tambo, which are part of Gauteng Province’s IDZ, consists of two sections: 
a 7.5ha and 32ha site housing a 4ha jewellery manufacturing precinct on the southern 
precinct and an agro-processing plant in the northern precinct of the 7.5h site. According to 
(Anon 2018) sectors specializing in high-value and low-mass products and exporting these 
via airfreight are prioritized in the Ekurhuleni SEZ and enjoy corporate incentive tax of 
15%, customs and excise incentives, employment tax incentives and VAT incentives. A 
total of R208m in public funds has been secured for the bulk development of the entire 7.5ha 
OR Tambo precinct and a further R134m in public funding and R129m in private funds for 
the development of the northern precinct. 
 
SEZ are said to have capacity to bolster economic growth through job creation and to 
significantly reducing unemployment. However, according to Saggers (2015), ILO data 
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from 2006 suggests that SEZ contribute very little to employment with an estimated total of 
about 1 million workers employed by firms within SEZ across the African continent. As 
stated  earlier,  SEZ  also  come  at  a  huge  cost  and  can  be  counterproductive  to  the 




As stated earlier, governments relax labour laws in SEZ to attract MNC and TNCs and to 
allay investors’ fears of possible industrial unrest Saggers (2015). According to Paul (2013), 
this give employers free hand to exploit workers as minimum wages are not often enforced 
by government in SEZ, and workers are also exploited though long working hours and 
unsatisfactory working conditions, which take a toll on the health of workers. Scheepers 
(2012) further states that SEZ normally require land and that often such land is acquired 
through exploitative and interrupt community livelihood strategies that depend on land. He 
further states that SEZ development can also cost countries more to build than the revenue 
they bring and that SEZ significantly drop environmental standards owing to the high cost 
or regulation oversight (Scheepers 2012). 
 
 
Saggers (2015) further points that although sub-Saharan Africa has seen broad 
implementation of SEZ policies, the “race to the bottom” for FDI amongst African countries 
have stymied their success. According to Saggers (2015) African countries have relied 
heavily on monetary incentives to attract FDI rather than other controllable variables which 
can be used to create an attractive investment atmosphere. Furthermore Saggers (2015) 
states that, by over-incentivizing MNC and TNCs to attract FDI, the cost and opportunity 
cost of these efforts exceed the economic benefit thereby resulting in a process whereby 
SEZ act in contradiction to the economic goals of the country. 
 
 
Bridger (2015) further posits that facilities on the aerotropolis land also attract host 
communities and therefore drain rather than stimulate the local economy. As stated earlier 
by Sassen, optimal performance of such cities/aerotropolis depends on an enabling work 
environment for high-income talent, unencumbered by poorly paid tasks such as low-level 
office work and low-wage household work. Those tasks are meant to be handled by the least 
“talented” (Sassen 2016(b)). Low paid workers providing support services to corporations 
around the aerotropolis, such as cleaners, hotel staff, chauffeurs and security guards are 
systematically expelled from the precinct as they cannot afford to live in it. Charles et al 
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(2007) points out that there is no planning allowance within the aerotropolis model for 
dwellings that could house the working poor. Many of low paid workers find themselves 
living in the periphery and far-flung townships and having to commute long distances to 
work. Hence Pleumarom (2017) states that the aerotropolis subverts the goals of building 
inclusive, equitable and sustainable cities. 
 
 
With the forgoing account, according to Bridger, the aerotropolis provides the physical 
infrastructure for turbocharging corporate dominance, which result in widening inequalities 
and worsening of poverty (Bridger 2015). This corporate dominance confirms Kasarda’s 
long held belief when he was a still student that, the size and reach of international trade 
and multinational firms had surpassed the ability of any one state to control them, and that, 
power has shifted from the state, leaving corporations to dictate the terms (Kasarda and 
Linday 2011). 
 
The forgoing debates about the aerotropolis are also important to the development discourse 
in South Africa, especially in the wake to the two planned Aerotropoli in Ekurhuleni along 
OR Tambo International Airport, and in King Shaka International Airport, in Durban. The 
aerotropolis is therefore only a sphere into which the long-standing ideological contestations 
about development in South Africa will be extended. It will also be another sphere at which 
maleficence and corruption that is so wide-spread in the ruling party, is most likely also 
going to play out. However, the impact of these two aerotropolis project in development, 




This chapter has reflected the nature and intricacies of the South African development 
discourse. It has illustrated that development thinking and practice in South Africa are the 
product  of  a  long  history  of  development  and  its  own  ideological  evolution  and 
contestations. Some point to the rise of the Cartesian subject and the dawn of modernity as 
having prompted the discourse of development, and others point to the 1940s. I have also 
tried to demonstrate how the idea of development is variously understood within different 
ideological positions. 
 
The chapter has clarified that two streams of historical processes have influenced the 
development discourse in South Africa. That is, the liberation struggle of South Africa 
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against colonialism and apartheid, and neo-liberal global capitalist forces, which currently 
dominate the development agenda. Furthermore, I noted how South Africa has straddled the 
two ideological influences it inherited from past namely, the RDP and GEAR, which are the 
source of ideological contestations in South Africa’s development discourse. 
 
I also stated that the development discourse in South Africa, and its inherent ideological 
tensions and contestations – including its silences – have played out within mainstream LED 
thinking and practice in this country. These tensions have cascaded to the level of 
municipalities into which aerotropolis projects sit. Furthermore,  I have also provided a 
broad discussion on the debates about the aerotropolis in which I explained the theory 
behind it, including those that that oppose it. 
 
As stated earlier, It is clear in the chapter that, aerotropolis straddles both the global and the 
local sphere and serve as a hub where the global meets the local. It is also clear that 
aerotropolis also follow a pro-growth LED models by aiming to respond to 21st-century 
global trade demands for export goods spawned by global capitalism. This even when 
aerotropolis projects are in municipalities and are often couched in the language of 
community development and create an impression that they are community driven LED 
projects. The aim of the aerotroplis is therefore to attract FDI and to stimulate 
macroeconomic growth and not necessarily small-scale community LED initiatives or 
general  community development  efforts.  It  is  a  portal  to  serve  national  and  regional 
economic growth interests. It is also clear that host communities of the aerotropolis are often 
excluded from governance of project. 
 
 
furthermore, the chapter also establishes that the aerotropolis seem to also have a negative 
impact on communities due to their deleterious impact on the environment, including the 
projects’ capacity to gentrify space and divide communities along class and racial lines. 
Furthermore,  aerotropolis  projects’  tax  incentives  for  MNC  to  attract  them  to  the 
aerotropolis zone take away the much-needed taxes for the poor and promote unfair 
competition between them and local businesses operating outside the aerotropolis precinct. 
 
The chapter also makes clear that the aerotropolis, as a portal to national and regional 
economic  interests,  is  shifting  development  planning  from  LED  to  L-RED  or  RED. 
Regional economic planning, which the aerotroplis is part, cuts across several municipalities 
and thus beyond the juridical authority on any one municipality and thus championed by the 
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provincial   gov  emment.   L-RED  or  RED  planning  therefore   displaces   municipalities   and 
centres   provincial    government,    as  the   agency   of   development    planning.   This   further 
suggests   that   technically,    local   communities    in   metropolitan    municipalities    have   no 
guarantee  to  leverage  infrastructure   (aitports)   or the  aerotropolis   within  their  boundaries, 
for their  LED initiatives. 
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In this chapter, I explain the methodology that guided this study. The chapter starts with a 
brief reflection on the research design options available to researchers for studies of this 
nature. This leads into a substantiation of the selection of the research design deployed for 
the study. I also reflect on the various methods of data generation used and discuss the 
strengths and weaknesses of each method. Before the sampling technique is discussed, I 
present a brief background on the organizational structure of the aerotropolis project. This 
substantiates the sample selection decisions. I then discuss techniques for data collection; 
this is followed by reflections on data analysis methods employed in the study. Measures to 
ensure validity and reliability are discussed. Finally, I examine the limitations of the study, 
and ethical considerations, and I end with a conclusion. 
 
4.2 RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
The aim of a research design is to address the primary research question. The research 
design is a plan articulating the systematic procedures deployed to address the research 
question (Hancock, Ockleford and Windridge 2009). Specifically, a research design guides 
how data are collected and analysed during different stages of the research process. To 
address the research questions appropriately, the choice of research design should be 
informed by the nature of the study, the stated research objectives, and the researcher’s 
theoretical and philosophical stance. This means that the nature of the study should inform 
the research design. 
 
Adler and Clarke (2008) stated that research can be exploratory, where an unexplored 
research phenomenon is investigated, or descriptive, where the aim is to describe a research 
phenomenon or explanatory, where the research is aimed at explaining a research 
phenomenon. 
 
Broadly speaking, there are two research designs namely, the qualitative and quantitative 
approaches. These approaches employ specific techniques for collecting data, analysing 
data, and arriving at different conclusions (Sale, Lohfeld and Brazil 2002). The qualitative 
approach depends mostly on collecting and analysing data through a combination of 
literature review, observation, in-depth conversations with respondents, and the analysis of 
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such data. According to Durrheim (2006), the qualitative approach is flexible and non- 
sequential. 
 
By contrast, while also employing a literature review for data collection, the quantitative 
approach relies on statistical analysis. The qualitative and quantitative approaches can be 
combined to produce the mixed-methods approach, wherein both approaches are employed 
to complement each other to improve the rigor and validity of the research (Jeanty and Hibel 
2011). Mixed-methods research uses both narratives and statistics to gather data and analyse 
them. 
 
The mixed-methods approach has become popular in contemporary research practice for 
various reasons. Mixed-methods studies can use the qualitative phase to inform the 
quantitative phase or vice versa (Green, Caracelli and Graham 1989). For example, results 
from a quantitative approach, in a form of a survey, may be used to guide the personal 
interviews in a qualitative phase of the same study. The mixed-methods approach is valued 
for cross-validation and reliability purposes (Auerbach and Silverstain 2003). That is, 
findings obtained through the qualitative approach can be tested for validity using the 
quantitative approach, and vice versa. 
 
The purpose of this study was to investigate the contestations about conceptions of LED in 
the LED debate, and to explain these, from the perspective of stakeholders of the Ekurhuleni 
Aerotropolis Project. The nature of this study is descriptive, explanatory and exploratory. 
That is, the study seeks to describe and to explain the varied meanings of LED and the nature 
of contestations over it. The study further wants to explain why these contestations exist. 
The study is also exploratory as it uncovers ways in which LED thinking and practice can 
be improved in South Africa. 
 
I selected a qualitative research design which according to Hancock et al (2009), is useful 
to allow immersion in a topic and to describe, explain and explore its dimensions. This 
allowed for data collection in the form of fieldnotes from observations and conversations, 
and through qualitative interviews. The goal was to develop a complete and intense 
understanding of the topic and the stakeholders who shape the discourse around it; and to 
uncover multiple understandings, values and behaviour. The qualitative design of this study 
drew on grounded theory methodology. 
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According to Corbin and Strauss (1990:5) this method can explain, describe and offer 
predictions under certain circumstances. I selected a constructivist approach because of its 
long history of engaging both with why questions and what and how questions (Charmaz 
2008; Lawrence et al 2013; Rosenbaum et al 2016). The grounded theory method was 
congruent with a qualitative approach as well as the topic of the study. 
 
According to Strauss and Corbin (1999:71), the basic principles of grounded theory are “the 
progressive identification and integration of categories of meaning from data.” Strauss and 
Corbin (1998:71) further add that the identification and integration of categories of meaning 
“is both the process of category identification and integration (as method) and its product 
(as theory.)” Grounded theory is inductive because categories of meanings and 
understandings are the primarily source or raw data from which a theory is constructed 
(Lawrence 2013). This constructed nature of lived reality is always contaminated with 
ideological frames. Indeed, LED discourse is regarded as being ideologically shaped. 
However, as a researcher arguing from a specific vantage point in history, I am aware of the 
role of ideology in knowledge-making. 
 
The above point is important as evidenced by Charmaz’s (2008) critique of the objectivist 
grounded theory approach of the late 20th century, regarding its naive empiricism and 
impartiality. She stated that although grounded theory claims to develop theory from the 
data or subject of study itself, the process is not a value-free, passive, neutral and objective 
inquiry. Subjectivities are embedded in data analysis as well as data collection (Charmaz 
2008). What objectivist research defines as factual still reflects partial knowledge and 
particular perspectives, priorities, and positions. A researcher must be sensitive to these 
when undertaking a grounded-theory study (Charmaz 2008). 
 
Grounded theory therefore provides an explanatory framework within which to understand 
the subject under study (Strauss and Corbin 1998:71). In grounded theory, data collection 
and analysis happen simultaneously and the researcher moves back and forth between data 
collection and analysis, in an attempt to ground the analysis of data (Lawrence et al 2013; 
Rosenbaum et al 2016; Strauss and Corbin 1998). Strauss and Corbin (1998) stated that 
instead of providing a series of steps to be followed – from formulating a research question 
to analysis and finally to a research report, grounded theory encourages continuous review 
of earlier stages of research. If necessary, the direction of the research should be changed 
along the way. 
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According  to   Charmaz   (2008:397),   “grounded   theory,   not   only  is   a   method   for 
understanding  research  participants’  social  constructions  but  also  is  a  method  that 
researchers  construct  throughout  inquiry.”  Charmaz  (2008)  also  stated  that  grounded 
theorists use various techniques to focus their data gathering and analysis. She added that 
what they do, how they do it, and why they do it, arise through their interactions with 
research settings, data, research participants, stakeholders, key informants, colleagues – and 
themselves. 
 
4.3 QUALITATIVE RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
The qualitative research design, because of its interpretive nature (Holloway 1997), is a 
form of social enquiry that seeks to understand social reality as it unfolds. This approach 
aims to investigate a social phenomenon and understand it in the way it is experienced and 
interpreted by people (Malterud 2001). The qualitative approach therefore takes place in a 
natural setting of the subject of enquiry. Undertaking a study in a natural setting allows the 
researcher sufficient proximity to observe the full experience of interaction with the research 
phenomenon (Lieber 2009). This provides the basis for attempting to make sense of or 
interpret it. 
 
Gerring (2007) stated that unlike the quantitative method, in qualitative research the quality 
of gathered data supersedes the quantity of respondents. This means an emphasis on the 
richness of descriptive information extracted from the respondents. By contrast, the 
numerical strength of a statistical analysis is emphasised as this can support the 
generalizability of findings. Gerring (2007) observed that the involvement of many 
respondents does not necessarily produce insight, and that more insights can be produced in 
a study with few respondents. 
 
Qualitative research approaches allow for a variety of techniques for gathering data, such 
as review of literature, face-to-face or telephonic interviews, focus-group discussions, and 
participant observation (Creswell 2003). In qualitative research, face-to-face or one-on-one 
telephonic interviews are used to gather data in a setting that grants the participant adequate 
space to express his or her views freely, without potential intimidation from other people 
(like enumerators), and without the distraction of a structured questionnaire (Auerbach 
2003). This technique is  especially useful  when  dealing with controversial issues. The 
nature of qualitative interviews can be either structured or unstructured. 
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The former refers to when a researcher uses a predetermined set of questions to guide the 
interview. The latter means that questions are merely guiding questions and the interview 
resembles a natural conversation. Depending on the depth and nature of the enquiry, face- 
to-face interviews can take 30 minutes or longer. The guiding principle is that both the 
interviewer and the interviewee should be satisfied that the interview has exhausted as many 
facets of the topic under investigation as possible. 
 
Focus-group discussions are another data-gathering technique commonly used in qualitative 
research. A group can have 4 to 10 people including a moderator who guides the discussions, 
and possibly a note-taker. The presence of the moderator ensures that all discussions are 
consistent with the theme being discussed. This technique is useful for data gathering on 
policy matters, as participants can provoke discussions that enrich the conversation. The 
technique is also useful because the moderator may change or modify the approach during 
the discussion to suit the atmosphere and purpose of the study. Furthermore, the moderator 
can ensure that all views, including minority ones, are heard by inviting all participants to 
voice their opinions. 
 
However, focus groups have limitations. For example, they are not effective when dealing 
with  sensitive  issues.  Furthermore,  depending  on  the  moderators’  experience  with 
conducting such discussions, focus groups may be heavily influenced by dominant persons 
in the group (Smithson 2000). 
 
Qualitative methodology was appropriate for this study for several reasons. A main reason 
was the descriptive, explanatory and exploratory nature of the study. The research topic 
required repeated in-depth conversations (interviews) with stakeholders in the aerotropolis 
project to examine the contestations and varied conception of LED among them. Through 
in-depth conversations with the aerotropolis project stakeholders, I was able to uncover rich 
descriptive data, which I interpreted to explore different possibilities in addressing the 
research questions. The use of this method was consistent with Holloway’s (1997) 
observation that the strength of qualitative research is its interpretive approach to social 
phenomenon. 
 
4.4 SAMPLING AND PARTICIPANTS 
 
Sampling is an important element in research. Sampling techniques are used to select unique 
and informative parts of the population of interest to the study. From the participants, a 
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comprehensive understanding and conclusions about the research phenomenon are drawn, 
from observing only the selected population (Palys 2012). Several sampling techniques are 
used in qualitative research, such as convenience sampling, purposive sampling and 
theoretical sampling (Strauss and Glaser 1967). Strauss and Glaser (1967) describe these 
techniques as follows. Convenience sampling is based on accessible respondents only, 
whereas purposive sampling draws certain targeted respondents. Theoretical sampling is 
utilised mostly in theorising new data. 
 
In purposive sampling, units of observation are selected based on their strategic value with 
regard to the research question. This means that key informants can be selected for their 
experience, knowledge, gender, age, proximity to the phenomenon under study, or any other 
characteristic considered important in the study. 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the purpose of this study was to investigate the contestations 
and varied conceptions of LED in the LED debate and to explain these from as wide and 
diverse a group as that of the stakeholders in Ekurhuleni Aerotropolis Project. As also 
mentioned earlier (see chapter 1), the diversit y of the stakeholders’ ideological orientations, 
socio-economic background, geographical location, and sphere of function created a perfect 
methodological setting and an interesting avenue to achieve the objective of this study. The 
diversity of the stakeholder can potentially also reflect the general perceptions about LED 
in the wider community, in South Africa. This sampling choice also came with an added 
advantage because stakeholders were involved in the same project (aerotropolis), which also 
served as a common reference point for examining their views and perceptions about LED. 
Therefore, consistent with the nature of this study, purposive sampling was used to select 
stakeholders of the aerotropolis project as my interviewees on LED. This approach also 
heightened the rigor of the analysis of data and the entire study in general through the use 
of triangulation, which I explain in some detail later in this chapter. 
 
Purposive sampling was therefore deployed, as the aim was to uncover in-depth knowledge, 
opinions and understandings from the people within the varied categories of stakeholders, 
in  the  aerotropolis  project.  To  this  end,  three  groups  of  purposive  informants  were 
envisaged. The first was official stakeholders such as government representatives and 
political authorities. The second was civil society, and the third group was specialist 
consultants. Table 4 provides a synoptic view of sampling for the first group. 
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Participant group Number   of   stakeholders 
 
in this committee or 
group 
Number of people selected for 
 
participation 
Mayoral committee 14 4 
Political steering committee 8 2 
Technical steering committee 7 5 
Technical working group 6 4 
Total 35 15 
 
Table 4 shows that interviewees were purposively selected from (a) members of the Mayoral 
committee, (b) members of the political steering committee, (c) members of the technical 
steering committees, and (d) the technical working group members. Eleven members of the 
Mayoral  committee  and  an  additional  three  members  representing  Gauteng  Province 
brought the number of the committee to 14 members. From these 14 members, the following 
four respondents were interviewed face-to-face. 
 
 
• EMM former Mayor, Mondli Gungubele 
 
• Kolobe, from Gauteng Provincial Government 
 
• Ismail Vadi, MEC for Road and Transport in Gauteng Province 
 
• Khaya, former EMM, MMC for economic development. 
 
 
The respondents were selected because they were instrumental in planning the Ekurhuleni 
Aerotropolis Project and were available and willing to participate in the study. With regard 
to the political steering committee, from the eight representatives, two were selected for 
interviews. They were the chairperson of the committee, Khaya, MMC of Economic 
Development in Ekurhuleni, and Pooley, who represented the EMM City Planning 
department in the list of stakeholder entities represented in this category, listed below. 
 
 
• MMC: Roads and Storm Water; 
 
• MMC: Public Transport and Provisioning; 
 
• MMC: Human Settlement; 
 
• HoD: City Planning; 
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• HoD: ICT; 
 
• HoD: Transport; 
 
• HoD: Human Settlements; and 
 
• HoD: Roads and Storm Water. 
 
 
The two respondents were selected partly because of their centrality in the project, with 
Khaya being the chairperson of the committee and Pooley having been responsible for the 
initial EMM plans to develop a new city. The other reason for selecting them was their 
availability and willingness to participate in the study. Most representatives in the political 
steering committee category were either unavailable or were unwilling to be interviewed. 
The interview with the chairperson of the committee proved to be invaluable because of the 
overview and insight into the diverse ideas and viewpoints that existed within the group he 
chaired, which he shared with me.The technical steering committee was made up of seven 




• Khaya, Ekurhuleni Economic Development MMC (also member of the Mayoral 
committee); 
• Zille, ACSA; 
 
• Tsakane, EMM Marketing and Communications Department; 
 




• Pooley (HoD), EMM City Planning. 
 
 
These respondents were selected and interviewed because of their centrality in the 
aerotropolis project and their availability at the time of the fieldwork. The technical working 
group was composed of a chairperson, Chaiphus Chauke, and five Work Stream conveners. 
Four interviews were conducted with the following conveners and their Work Streams: 
 
 
• Marula: Business, Research, Education and Economic Planning Work Stream; 
 
• Zille: Land Use, Transport, Freight, Sustainability, Environment and Safety Work 
 
Stream (also member of the technical steering committee); 
 
• Tsakane:  Marketing  and  Communications  Work  Stream  (also  member  of  the 
technical steering committee); and 
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• Kolobe: Governance and Institutional Structures and Funding Work Stream. 
 
 
The above-mentioned respondents were selected purposively because each convener headed 
a Work Stream. The reason for selecting them was that they were well placed to know the 
broad issues and ideological dynamics within each of the Work Streams they each headed. 
Only one convener, who chaired the Information and Communication Technology Work 
Stream, was not interviewed because he was unavailable. 
 
As is evident in the foregoing accounts, several respondents were involved in more than one 
structure at the same time. For example, former MMC for local development Khaya served 
as both the chairperson of the political steering committee and as a member of the Mayoral 
committee.  Pooley was  also  serving in  the  political  steering committee  while  being a 
member of the Land Use, Transport, Freight, Sustainability, Environment and Safety Work 
Stream. Conveners of the technical work group were also members of the technical steering 
committee chaired by Jack van der Merwe. 
 
These double roles of respondents were an advantage for greater insight and validation, and 
reduced  the  initially  planned  sample  size.  For  respondents  who  served  in  several 
committees, their reflections and insights during the interviews were insightfully drawn 
from  the  diverse  views  represented  within  the  different  committees.  This  process  also 
worked well for validating the reliability of interviews, because the views raised could be 
crosschecked and validated by other respondents. Within the categories listed above 
(Mayoral committee, political steering committee, technical steering committee, and 
technical working group), a total of 15 interviews were conducted. The sample comprised 




The second cluster of respondents was selected from civil society organisations, such as 
businesses in Ekurhuleni, ward councillors, and community-based organisations. The 
categories and their representatives were drawn from the Aerotropolis Master Plan. 
According to the master plan, the civil society representatives on the list were consulted 
during the forums leading to adoption of the master plan. 
 
Given the number of stakeholders in the categories and the challenge of respondents’ 
 
availability, not  everyone  was  interviewed.  Interviews were conducted  with  selected 
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respondents who were purposively chosen within their categories and were available and 
willing to participate in the interview, at the time of the fieldwork. 
 
Community respondents were identified from a long list of names of organisations which 
appeared in the master plan. This list was used as an entry point to respondents’ contacts, 
with snowball sampling then being used to identify other willing participants who were 
involved but did not appear on the list. The snowball technique was useful because many 
people  on  the  list,  especially  business  people,  had  left  the  organisations  they  had 
represented, and some were unreachable because of changed contact details. The snowball 
technique also helped because at the time of my fieldwork the EMM council composition 
had changed following the 2016 local government elections. Ward councillors of the 
previous EMM council were thus traced using the snowball technique. 
 
Under the category of business, I purposefully targeted businesses in Ekurhuleni. Under 
civil society, I targeted ward councillors and CBOs, all of whom had either appeared in the 
master plan list or participated during the aerotropolis consultations. I made substantial 
effort to cover respondents across all regions of Ekurhuleni and across different spatial 
settings, such as towns, townships, suburbs and informal settlements. I did this to maintain 
the diversity of perspectives and opinions. Table 5 provides a list of names of respondents 
and the various entities that they represented in the project. 
 
Table 5: Critical cases for business stakeholders as purposive sample units. Pseudonyms 





Name Capacity Organisation 
Mr Nkosi Chairperson Brakpan  Agricultural  Forum  (an  agricultural 
business  activity  operating  in  the  Brakpan 
Townships) 
   
Member of Ekurhuleni Cooperatives League 
   
Member of Ekurhuleni Business Council 
Mr Kosher Chairperson East Rand Industrial Association 
   
Member of Ekurhuleni Business Association 
   
CEO of the Benoni Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry 
121  
Harry Member Ekurhuleni Business Initiative 
 
 
Ekurhuleni Chamber of Commerce (under the 
Afrikaner Sakekamer in Benoni) 
Captain of Industry Forum 
Ambassadors’ Forum 
Mr Moreki Chairperson Greater Tembisa Business Council 
 
 
Tembisa Business Association 
 
 
Member of Ekurhuleni Business Council 
Mr Makula Chairperson Salute Empowerment Forum 
 







Mrs Mlangeni Member Tembisa Chamber of Commerce 
Mr Smilo Former 
chairperson 




It is evident from Table 5 that many respondents from the business sector were affiliated 
with several other business organisations in Ekurhuleni, which had also participated in the 
aerotropolis projects’ consultative process. Each respondent in this category was affiliated 
to two other business organisations on average. Some people were affiliated to three or 
enjoyed leadership positions in all of them. The multiplicity of membership of my 
respondents in various business entities was an advantage. It added rigour to the knowledge 
and depth of insights regarding the intricacies of issues affecting the business community 
in Ekurhuleni. Furthermore, their multiple roles reduced the number of interviews initially 
intended under this category, and allowed for verification and validation of findings in this 
category also. 
 
Table six below, lists the names of ward councillors who were interviewed. 
 
 
Table 6: Critical cases for civil society stakeholders (Ward Councillors) as purposive 
sampling units. Pseudonyms are used in all cases. 
 





Mr Jiyane Region  F:  Ward  38 Brackendowns, Brackenhurst, 
 Alberton  Albertsdal, part of Meyersdal, south of 
Hart Avenue 





















Mrs Bodibe Region  C:  Ward  24 
Benoni 
Ms Hassan Region  D:  Ward  29 
Benoni 







Mr  Plum Region  E:  Ward  79 
Kwa-Thema 
Mr Zwide Region  A:  Ward  21 
Germiston 
Mrs Ngena Region  F:  Ward  63 
Katlehong 2 




Mr Hanekon Region  B:  Ward  1 
Tembisa 
Motsamai, part of Motloung and Twala 
Sections 
Meadowbrook,  Wilbart,  Solheim,  parts 
of  Sunnyridge,   Symhurst,   Fishershill, 
Dawnview, Primrose Hill, Creston Hill, 
Simmerfield, Wychwood and 
Extensions, Jupiter Ext 2, Summerfield, 
parts of Germiston Exts, Rand Refinery, 
Airport Park – Rand Airport, Gosforth 
Park, Elandshaven and Castleview 
Illiondale, Sebenza, De Klerkshof, 
Clarens  Park,  Eden  Glen,  Isandovale, 
Edendale,  Hurlyvale,  Elma  Park  and 




Actonville and Benoni South 
 
 
Eden Park Ext 5, Phola Park informal 
settlement (Casovo and Emalahleni), 
Thokoza  Ext  1  (Othandweni), 








Khumalo section, Silluma View, Dikole 
Ext 1 
Kempton Park CDB Ext 24, Allen Grove, 
Nimrod Park, Aston Manor, Glen Marais 
Ext 1-7 
Clayville Ext 21, 24, 27,29, 33, 34, 45. 
Midstream, Clayville West, Tswelopele 
Ext 08 & Transit 
 
 
Table seven lists the names of representatives of CBOs, who were also interviewed. These 
representatives were interviewed based on their availability and willingness to participate 
in the study, at the time of the field work. 
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Table 7: Critical cases for civil society (CBOs) stakeholders as purposive sampling units. 
Pseudonyms are used in all cases. 
 



























Community youth representative and 









Ms  Mshengu 
Ward 63 youth group Katlehong 
 
Mr Sello 





Mr Andile Community activist in Ward 21 Germiston 
Mr Dlanga Youth  leader  and  member  of  the 





Table eight lists the names of project consultants who were interviewed. Both consultants 
were from a consultancy firm, Aurecon. They we tasked with specific roles in the 
aerotropolis project. 
 




Mr Deon Aurecon: convener of consultant 
teams  and lead specialist consultant 
Mrs Amanda  Aurecon: participation specialist 
consultant 
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4.5 BACKGROUND TO THE AEROTROPOLIS PROJECT OF EKURHULENI 
 
As explained in Chapter 1, EMM is a municipality on the East Rand in Gauteng Province 
and is home to the biggest airport in South Africa, OR Tambo International Airport. It is a 
category A municipality into which the administrations of the 11 towns of the former East 
Rand were amalgamated (EMM n/d). It is one of the most densely populated areas in the 
province and the country. The percentage of economic sectors of the region are 
manufacturing (23%), finance and business (21%), community service (20%), trade (15%), 
transport (11%), construction (4.1%), electricity (2.3%), and mining (2.3%). The 
demography and the size of the economic activity of Ekurhuleni therefore meets the 
requirements for a category A municipality amongst which is, high population density; an 
intense movement of people, goods, and services; extensive development; and multiple 
business districts and industrial areas and is a center of economic activity with a complex 
and diverse economy, as stipulated in section 2 of the Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998 
(RSA 1998). 
 
Ekurhuleni is regarded as the transport hub of South Africa, not only because it is home to 
OR Tambo international Airport but also because it has the country’s largest railway hub, 
modern freeways and expressways (EMM n/d).   It is connected by road, rail and air to 
various destinations in and outside South Africa. Ekurhuleni accounts for nearly a quarter 
of Gauteng’s economy, which in turn contributes over a third to the national GDP (EMM 
n/d). It is in Ekurhuleni that the aerotropolis is planned. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the 
aerotropolis  concept  began  at  the  University  of  North  Carolina  through  the  work  by 
Professor John Kasarda. The concept denotes a new urban form that has begun to evolve 
around airports (City Planning Department – Spatial Planning Directorate 2013). According 
to the Spatial Planning Directorate, an aerotropolis consists of an airport city and outlying 
corridors and clusters of aviation-linked businesses and associated residential development. 
It stretches for up to a 30-km radius around the airport. 
 
In a 2013 Special Aerotropolis Publication by the City of Ekurhuleni, the former executive 
Mayor of Ekurhuleni, Mondli Gungubele echoed Kasarda’s reflections on the evolution of 
modes of transport and the emergence of new cities. He stated that the aerotropolis is to be 
the game changer for modern city planning in the world (EMM 2013). Gungubele also stated 
that Airports are increasingly becoming attractive destinations for entertainment, hotels, 
hospitality, conferences services and trade. He concluded that the Ekurhuleni Aerotropolis 
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Project is thus a response to leverage from the OR Tambo airport, a trend that has also 
emerged in other countries (EMM 2013). 
 
4.6 THE AEROTROPOLIS: FROM AN IDEA TO THE MASTER PLAN 
 
In South Africa, and specifically in Ekurhuleni, the idea of the aerotropolis has an interesting 
background. This background can be best captured by an antithetical descriptor of being a 
planned and supported coincidence. What would become known as the aerotropolis in 2018 
started around the 2010–2011 as the Ekurhuleni Spatial Development Framework Project 
aimed at stimulating the economy of Ekurhueleni. The project was at that time championed 
by the City Planning Department of EMM during the mayoral tenure of Ntombi Mekgwe in 
Ekurhuleni. 
 
The initial operational task team of the aerotropolis consisted of Jack van Der Merwe, who 
was   appointed   as  the   convener,   and  representatives   from   the   Gauteng  Provincial 
Government (GPG) and EMM, drawn from the following departments: 
 
 
• Economic Development (GPG and EMM); 
 
• Roads and Transport (GPG and EMM); 
 
• Infrastructure Development (GPG and EMM); 
 
• Treasury and Finance (GPG and EMM); 
 





The project coordinating team was made up of members of the mayoral committee of 
Ekurhuleni, representatives of the Gauteng Provincial Government and the Premier’s office. 
This team was tasked with the conceptual framework of the project and the broader plan for 
its implementation, including setting up the operational task team. The operational task team 
put in place five Work Streams, coded A–E, with each being assigned its own tasks. 
 
Work Stream A was responsible for the conceptual framework; B, for regional spatial 
development planning; C, for planning the aerotropolis; D, for providing the aerotropolis 
master plan  and  procurement  guidelines;  and  E,  for developing  a  marketing plan  and 
creating a consultative forum with all stakeholders. All Work Streams had their own 
stakeholders  of  various  types,  representing  government  departments  and  ministries, 
126  
business and labour unions, and community organisations. The organisational structure is 
reflected diagrammatically below. 
 
 






Source: Van der Merwe 2013 
 
 
The preliminary work prepared by the Work Streams would later feed into the work of a 
consultancy consortium. This consortium was led by consultancy firm Aurecon, which was 
appointed by EMM in 2013 to provide the final 30-Year Aerotropolis Master Plan. The 
consortium consisted of the following specialist firms: 
 
 
• Turner & Townsend: costing and finance specialists; 
 
• RTLK: Urban design and planning; a specialist firm in aerotropolis planning; 
 
• MXD: Development strategists and real estate economist and planners; 
 
• CSIR: Transport logistic specialists; and 
 
• Salt and Pepper: Marketing (EMM 2015). 
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At the time of undertaking the fieldwork between 2016 to 2017, much of the above- 
mentioned project organisational structure had changed. The result was the institutional 
arrangement shown in Figure 4, which finally saw the Ekurhuleni 30-Year Aerotropolis 
Master Plan finalized. 
 





Source: Author’s field notes 
 
 
Figure 5 shows that the political steering committee was the consultative intermediary 
between the technical steering committee and the Mayoral committee. The role of the 
committee was to consider submissions from the technical steering committee and to report 
to the Mayoral committee. The political steering committee was constituted under the 
leadership of Khaya, former Ekurhuleni member of mayoral committee (MMC) for 
economic development, with the following HoDs and MMC as members: 
 
 
• MMC: Public Transport and Provisioning; 
 
• MMC: Roads and Storm Water; 
 
• MMC: Human Settlement; 
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• HoD: City Planning; 
 
• HoD: ICT; 
 
• HoD: Transport; 
 
• HoD: Human Settlements; 
 
• HoD: Roads and Storm Water. 
 
 
The technical steering committee was constituted with Jack Van der Merwe as its 
convener. It included representatives of the following stakeholders as members: 
 
 
• Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality Departments; 
 
• Gauteng Provincial Government Departments; 
 
• Gauteng Growth and Development Agency; 
 
• Airports Company South Africa; 
 




• Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa (PRASA). 
 
 
The technical steering committee was first established as the Operational Task Team by 
joint agreement between the Premier of Gauteng and the Mayor of EMM. After the 
appointment of Aurecon (the private consulting service provider for the project), the 
technical steering committee became the coordinating agent among all key stakeholders of 
the project.  It  considered  reports  from the technical working groups before submitting 
reports to the political steering committee and the Mayoral committee. 
 
The technical working group acted as the interface between the Working Streams and the 
technical steering committee. Inputs from the Working Streams were reviewed for 
consistency and integrated before they were reported to the technical steering committee. 
The technical working groups were constituted under the leadership of Chaiphus Chauke, 
the Economic Development (HoD), the Aerotropolis Project Office, and conveners of the 
various Working Streams, namely: 
 
 
• Marula, from Airports Company SA (ACSA), who chaired the Business, Research, 
Education and Economic Planning Work Stream; 
• Zille, from ACSA, who chaired the Land Use, Transport, Freight, Sustainability, 
Environment and Safety Work Stream; 
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• Tsakane,  Divisional  Head:  business  relationship  in  EMM,  who  chaired  the 
 
Marketing and Communications Work Stream; 
 
• Kolobe, from Gauteng Provincial Government, who chaired the Governance and 
 
Institutional Structures and Funding Work Stream; 
 





Each Work Stream was constituted by various organs and tasked with specific 
responsibilities. Phumla’s Business, Research, Education and Economic Planning Work 
Stream was tasked with delivering on aspects related to social upliftment, social 
infrastructure, culture and heritage, and community participation. This Work Stream was 
constituted by representatives from the following stakeholder representatives: 
 
 
• HoD: Human Resource Management and Development; 
 
• Health and Social Development; 
 
• HoD: Sports, Recreation, Arts and Culture; 
 
• Divisional Head: Economic Research, Planning & Strategy; 
 
• Divisional Head: Industrial Investment Facilitation; 
 
• Divisional Head: IDP; 
 









The Land Use, Transport, Freight, Sustainability, Environment and Safety Work Stream, 
under the leadership of Zille, was tasked with developing the following: a land-use plan; 
integrated transport master plan, including road network plan; strategic public-transport 
network plan; freight logistics plan; rail network plan; non-motorised transport plan; and 




• HoD: Water and Sanitation; 
 
• HoD: Energy; 
 
• HoD: Waste Management Services; 
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• HoD: Environment; 
 
• Director: Strategic Support and Planning (Human Settlements); 
 
• Divisional Head: Specialist Projects; 
 
• Divisional Head: Transport Planning; 
 
• Divisional Head: Property Development; 
 
• Executive Manager: Proactive Services; 
 





Tsakane’s Marketing and Communications Work Stream was responsible for the following: 
a communication and marketing plan; public participation and consultation; consultations 
with stakeholders regarding a 5-year implementation plan; and marketing material. The 
members of this team were representatives from the following stakeholder entities: 
 
 
• Divisional Head: Citizen Relationship; 
 









Kolobe’s Governance and Institutional Structures and Funding Work Stream was tasked 
with  delivering  the  following:  governance  structures  and  institutional  arrangements, 
financial and funding plan, and implementation. Members of the committee were: 
 
 





4.7 DATA GATHERING 
 
Data collection was guided by the tool in (Appendix A). Because this study was interested 
in rich descriptive data that would reflect respondents’ subjective views on the study topic 
(rather than a statistical analysis), I gathered data through interviews. These were in-depth 
semi-structured single face-to-face interviews. This format allowed respondents to express 
their views freely and without potential intimidation by the presence of colleagues (Kothari 
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1985). The interviews allowed space for the respondents to clarify their views in detail and 
provided room for exploration and probing of issues that came up for discussion. 
 
Guided by the objectives of the study, I developed a set of theme-based questions that 
guided the interview discussions. This technique assisted the extraction of rich qualitative 
data. Respondents were not restricted to a set of pre-determined questions but could speak 
broadly on the issues and themes put to them, without deviating from the subject matter. 
This process allowed for deeper probing of matters that were raised as the interviews 
unfolded.  The  face-to-face  interviews  were  recorded  on  a  voice-recording  device  and 
through handwritten notes. Furthermore, data were collected from literary material such as 
books, journal articles, government documents and newspapers, and through the internet. 
 
4.8 DATA ANALYSIS 
 
With consideration of the broad objectives of the study, I coded key issues and themes that 
emerged in the literature and the findings from my fieldwork, during the study. The primary 
codes were created by searching for words, phrases and concepts that were repeated most 
often during the interviews and comparing these to one another. This first step of coding 
was consistent with Corbin and Strauss’ (1990) grounded theory method. It was also 
congruent with Auerbach and Silverstein’s (2003) observation that coding of data makes 
patterns of ideas visible and helps to reduce data to a manageable size. 
 
The coding of issues, phrases and concepts was then developed into primary categories. 
According to Corbin and Strauss (1990) these categories are higher in level and more 
abstract than the concepts they represent. Categories were also generated through the same 
analytic process of making comparisons to identify similarities and differences. Typically, 
this meant multiple build-ups of new categories through comparing them with others, and 
building new ones based on emerging patterns of similarities and differences. I repeated this 
process of comparing categories and constituting new patterns, based on their similarities 
and differences many times, until secondary thematic categories addressing the research 
questions became clearer. 
 
This process follows the general rules for theoretical sampling in a grounded-theory 
qualitative  research  design.  There  was  an  iterative  interchange  between  purposively 
selecting key informants, interviewing, transcribing, coding and theoretical reflection. 
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Thematic categories were then clustered with reference to literature, into tertiary categories. 
These were theoretical categories from which the final analysis of the data arose. The 
creation of categories is important because they are the cornerstones of developing a theory 
(Corbin and Strauss 1990). Theoretical memos were maintained throughout the coding 
phases to avoid losing valuable insights. Key among this stage was noting and explaining 
the nature of the various relationships between different categories and the meanings of new 
emergent patterns. 
 
The coding and creation of theoretical categories were performed with the assistance of 
AtlasTI. According to Smit (2002:65), AtlasTI is “a powerful workbench for qualitative data 
analysis, particularly for large sections of text, visual and audio data… the software offers 
support to researchers during the data analysis process, in which texts are analysed and 
interpreted using coding and annotating activities.” This software is praised for its network- 
building capacity, which makes it possible for researchers to visually draw parallels between 
selected texts, memos and codes (Smit 2002). 
 
4.9 VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY 
 
Validity and reliability are key aspects of any research and can be enhanced through several 
techniques (Babbie and Mouton 2006). Validity refers to the truthfulness and accuracy in 
the method of collecting data and the analysis thereof, including the process of drawing 
conclusions and the dissemination of the research results. Reliability refers to uniformity in 
the subject under study (Keats 2000). According to Neuman (2006), qualitative researchers 
are mainly interested in establishing the trustworthiness, credibility and authenticity of the 
data. 
 
To ensure dependability of the data, I painstakingly maintained complete research records 
in the form of handwritten notes and used a voice-recording device to record the interviews. 
The recorder ensured access to verbatim accounts of respondents and allowed me to refer 
to recorded data for verification purposes. The validity of the analysis of data was also 
improved by cross-checking the responses given by respondents, against the views of their 
colleagues. 
 
Yardley (2000) proposed that suitable criteria for qualitative research include sensitivity to 
the context, commitment and rigour, transparency, coherence, impact and importance. I 
remained sensitive to the complex network of the diversity of stakeholders and role-players 
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involved in the aerotropolis project. I purposively included the coordinating committee, the 
political steering committee, and the technical steering committee members because they 
were largely responsible for the project. 
 
In terms of commitment and rigour, I maintained extensive engagement with the topic 
throughout the iterative processes of sampling, interviewing, transcribing and analysis. For 
example, I asked all respondents about their understandings of LED in general terms, first. 
I then followed up by asking them about their understanding of LED in relation to the 
aerotropolis. I also asked respondents their understanding of the meaning of local in general 
terms first, and followed by asking them same, in relation to LED, before asking them 
further their understanding of local in relation to the aerotropolis project. I repeated the same 
approach with regards to examining idea of development as well – see Appendix A for 
interview guide. This process of examining respondents’ views and understandings of LED 
from various vantage points, together with the method of repeating same questions to 
respondents, strengthened the rigor of my analysis. This method also assisted to identify 
inconsistencies and contradictions in respondents’ views about LED. 
 
4.10 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
 
There were not many serious limitations in this study. The most prominent was that of 
gaining access to potential respondents and gaining their trust and confidence. Because of 
the busy schedule of high-profile senior government bureaucrats and politicians, and the 
challenge  of  getting  them  to  commit  to  an  interview  appointment,  not  all  targeted 
respondents were interviewed. For example, over 24 months and despite my making 
countless calls and sending emails to request an interview with Chaiphus Chauke, the 
Economic Development HoD in Ekurhuleni, who was also the convener of the aerotropolis 
in Ekurhuleni, those efforts were in vain. 
 
The same applied regarding Jack van der Merwe, whom I tried to contact over 6 months to 
request an interview. Van der Merwe was the overall convener of the aerotropolis project 
and was also a representative from the Gauteng Provincial Government. The absence of 
these two key individuals has somewhat limited the insight obtained from people at the 
driving edge of the project. However, efforts were made to extract sufficient insight from 
senior official of the coordination committee, political steering committee, and technical 
steering committee – with whom the two absent individuals worked closely. 
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Another challenge was to gain the confidence and trust of my respondents to guarantee their 
authentic responses. This was demanding, especially during a turbulent time of mistrust and 
political witch-hunting in South Africa. However, gatekeepers proved highly effective in 
this regard. I identified several gatekeepers who facilitated smoother access to senior 
officials. Once access was gained and a measure of trust instilled, I provided documentary 
proof that this research was for academic purposes only and for furtherance of a professional 
qualification. This gesture eased potential fears or mistrust and helped senior respondents 
to relax, and to willingly share their views on the questions put to them. 
 
Another limitation was that of obtaining respondents from the community side, especially 
ward councillors who had participated in the aerotropolis consultative processes. My 
fieldwork occurred after the 2016 local government elections, which saw new demarcations 
of municipal wards and new councillors installed. Only a few old councillors were retained 
in council at the time. However, through the snowball technique and tracing, I managed to 
target previous ward councillors who had participated in the consultative processes. This 
process also meant checking the list of names of councillors and municipal wards who had 
participated in the aerotropolis, against the list of new councillors and newly demarcated 
wards: often the two did not match. Hence, despite my efforts, many of the councillors 
whom I interviewed had not been part of the previous council and did not participate in it. 
The new councillors thus had little official knowledge about the aerotropolis project, 
however, they expressed their general views about it and LED. Their views were invaluable 
too, as the purpose of the study, as clarified earlier, was about the examination of various 
contestations and conceptions of LED in the LED debate, and not necessarily about the 
aerotropolis. 
 
4.11 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
 
Consistent with the practice of ethical research, a researcher should explain full details about 
the research to the respondents and acquire their consent to participate (Crow, Wiles, Heath 
and Charles 2007). The researcher must explain the purpose of the research and how the 
findings will be used and disseminated. Furthermore, Corti and Backhouse (2000) stated 
that  the  researcher  should  explain  to  potential  respondents  that  their  participation  is 
voluntary and that they can leave at any given stage of the project. The researcher must also 
explain the extent to which confidentiality (if required) can be maintained. 
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In this study, the full consent of the respondents was sought. As mentioned in chapter 1, I 
fully disclosed the nature of the research.   Furthermore, respondents were informed that 
participation in the study was voluntary and that they could stop participating at any stage 
of the project, if they wanted, without prejudice. Respondents were also informed about 
their right to request for their identity not to be made known. 
 
There were no requests for confidentiality by my respondents across all sampling categories. 
However, pseudonyms were still used to protect the identity of civil society category 
respondents and officials of the operational task team. Some respondents such as the Mayor 
of Ekurhuleni, the Member/s of the Mayoral Committee (MMC), the Members of the 
Executive Committee (MEC) and the Aerotropolis Project leader are generally known to 
the public, so at times hiding their identity was a challenge. I however also undertook 
significant effort, where possible, to also hide their identity by use of pseudonyms. 
 
I adhered to the normal post-graduate ethical standards for handling and analysing the 
research data and did not falsely manipulate it or misrepresent my findings. My study was 
also granted the necessary ethical clearance certificate from the relevant authorities, at the 
University of Johannesburg. The information sheet and the informed consent form, and the 




This chapter has discussed the methodology adopted in the study, and the use of a qualitative 
approach was motivated. Literature review and face-to-face interviews were used for data 
gathering. The chapter also discussed the sampling techniques that were used and identified 
the interviewed sample. Furthermore, the chapter reflected on issues of validity and 
reliability in the research process and data analysis, including ethical matters that were 
considered during the study. I reflect on the study findings in the following chapter. 
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In this chapter, the broad findings of the study are presented out and discussed. My findings 
were guided by the purpose of this study. As mentioned in Chapter 1, this was to investigate 
the various contestations and conceptions of LED in the LED debate amongst stakeholders 
of the Ekurhuleni Aerotropolis Project. Only the prominent themes and categories that 
address my research questions are reported here. In my discussion, I reflect on the thematic 
categories and explain how they relate and, in some instances, reinforce each another, in 
relation to the broad research objectives. I linked and relinked and compared various codes 
against each other to establish possible patterns and explain these. Findings were therefore 
discussed as presented during the interviews in the purest form possible, and unadulterated 
by the literature. This would allow for the reader’s appreciation of the fullness of raw data 
from the interviews. 
 
The chapter begins with a list of the main broad thematic categories which emerged from 
the findings, and which relate to my research questions. These categories include the 
background to the Ekurhuleni Aerotropolis Project and its internal dynamics. The second 
broad category is that of the diverse meanings of LED, followed by the third category, which 
is about contestations about LED amongst the stakeholders in aerotropolis project. After 
this presentation, I provide the conclusion which sums up the study findings. 
 
5.2 BACKGROUND TO THE AEROTROPOLIS. 
 
Figure 6 displays the processes leading to the development of the Ekurhuleni 30-Year 
 
Aerotropolis Master Plan. The unfolding of this process is discussed in detail below. 
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Master Plan and 






Source: Author’s field notes 
city of Ekurheleni around it were inward-looking. The planned city and its potential benefits 
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What would finally be called the Ekurhuleni Aerotropolis has an interesting background. 
This background is perhaps best described as “a planned and supported coincidence.” 
According to Ekurhuleni City Planning HoD Pooley, what would become the aerotropolis 
(an unknown word at the time) started around 2010–2011, known then as the EMM spatial 
development framework project. Figure 6 illustrates the planning process. The EMM spatial 
development project was championed by the Ekurhuleni City Planning Department during 
the tenure of Ntombi Mekgwe as Mayor of Ekurhuleni. According to Pooley, at that time, 
the department was tasked to provide EMM with a spatial-use guide. The land guide was to 
be developed in view of Ekurhuleni’s interest to build a city, the City of Ekurhuleni, which 
would be central among all the towns of the former East Rand. 
 
In the spatial plans, OR Tambo International Airport was identified as a unique and strategic 
anchor around which the new City of Ekurhuleni would be founded. Pooley stated that the y 
knew from international experience what it would take to propel Ekurhuleni’s economy into 
the league of large cities. He stated that to achieve this goal, they had to optimise efforts 
regarding business services, logistics, and transportation. The OR Tambo International 
Airport was the crown jewel, as such. This Ekurhuleni strategy to build a city in Ekurhuleni 
and to intensify the logistics and transport systems for optimum business function and to 
stimulated economic development in the metro, resonated with the idea of the aerotropolis, 
although this idea was not known in Ekurhuleni, at the time. 
 
The Ekurhuleni MSDF that the City Planning Department developed thus included 
recommendations for optimal use of OR Tambo Airport and the existing land around it, for 
the development of the planned city. According to Pooley, the MSDF was approved by the 
then Mayor of Ekurhuleni, Mondli Gungubele, in 2011. Because of the centrality of the 
airport in the MSDF, according to Pooley, the City Planning Department was requested 
again by the EMM to develop a regional spatial framework for Region A. This region 
encompasses the northern side of EMM and Kempton Park, where OR Tambo International 
Airport is located. The spatial framework of Region A later fed into and culminated in the 
aerotropolis roadmap developed by Kasarda (who was invited by the Mayor). According to 
Pooley, the drafting of the aerotropolis roadmap, with advice from Kasarda, was facilitated 
by the EMM Enterprise Project Management office but was later moved to the EDD. 
 
During the initial stages of the project, plans about leveraging the airport and founding a 
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were aimed and confined to the economic interests of Ekurhuleni. According to Pooley, 
there was less concern about how the neighbouring metros of Johannesburg and Tshwane 
or national government would also leverage from the City of Ekurhuleni. Both neighbouring 
metros already have their own major cities, whereas Ekurhuleni had independent towns 
only, and without a central business district (CBD) stated Pooley. Furthermore, according 
to Pooley, Ekurhuleni had paid for all the preparatory work and activities, and therefore 
regarded the aerotropolis to be a LED catalyst project for Ekurhuleni. As stated earlier, 
Ekurhuleni started the project. 
 
However, while City Planning Department was making plans to leverage from OR Tambo 
Airport, according to Zille, ACSA also had its own independent land-use guide. This guide 
spelled out the future spatial land use for OR Tambo International Airport. The ACSA land- 
use plan included inter alia the development of another passenger and cargo terminal, and 
the expansion of the retail sector within the OR Tambo precinct. All these plans in 
Ekurhuleni would later be taken away from the metro, to make up a bigger region-wide 
project namely, the aerotropolis. The project plan would develop into a 30 YEAR 
Aerotropolis Master Plan, now technically under the auspices of Gauteng Province and 
national government and not Ekurhuleni. This, even when Ekurhuleni retains its name in 
the projects and claims it as its own. 
 
As  stated  earlier,  the  usurping  of  the  Ekurhuleni  Aerotropolis  by  Gauteng  Province, 
confirms Luthuli and Houghton’s (2019a;b) observation of development planning shifting 
from LED to L-RED or RED. More importantly though, the usurping of the aerotropolis 
project by Gauteng Province also highlights provincial and national government interest on 
the aerotropolis project. As stated earlier, the latter’s interests are drive more by pro-growth 
or smokestack chasing approach to LED, which focus on large projects or infrastructure 
investments to attracts MNC and FDI. The usurping of the project  also  highlights the 
conflict of interests between local community development efforts and interests, which are 
championed by municipalities, and those of Gauteng Province, which are most likely to 
resonate more with those of national government. These issues also point to conflicting 
conceptions  and  understandings  about  the  meaning  of  LED  at  different  sphere  of 
government. 
 
As the closest sphere of government to the people, municipalities are generally inward 
looking and are, theoretically, oriented more towards the interest of communities in their 
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jurisdiction compared to provincial or national governments who are further away from 
communities. The fact that Ekurhuleni had initially sought to develop its “aerotropolis” for 
its own LED stimulation is incisive in this respect. The subsequent shift of the aerotropolis 
project from EMM (whose primary aim was to benefit its local community), to the region 
wide Gauteng Province (whose interest is to attract FDI by being kind and hospitable to 
MNC), also signals that aerotropolis’ projects tend to privilege international corporate 
interests over those of the community. That is to say, global interests matter more than local 
ones. 
 
No wonder as stated earlier, Pleumarom (2017) posits that, the aerotropolis is not a city 
designed to enhance the lives and livelihoods of ordinary urban citizens, and to provide a 
space to invite participatory democracy and civic empowerment. He states that it is a city 
driven more by a combination of private business imperatives and state power, and it caters 
mostly for the privileged air passengers and TNCs, which want to ship their products to 
customers around the world (Pleumarom 2017). 
 
More importantly, and as also stated earlier, the usurping of the aerotropolis project by 
Gauteng Province from EMM also confirms the dominance the Provincial Government over 
municipalities and to which they are all subject.  Furthermore, it also confirms the fact that 
metropolitan municipalities have no guarantee to leverage infrastructure such as airports 
within their boundaries for LED initiatives, where national or provincial government has 
economic interests. 
 
At the time of the development of the aerotropolis roadmap, according to Zille, ACSA – at 
the invitation of EMM City Planning Department – was already a key stakeholder in the 
aerotropolis project. South African Airways (SAA) was also targeted by EMM as a potential 
stakeholder on the basis of being a local airline carrier. It was however, soon dropped after 
ACSA raised concerns about unfair competition issues which were suspected by other 
airlines. As mentioned in Chapter 3, EMM had also developed its own project organogram. 
According to Tsakane it went through several changes, including the renaming of Work 
Streams, following new project development. 
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5.2.2 City of Ekurhuleni 
 
 
EMM is regarded as a city although it lacks a CBD for the metro. Instead, EMM is composed 
of independent towns, which have since amalgamated into one metro. Contrary to the 
tradition of a city having one CBD, the approach to building the City of Ekurhuleni is 
polycentric in nature, according to Pooley. The city will be facilitated through transport 
infrastructure networks. According to Pooley, transport networks will link all former towns 
and economic nodes of EMM together to function as one city. According to Deon, this 
transport and infrastructural network city design is founded less on the centrality of the old 
city-centre model and more on the logic of the service potential and competitive advantage 
of each town. The swift movement of people in and out of the service areas is also 
considered. 
 
Deon stated that each of the EMM former towns would each serve a specific niche area, 
which would be accessible to everyone in the city through efficient transport infrastructure. 
For example, the town of Germiston is Ekurhuleni’s administrative capital, whereas 
Kempton Park (the airport region) is the economic capital of the metro. Pooley, echoing 
Deon’s sentiments about a single CBD as an archaic idea, stated as follows: 
 
Today we speak of multiple CBDs in one city. Sandton, Randburg and several others 
have become CBDs of Johannesburg; and Centurion and certain parts of Midrand 
are also among a list of CBDs of Tshwane. We no longer speak of one CBD in any 
given place but multiple CBDs. 
 
Pooley stated that this new form of city planning has advantages. For example, multiple 
CBDs in a city reduces the time and travel required to access services. The distance and 
time that people of Ekurhuleni travel and spend to access services in their respective towns 
is, according to Pooley, far less than that of residents in Johannesburg – who used to travel 
all over to visit a single CBD for services. According to Pooley, theoretically, planners think 
of a central place, a core centre of attraction, and in this case, it was the airport. 
 
Pooley further stated that the airport was the only entity that was unique in EMM and around 
which a new city identity can be founded. According to former MMC Khaya, the decision 
to choose the airport precinct as the central node of Ekurhuleni City was based on the 
understanding that the nodal point of Ekurhuleni was in Kempton Park. Khaya stated that 
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Kempton Park was chosen as a central node, although Germiston is the main centre of EMM 
 
– because it is a town where the Ekurhuleni transport infrastructure networks converge. He 
stated that Germiston train station is where all trains from Ekurhuleni townships converge 
and rail-route exchanges occur. It is also where trains from the entire province converge. 





The community and stakeholder participation component of the aerotropolis project was 
handled jointly by the EMM’s Department of Marketing and Communication. The 
department was headed by Adel Tsakane from EMM and by Amanda. Amanda led the 
participation component on behalf of the Aurecon consultant group. According to Amanda, 
the EMM supplied a list of targeted audiences for the participation process, which included 
people from various departments and community organisations. The participation 
consultation meetings included ward councillors; people from the departments of energy; 
public participation; education; health; social department; sports arts and culture in 
Ekurhuleni;  business  people;  youth;  and  women  and  disabled  people.  According  to 
Amanda, because of time constraints the participatory meetings and consultations with 
communities took place only in selected areas (Germiston, Kempton Park, Tembisa and 
Edenvale) rather than throughout the entire region of EMM. 
 
As mentioned in chapter 3, some of the ward councillors who were interviewed said they 
had no knowledge about the aerotropolis project and had not participated in it. Those who 
knew about the aerotropolis – most of whom were from businesses in Ekurhuleni – reported 
having been unimpressed about the weak nature of the participatory exercise. Decrying the 
participatory aspect of the aerotropolis project, Moreki, the chairperson of both Greater 
Tembisa Business Council (GTBC) and Tembisa Business Association, described his 
experience of the participatory process for the aerotropolis project as follows: 
 
It seemed like it (aerotropolis project) was already decided. It was not participatory 
at all, and nor was it for and or about business. It seemed as though they bussed in 
people to become the audience. It was like they realised that they did something 
wrong by not consulting people and later started to cover lost ground through these 
ineffective consultative meetings. … How can you expect maximum participation of 
business in a community meeting? 
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These comments were made in relation to a meeting that was part of the participatory 
process of the aerotropolis project, held at Emperors Palace in Ekurhuleni. Organised 
business and the community, including various community organisations were called in to 
be part of the meeting. Mlangeni of Tembisa Chamber of Commerce (TCC) and Black 
Management Forum had the following to say about her experience of the project’s 
participation process: 
 
I cannot even pronounce the word aerotropolis.  I have been involved in business 
meetings in this area for almost 15 years, but we have not heard much about this 
project. What we know is superficial. We never really participated in the initial 
stages. The only time we hear of the aerotropolis is when it’s spoken about in large 
crowds, where there would be very little space for robust consultation. 
 
Harry, a member of the Ekurhuleni Business Initiative (EBI) and Ekurhueleni Chamber of 
Commerce, including the Captains of Industry forum and Ambassadors’ forum, remarked 
as follows about his experience of the aerotropolis participation meetings: 
 
Even having been involved from the start, we did not have influence in terms of the 
ideological makeup of the aerotropolis projects. We were told about it via 





We [EBI, Captain of Industry and Chambers of Commerce] were asked for our 
contribution on the aerotropolis and I told them that these meetings were talking to 
the wrong people. They were supposed to have a structured approach where SMMEs 
and big  business  talks  were supposed to  be held  separately, rather than being 
lumped together. 
 
The Managing Director of Ekurhuleni’s National African Federated Chamber of Commerce 
(NAFCOC), Karabo, commented as follows about the participatory process of the 
aerotropolis project: 
 
If EMM is a developmental municipality and has such a big project cutting across 
all sectors, surely, in your implementation plans, you need to say to NAFCOC – how 
do you see this project contribution or impacting your constituency, and what do 
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you think you could contribute? So, consultation would be key throughout the entire 
project, even on its implementation. Otherwise, as it is the case, we think that initial 
attempts at consultation were only a legitimating process and had very little to do 
with the real value of consultation. 
 
According to Amanda, the participatory exercise deployed the AI method. She stated that 
she used AI because this method engages people as a resource in mapping the future. She 
stated that “The method does not allow any negativity simply because there is no time/room 
for negative sentiments in this paradigm. It is positivist.” Explaining how effective this 
method was, she recounted how two ward councillors who were opposed to the aerotropolis 
project during her meetings soon changed their attitudes, when they we encouraged to be 
positive about it. They evidently warmed up to the project as the appreciative method 
unfolded, she said. According to both Amanda and the Ekurhuleni 30-Year  Aerotropolis  




• Conscientise community stakeholders about the development of aerotropolis; 
 
• Discuss opportunities associated with the project; 
 
• Discuss concerns and expectations; 
 
• Guide the order of community priorities or preferences in the project 
 
• Enhance decision making process through community inputs. 
 
 
Typically, the consultation and participatory engagements took place in a workshop setting, 
where identified community stakeholders attended. Expert facilitators presided over and 
guided the participatory exercises and discussions in focus groups.  Techniques such as dot- 
voting, asset-based community development methodology (ABCD), and creative drawings 
were used. Dot-voting was used for choice and decision-making; ABCD for assessment of 
human socio-economic capital; and creative drawings for imagining and reconstructing a 
future community of their aspirations. 
 
Contrary to the negative sentiments about the aerotropolis participatory process among 
community members and business representatives, former Mayor Gungubele and former 
MMC for economic development Khaya believed there had been broad consultation, and 
that the participatory component of the project was excellent. Responding to a question 
about the nature of community participation and its intended objective, Gungubele said: 
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The nature of the participation was to explain to people how jobs were going to be 
created, to explain to small business how they were going to benefit. 
 
Respondents who were heading the technical Work Streams reported that their participation 
in the project had been merely technical. A representative of ACSA, Zille, described his 
experience of the participatory aspect of the project as follows: 
 
In the committees, it was bunch of technical persons like urban planners, engineers 
transport planners and so on, and communities were invited to be informed and 
briefed about the project. 
 
This observation was confirmed by the City Planning HoD, Pooley, who added that in 
hindsight,  consultation  meetings  with  the  committees  should  have  involved  the  labour 
unions. This point was decried by Gungubele, who suggested that committees dealt with 
technical and professional issues, which would be beyond labour’s expertise. 
 
Based on the above findings, it is clear that the community participation did not follow the 
orthodox bottom-up participatory development tradition. This paradigm is best described as 
a bottom-up approach, which offers participants the opportunity to shape their development 
in accordance with their own needs and desires rather than pre-set initiatives. Furthermore, 
this paradigm enables the empowerment of communities to be self-reliant and sustainable 
in the future. The poor and near non-existent participation of the community in the project 
confirms Pleumarom’s (2017) observation that, aerotropolis projects do not provide space 
for participatory democracy and civic empowerment. This also further justifies Bridger’s 
(2015)  account  that  host  communities  of  the  aerotropolis  are  often  excluded  from 
governance of projects, since foreign investors are major shareholders in most cases, placing 
the project even further away from control of the community. 
 
5.2.4 Attitudes and perceptions about the aerotropolis 
 
 
Our  respondents’  feelings  about  the  aerotropolis  project  varied  from  optimistic  to 
pessimistic, with some respondents even rejecting the project outright. Few respondents 
held the project in high esteem because of its alleged potential for job creation and unlocking 
LED for Ekurhuleni and Gauteng Province – or for all of South Africa. Most of these 
optimists were official stakeholders, as listed in Chapter 4, namely government officials and 
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other stakeholder members. However, there were also a few optimists among ordinary 
community members and ward councillors. 
 
Aerotropolis project optimists shared the belief of Kasarda and Linday’s (2011) and Luthuli 
and Houghton’s (2019a) about the aerotropolis potential capacity to attract the much-needed 
development through FDI attraction to stimulate LED and job creation. They believe that 
the Ekurhuleni Aerotropolis will be efficiently responsive to the 21st  century demands for 
the speed in international trade and turning the Metro into an efficient competitor in the 
global economy. They also believed that many corporations will be attracted to move their 
offices and warehouses within the aerotropolis zone to leverage time value and speed of the 
movement of goods and services offered by the aerotropolis precinct, as also postulated by 
Luthuli and Houghton (2019(a)). As stated earlier, Kasarda and Linday (2011) and Luthuli 
and Houghton (2019a()) suggest that the aerotropolis can stimulate positive competition 
between firms in the global market, and also lead to greater economic growth for the host 
cities and regions. According aerotropolis optimist respondents, the aerotropolis project 
presented an opportunity to revitalise Ekurhuleni’s economy. Former Mayor Gungubele’s 
words were incisive in this respect when he stated that: “If this plan is actualised, in 30 years 
from now, Ekurhuleni will be the biggest city in Africa.” 
 
 
Other respondents such as councillor Jiyane also supported the aerotropolis project though 
he believed that it should be funded by national government and not Ekurhuleni. This view 
was related to his concern about the potential spread of benefit from the aerotropolis, which 
also benefit areas outside EMM. The issue of shared costs and responsibility for the project 
was based on his observations of Gautrain. According to him, Gautrain had benefitted the 
City of Johannesburg more than Ekurhuleni. The forgoing concerns by Jiyane further 
resurfaces the ideological tussle in development planning between LED and RED/L-RED 
as also pointed out by Luthuli and Houghton’s (2019a;b). 
 
Most of the project pessimists were business people in Ekurhuleni, although some 
councillors and members of community organisations or official stakeholders were part of 
this group as well. Their scepticism was fuelled by various negative experiences and 
perceptions. A point of concern for many sceptical councillors was that the Aerotropolis 
Project Master Plan had not been tabled for approval at the EMM council or the council’s 
oversight committee by the time of the interviews in 2017 – a year after the master plan had 
been completed. In addition, many respondents from businesses in EMM felt that they were 
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not given an opportunity to participate meaningfully in the project and this left them 
doubting the project’s genuineness. Expressing her sceptical attitude about the lack of 
transparency in the project, Ward 18 councillor in Edenvale, Break, commented as follows: 
 
The Aerotropolis project is fait-accompli… It was pushed down our throats with 
obfuscation, corruption and little transparency, and millions have been spent for 
Prof Kasarda’s presentations. 
 
The  forgoing  sentiment  further  confirms  Pleumarom’s  (2017)  observation  of  private 
business imperatives and state power being drivers of aerotropolis project, and without 
community participation. 
 
Other respondents raised general concerns about infrastructure problems such as the lack of 
transport infrastructure and absence of tourist attractions in Ekurhuleni as possible 
impediments to the project’s success. For councillor Delpoort, the aerotropolis was like 
“putting the cart before the horse.” He sceptically questioned the potential success of the 
aerotropolis. According to him, OR Tambo International Airport does not have enough land 
for further expansion around it, and Ekurhuleni does not have its own university, which is 
a norm in aerotropolis planning elsewhere. Furthermore, he was sceptical about the political 
will to attract tourism to EMM. He ironically concluded that “There is too much decay, 
prostitution and filth in the Kempton Park area – a place supposedly meant to be the core of 
the aerotropolis.” Linked to the scepticism about the aerotropolis was a concern that many 
respondents expressed regarding the success of an aerotropolis when there is no “city” in 
EMM. That is, there is still no CBD in Ekurhuleni. 
 
Another prominent criticism about the aerotropolis project was rooted in suspicions about a 
lack of political commitment. ACSA’s Zille stated that elected political officials or 
administrators are mainly interested in quick and tangible short-term goals to earn 
themselves election votes. They are typically uninterested in long-term infrastructural 
development   projects,   such   as   those   demanded   by  the   aerotropolis   master   plan. 
Furthermore, respondents commented on the poor communication and project coordination. 
The aerotropolis master plan had still not been approved by the EMM council and there was 
still no special vehicle purpose (SPV). The SPV is the administrative entity, which the 
masterplan recommended be established, to manage the implementation of project. 
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For other sceptics such as Kosher, Ekurhuleni does not need an aerotropolis. He stated that 
Kempton Park is one already (an aerotropolis). He commented that he had been saying this 
even to Kasarda, the specialist advisor and originator of the idea of the aerotropolis. 
According to Kosher, there is no more land on which to expand and develop OR Tambo 
further, except in the north-east corridor (R21), which had been strongly developed even 
before the aerotropolis idea. 
 
Other respondents felt that the aerotropolis project was set to perpetuate the challenges of 
racial and spatial inequalities of apartheid. This concern also resonates with Pleumarom’s 
(2017) observation of aerotropolis projects’ tendency to subvert the goals of building 
inclusive,  equitable  and  sustainable  cities.  For  the  Ekurhuleni  NAFCOC  chairperson, 
Karabo, the aerotropolis would exacerbate racial inequalities and contribute to the rapidly 
deteriorating social cohesion in South Africa and specifically in EMM. Karabo opined that: 
 
We cannot talk about social cohesion in Ekurhuleni… even at the national level, 
when black people are still in townships, suffering from all imaginable social ills, 





These divisions harbour anger… we cannot cohere because others are talking about 
their poverty, while others are more concerned about protecting their wealth. If the 
aerotropolis was developmental in nature, its planners should be able to tell us how 
much is being set aside for black and township businesses within the aerotropolis 
project. They would have to convince me by numbers. 
 
Mr Scotland of Kathorus Kgotso Tourism Association (KKTA), a community-based 
organisation in the township of Thokoza, rejected the aerotropolis outright. He stated that it 
is a non-starter for local economic development interests of black people and businesses, 
especially in the townships. “It speaks the language of white people,” he suggested. The 
forgoing sentiments by Scotland, though taking on a racial character, are also confirmed by 
Bridger (2015). As states earlier, Bridger (2015) admits that while the aerotropolis may well 
stimulate economic growth, she states that local small and medium size enterprises stand no 
chance to benefit, because the aerotropolis serves the growth and profits of TNCs such as 
Aircraft manufacturers, airlines, oil companies, construction, and concrete and tarmac firms. 
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5.2.5 The current stage of the aerotropolis 
 
 
According to former Mayor Gungubele, at the time of our interview, the mayoral council 
and  the  Presidential  Infrastructure  Coordination  Committee  under  the  Strategic 
Infrastructure Projects 2 endorsed the aerotropolis project. 
 
According to MEC Vadi, the aerotropolis master plan had been accepted and endorsed by 
Gauteng   Province   and   the   Gauteng   Planning   Commission.   However,   despite   the 
aerotropolis project being endorsed by government entities at national and provincial levels, 
it was not officially adopted by the EMM council during the research fieldwork. It was 
accepted only in early 2018. This delay by EMM to adopt the master plan a year after it was 
completed was, according to Vadi, deeply troubling for Gauteng Provincial Government. 
Expressing his disquiet about the delays of the EMM council, Vadi recounted: 
 
In March this year, 2017, we were told that the master plan was going to be taken 
to council for approval and that in April, there was going to be an official launch. 
This has not happened… to be frank, we are concerned as the province, why the 
master plan is not yet approved by council, a year after it was tabled. 
 
Former Mayor Gungubele stated that when he left the Mayoral office in 2016, they were 
planning for the establishment and financing of the SPV, which would manage the project, 
as suggested in the master plan. Reacting to the question of why EMM had not yet officially 
approved the aerotropolis master plan, Gungubele stated EMM approval was only a 
ceremonial gesture because the aerotropolis project had already been accepted by the 
provincial and national government. According to Pooley, the SPV was not established yet 
at the time of my interview with him. 
 
While the aerotropolis was awaiting final council approval, some of the identified catalytic 
projects suggested in the master plan were already underway. Among these were ACSA’s 
work to open a midfield passenger and cargo terminal at OR Tambo Airport, including the 
freight road infrastructure on the R21 corridor. According to MEC Vadi, this was jointly 
paid for by Gauteng Province and EMM. 
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5.2.6 Improving the Aerotropolis project in future 
 
 
On the question of what could be done to improve the aerotropolis project, several opinions 
were expressed. Former Mayor Gungubele identified the need for speedy establishment of 
the SPV and the release of funds from both provincial and national government. He also 
suggested the need to improve relations between the ANC, the governing political party, 
and government administration, to avoid what he termed “the political management of 
governance.” Simply put this means improving the working relationship between the ANC 
and the EMM officials and the Mayoral council. Gungubele added that training and teaching 
of communities about the aerotropolis is paramount, more than just “consulting” them. He 
stated: 
 
A lot of people are still in the dark and must be made aware about the aerotropolis 
project, especially, and other projects that are linked to it, which the communities 
can leverage. 
 
According to him, some of the aerotropolis projects that could benefit poor people were 
being hampered by squatters refusing to move out of their informal settlements because they 
were unaware what they might gain from such projects. 
 
Many respondents, especially from organised business, suggested that the aerotropolis 
project should improve its communication with the community and that project plans must 
be transparent and explicit about the targeted beneficiaries. Karabo commented that “The 
aerotropolis project must also be transparent about the total budget that would be allocated 
to  the  most  disadvantaged  sector  of  the  economy,  and  black  township  business  in 
particular.” 
 
Furthermore, respondents felt that the aerotropolis needed to do more to empower blacks 
and township businesses. “A black government should privilege black business,” Mlangeni 
stated. Varied proposals were put forward to this end. One suggestion was that the 
aerotropolis should have its own SPV with power to enforce collaboration between large, 
well-established white business and small black businesses. Another view was that 
partnership with white businesses would only serve white business interests and undermine 
the capacity of organised black business to do things by themselves. It was thus suggested 
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that  the  aerotropolis  project  authorities  should  use  the  structures  of  organised  black 
business, such as NAFCOC, to set up partnerships. Karabo commented: 
 
We have dynamic differences in terms of our business aspirations and interests 
which need specific attention, and which could  never be realised when  we are 
lumped together with white business. 
 
Karabo advocated for the inclusion of NAFCOC to participate in the implementation of the 
project, and as a guardian of black business interest in the aerotropolis project. Makula 
suggested that EMM must be able to create partnerships to leverage the 30% set aside for 
township procurement initiative. The 30% set aside is a government declaration, which 
states that government must set aside 30% of appropriate categories of state procurements 
to purchase from SMMES, and from township and rural businesses (Department of National 
Treasury 2017). Makula stated, “Let people fail not because of lack of opportunities and 
technical assistance, and or lack of information, but only out of lack of interest.” 
 
The forgoing calls by Scotland, Karabo, Mlangeni, and Makula for the aerotropolis project 
to empower black people, and their fears about the project’s potential to exacerbate racial 
inequalities is also incisive. It points to greater need for race consciousness in development 
planning and development discourse, more especially in a place with such a racialist history 
and structural racism persistence such as in South Africa. Mathibe and Croucamp’s (2019) 
call for both the public and private sectors to formulate and implement sustainable policies 
and strategies geared to stimulate, grow and sustain black women-owned businesses is a 
potential step in the right direction. More importantly, this calls for the need of CRT to 
systematically undo the systematic structural reproduction of racial inequality through 
development. As stated earlier, this is because CRT understands racism as a structural, 
systemic problem that is produced economically, socially and politically, and which must 
be confronted in those terms, as suggested by Modiri (2012). 
 
Other  respondents  felt  that  the  aerotropolis  project  must  be  managed  by the  province 
because it has more political clout, especially over the other two metros, which were under 
the political leadership of the coalition of opposition parties. Amanda suggested that the 
consultancy team that produced the master plan should manage it, because of its experience 
in the project. 
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5.2.7 Diverse conceptions and meanings of LED 
 
 
Figure 7 below provides an overview of the various conceptions and meanings of LED, as 
presented by respondents during this study. The concepts are discussed in the text that 
follows. 
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Source: Author’s field notes 
 
 
Shown in Figure 7, the research participants variously echoed views of Bond (2002); 
Rogerson (2009); the 2006 LED Framework (DPLG 2006); and the 2014–2019 and 2017- 
2022 National LED framework (Department of Cooperative Governance 2017a;b), and 
understood   LED   to   be   about   the   following   eight   categories   namely;   community 
participation, entrepreneurship, informal trade, pro-poor support efforts, capacity building 
for the poor, job creation, improvement of quality of life, and pro-growth measures. 
 
Respondents ranked entrepreneurship and job creation as the main defining features of LED. 
This was followed by skills development, and life improvement. However, the views of 
respondents varied and at times were contradictory. For example, LED was understood by 
some respondents, especially those in township settings, to be about capacity development 
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initiatives and the empowerment of blacks in townships. This capacity-building initiative 
meant that government was supposed to establish resource centres in townships to assist the 
community. It was also understood to mean that government must remove barriers that 
hindered township businesses from developing and thriving, such as through removing red 
tape that affected trading or doing business in townships. Furthermore, this meant that 
government must provide protection for informal and street traders against harassment by 
government officials. 
 
One respondent from the Tembisa Chamber of Commerce (TCC), Mlangeni, suggested that 
LED should be about the support of informal trading and businesses in townships only. The 
idea here was that this sector has the highest concentration of black people who were denied 
government support during apartheid. She stated that ultimately, LED is about integrating 
the economic interest of previously disadvantaged peoples into the mainstream economy. 
The director of Ekurhuleni’s (NAFCOC), Karabo, emphasised the need for LED to support 
black businesses. Karabo stated that the neglect of government support for black township 
businesses would amount to the continuation of economic marginalisation of blacks and 
township small businesses in the mainstream economy. 
 
Also  emphasising  the  importance  of  LED  to  prioritise  township  business,  Ward  50 
councillor in Katlehong, Steve, stated that the empowerment of township businesses is 
necessary because otherwise such businesses  would fail. This  failure  would  mean that 
locally owned businesses would be taken over by foreign nationals (assumed to be Somali, 
Pakistani and Bangladesh migrants who operate most of their businesses in township). He 
added that the support of black business in townships would lead to their success and 
improve the local economic conditions. For Ward 53 councillor in Thokoza, Moseki, the 
empowerment of township business should include capacitating local people to produce 
goods, market them, and sell their produce. People should also consume what they produce 
themselves. Respondent views about the need racial preferentialism for blacks and black 
owned business in LED support, also highlights the persisting problem of racialised 
inequality and poverty felt by so many black people in South Africa and which is so well 
acknowledge by the NDP “Vision 2030” (Manuel 2011), amongst many other observers 
referred to earlier. 
 
Another category of LED understanding was that which resonated with LED is about 
community participation. Some respondents strongly believed that LED should be a bottom- 
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up exercise in which the township community and local government work together, to 
develop the local economy. This understanding of LED resonates with the 1998 White Paper 
of Local Government on the principle of what it calls a developmental local government, 
which as we have stated earlier on advocated for government to work with citizens and 
groups within the community to find sustainable ways to meet their social, economic and 
material needs, and improve the quality of their lives (RSA 1998). Ward 38 councillor in 
Alberton, Jiyane, perceived LED as a community participatory process that should be 
directed at social issues as well as the econom y. Jiyane stated that LED should be pro-poor 
and should target poverty alleviation. He stated that social challenges such as lack of 
education and poor health conditions are often intricately linked with economic issues. 
Jiyane believed that LED should also be about human development and social capital. This 
means that government must support efforts to develop an assemblage of all categories that 
empower people to function optimally, such as hospitals, schools, a clean environment, and 
safety. He emphasised that “You need good health in order to be a good consumer or a good 
businessman.” 
 
Another category of LED understanding was that of enterprise development and creating a 
conducive environment for business to thrive. Ward 36 councillor, in Edenvale, Break, 
qualified this opinion by stating that “Our mantra is that we have to create an environment 
conducive  for  development,”  She  stated  that  a  business-conducive  environment  would 
attract business and allow entrepreneurs to do their jobs. To create this environment, 
respondent Plum, the Ward 79 councillor in Kwathema, suggests that government should 
facilitate faster access to land for people who want to open businesses. In addition, 
government must reduce bureaucratic red tape for doing business. Other respondents – 
namely Kosher (Eastrand Industrial Association) and councillors Delpoort (Ward 16 in 
Kempton Park), Ndlovu (Ward 36 in Germiston) and Moseki – felt that LED would require 
improving the current infrastructure for electricity and water supply. They also mentioned 
the need to clean the place up, and councillor Delpoort emphasised the need for decent 
housing for poor people. 
 
Some respondents understood LED as an inward-looking process aimed at bringing money 
back into townships and having local people owning and controlling their economy. The 
government’s township economy revitalisation programme was welcomed by Nkosi of the 
Brakpan Agricultural Forum, as a necessary and good initiative for LED in townships. Other 
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respondents  believed  that  LED  is  about  attracting foreign  direct  investment  (FDI)  and 
making sure that MNCs and transnational corporations (TNCs) settle in specific places to 
create jobs, as also noted by Bond (2002); Rodriguez-Pose and Tijmstra (2005). 
 
As also stated, Patterson (2008:4) posits that the pro-market approach seeks engagement 
with global economic forces through enhancing competitive advantage and often attract 
MNC and TNC for FDI through tax incentives. Kosher, emphasising concerns about a lack 
of effort by EMM to retain businesses in Ekurhuleni, stated that “We are losing people who 
are moving to the Vaal, South of Johannesburg, because of better tax breaks that businesses 
are being offered to stay there.” He added that “We need to do more to retain business in 
Ekurhuleni.” 
 
Furthermore, LED was also understood to be about attitude change. Peoples’ attitudes need 
to change so that they are dedicated to development and do not depend on handouts and 
entitlement. “They must know that development means hard work,” Makula of Salute 
Empowerment stated. Makula also highlighted the need for attitude change about the type 
of businesses that people should venture into, especially among black people. He asked, 
“For me LED should not necessarily be minimalist and only be about spaza shops, the taxis 
business industry and petrol filling stations only … what about the rest of business activity? ” 
He suggested the need to think about establishing enterprises that go beyond what the 
community is used to. 
 
5.2.8 Ideological contestations in LED 
 
 
Figure 8 below reflects the findings of this study regarding the ideological differences on 
LED among the stakeholders in the aerotropolis project. The nature of and contestations 
about LED in the general which were raised by respondents, converged very strongly with 
respondents understanding of LED in relation to the aerotropolis, as show in figure 8 below. 
Therefore, I discuss the two categories together. However, there we some minor differences 
and contradictions, which I also explain. 
 
















































































































Source: Author’s field notes 
 
 
As indicated in Figure 8, nine categories were identified as key issues defining the 
respondents’ understanding about LED. These were also the issues surrounding the 
contestations about LED and the aerotropolis project. 
 
5.2.9 LED contestations 
 
 
With regard to ideological contestations about LED in general, the survey showed that 
respondents  understood  LED  from  two  broad  perspectives.  I  classified  these  broad 
categories as the socio-political activist perspective (SPAP) and the technicist economic 
development perspective (TEDP). These two categories basically represent the traditional 
categories of mainstream LED namely, the pro-poor and pro-market principles, as discussed 
in Chapter 3. However, they differed slightly and were sometimes messy and contradictory. 
The SPAP perspective has almost all elements of the pro-poor perspective in mainstream 
LED discourse, both in theory and practice, with only the addition of race as another 
category. 
 
In my findings, the race issue in LED was important for most respondents across all 
respondent categories, particularly those who represented business and civil society. For 
example, some respondents from the communities felt LED should be only for the 
empowerment of black people in townships and not for whites. The race issue was also 
raised within organised business, wherein respondents raised concerns about unfair white 
business privilege. 
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These respondents advocated for greater support for black business to penetrate mainstream 
economy. However, some of these respondents were surprisingly less concerned with 
poverty-alleviation matters of LED. Their struggle was about overcoming the racial barriers 
in business and in mainstream economy alone. 
 
As I suggested in the preceding section about the TEDP category being equivalent to the 
pro-market approach in LED literature, my findings established untraditional elements in 
this category. Here, the issue of race, surprisingly, also became a central concern, including 
advocacy for the social economy by some respondents. As we have stated earlier, this 
highlights the pressing problem of racialised inequality and poverty persisting in South 
Africa post-1994 and which, as suggested by White (2002) earlier, can be undone through 
anti-racist  racial projects/intervention. The social  economy is  associated  more with the 
SPAP category. TEDP, therefore, represented a somewhat different category made up of 
elements   that   appeared   somewhat   contradictory  from   the   traditional   viewpoint   of 
mainstream pro-market LED categories. I discuss each of these categories, SPAP and TEDP 
below. 
 
5.2.10 Socio-political activist perspective (SPAP) 
 
 
As shown in figure 8 below, LED was understood in the SPAP category to be more about 
several mutually reinforcing sub-categories. These were access to land, poverty alleviation, 
social justice and participatory development. 
 






























Source: Author’s field notes 
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Within the SPAP category, concerns about access to land were strong, especially among 
ward councillors with many informal settlements in their wards. Examples were Ward 21 
in Makause, Germiston; Ward 53 in Thokoza; and Ward 79 in Kwa-Thema. Most of the 
demands for land were tied to demands for housing. The words land and housing came to 
be used interchangeably and to mean one thing for respondents. Only in a few instances was 
the issue of land expressed for business interests in the SPAP category. 
 
The idea of land access for residential purposes has a strong impact on LED from a social- 
economy and poverty-alleviation perspective. For councillor Moseki, access to land and 
housing allows people to have a sense of belonging which enables them to develop long- 
term plans, and to invest in the areas where they live. Respondents also believed that LED 
is about poverty alleviation. Furthermore, some respondents believed that LED is about the 
development   of   efforts   already  existing   in   communities   and   not   necessarily,   the 
development of new things. The latter view was raised within the context of understanding 
development as a bottom-up process, which builds from below. It therefore makes sense 




• The empowerment and support of township informal traders, cooperatives and 
 
SMMEs so they can become part of mainstream economic activity 
 
• job creation, including the delivery of basic services such as health care facilities, 
water, housing and electricity 
• Skills development programmes and preferential consideration for communities by 
municipal procurement processes. 
 
These issues advocated for within the SPAP resonate with matters of social justice which 
were expressed in the LED policy paper called Refocusing Development on the Poor. As 
stated earlier, this document rejected “orthodox” LED practices akin to the aerotropolis, 
which reflect corporate interest and dominance and supported bottom-up community-based 
LED approaches (Rogerson 2009). Furthermore, according to Bond (2002) (in Rogerson 
2009) the policy paper called for LED forms that broaden access to infrastructure and 
services; foster greater gender parity; improve health; reduce the scale of racial segregation; 
and improved social capital. Proponents of the social-justice category in SPAP were a 
combination of those who believed LED to be a poverty-alleviation initiative and those who 
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felt it should be about empowerment of only black people and black business interests in 
townships. However, black business within the SPAP category was split into two sub- 
categories. That is, those who were concerned only with business and showed no real 
interest in communit y-based pro-poor LED methods, and those who showed an interest in 
both business and pro-poor poverty-alleviation measures in LED. 
 
It was largely within the SPAP category that most respondents felt that LED is about 
community participation and that it should be a bottom-up process, as also understood by 
Rogerson (2009). This perspective is consistent with the broader views and methods of pro- 
poor or pro-community development initiatives, which prioritise the community over 
corporate interests. I believe therefore that the SPAP category of LED, with its emergent 
sub-categories established in the study, is mainly congruent with the social-economy and 
pro-poor school in LED discourse. However, it also emphasises the category of race, which 
is unfortunately missing in mainstream LED discourse categories. 
 
5.2.11 Technicist economic development perspective (TEDP) 
 
 
LED was understood within the TEDP category to be about three broad areas represented 
below in figure 10. 
 
 







































Source: Author’s field notes 
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As shown in figure 10, LED was understood broadly to be about attracting FDI and the 
development of SMMEs to create job opportunities, and it was also understood to be about 
the development of the social economy. However, respondents in this category only differed 
on the method of achieving the ends of job creation and development. For example, some 
respondents – especially members of the technical steering committee of the aerotropolis 
project and the Mayoral committee – felt that the success of LED rests on the efficiency of 
the macro-economic development strategies and FDI attraction, as also understood by Bond 
2002; Bond 2003, Rodriguez-Pose and Tijmstra 2005). This view implies a belief that 
foreign investment will create jobs and improve LED, and that by extension, this will 
improve the lives of the people. 
 
Other  respondents  in  the  TEDP   group  instead  emphasised  the  idea  of  enterprise 
development and support for SMMEs and cooperatives as the most effective and efficient 
way to create jobs, and to stimulate LED growth, and not the state. In both these sub- 
categories, concern was fundamentally about making the private sector, not government, a 
champion of LED. These views resonated strongly with both the 2006 LED framework and 
the revised 2014–2019 National LED framework, which as we have stated earlier, argues 
the state’s responsibility is not to create jobs and to derive LED, but rather to create an 
enabling   environment   for   business   and   job   creation   (Department   of   Cooperative 
Governance 2017(a)). 
 
The third sub-category in TEDP which sits uncomfortably in this group is the social 
economy category. This category shared strong similarities with the SPAP on LED, 
especially on issues of social justice. That is, the belief that LED can be achieved through 
dedicated support for the development of black-owned SMMEs and cooperatives in 
townships, to address the issue of inequality. This includes the support for the informal trade 
which Khumala et al (2019), as we have stated earlier, suggests to employing 2.9 million 
people, 70% of whom start informal businesses to sustain themselves economically due to 
unemployment. This sub-category of social economy category supported the idea that 
economic growth leads to development, which is espoused in TEDP. However, the social 
economy category also advocate for local, and black owned SMEs and SMMes to champion 
LED initiatives, and not MNC and TNC which are mostly advocated for in TEDP, especially 
on large projects such as the aerotropolis. Furthermore, some within this category also 
believe in the empowerment of the poor. 
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The  social  economy  category  criticised  the  dominant  macro-economic  development 
planning strategy within TEDP for its alleged top-down management style, also noted by 
Bond (2002). Another criticism was that it lacks popular initiatives in project management 
and planning, such as community participation. To confirm Bridger’s (2015) thesis about 
the   participatory  character   of   aerotropolis   projects,   according   to   respondents,   the 
Ekurhueleni aerotropolis project planning was no exception regarding the problem of lack 
of participation. As stated earlier, respondents felt that the civil society participation process 
of the aerotropolis was a sham, whose sole purpose was to pretend that the community had 
been consulted to legitimise the project. After all, the objective of the aerotropolis 
participation exercise was according to the master plan; to conscientise community 
stakeholders about the project and its potential. That is, it would conscientise the community 
about something that already existed – rather than consulting them about whether they 
wanted an aerotropolis, or to soliciting their opinions about how they would like to see the 
project unfold. 
 
It is no wonder therefore that the appreciative enquiry participatory method was used during 
the community consultation. As mentioned earlier, this enquiry method was used because it 
does not accommodate dissent. Participants simply deal with what is on the table and make 
the best of it from an appreciation point of view, without the option of rejecting what is 
proposed. As stated earlier, AI therefore represses important conversations by avoiding 
critical examination of phenomena and encourage avoidance of known problems (Clouder 
and King 2015; Duraiappah, Roddy and Parry 2005; Grant and Humphries 2006). 
 
It is on the score of the foregoing that I hold that, unlike in the SPAP category where 
community participation is understood to be central to LED, on the TEDP side, participation 
was theoretically not as important. This was related to the predominance of technical 
managerialist thinking within the TEDP group. 
 
TEDP respondents also experienced differences in the group regarding the aerotropolis 
project as well. These differences were pronounced between the political and technical 
steering committees. Although some respondents were reluctant to admit this, many 
differences were territorial and administrative rather than ideological in nature. Ideological 
differences occurred mainly between certain segments of civil society (ward councillors, 
business and civil society organisations) and the political and technical steering committees, 
or between segments of the SPAP and TEDP categories. 
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An example of ideological differences between civil society and the aerotropolis project 
stakeholders was that former Mayor Gungubele stated that the aerotropolis made sense to 
people who understood economics and less sense to those with little economic insight. He 
stated that the labour union representatives thought that the project was elitist, with little 
benefit for blue-collar workers; others suggested it was a “white man’s thing”. However, 
according to him, the aerotropolis project would create more blue-collar jobs than white- 
collar ones. 
 
Tsakane of EMM Communications Department reported that she had observed dissent 
among some stakeholders, assumedly those who represented Gauteng Province, about the 
aerotropolis being called the Ekurhuleni Aerotropolis. According to Tsakane, this dispute 
arose because the Province wanted a stake in the project; by then, the project was drawing 
resources from Gauteng Province to fund aerotropolis-linked projects. Zille, reacting to his 
observation of territorial clashes between Gauteng Province and EMM on the project, 
described things as follows: 
 
There was definitely some political tensions about this issue [the naming and 
management of aerotropolis] . EMM did the dirty work, and now the project is 
confiscated from them. 
 
She added that there was also some territorial concern about where the SPV was going to 
be located, whether in EMM or at the level of the Province. That is, whether it should be an 
agency of Ekurhuleni or of Gauteng Province. Deon affirmed that observation and 
commented as follows: 
 
I observed some tensions between the Province (Gauteng) and the EMM about 
where this project should sit, and about who will manage and take responsibility for 
it… the big source of tension was that a lot of work had been done by the EMM. 
 
 
He stated further that, another source of tension was the intended scope of impact of the 
project. Given the strong personality of Jack Van der Merwe, as the lead convener of the 
technical steering committee (appointed by both Mayor of EMM and Premier of Gauteng), 
according to Deon, Van der Merwe won the day. The project was steered to a much wider 
focus of the Province. Deon states that, Aurecon was thus asked to come up with a new 
master plan that would include other areas falling outside Region A, in EMM. As also stated 
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earlier, the shift of focus of the Ekurhuleni Aerotropolis from being primarily an EMM 
project to it being a region-wide one, further signified Luthuli and Houghton’s (2019(a)) 
observation about the growing shift of development planning from local to regional 
development planning. As also stated earlier, this shift is also encouraged in the 2014-2019 
and 2017-2022 LED framework, and is premised on the belief that strategic coordination of 
regions will create greater economic growth. 
 
This section has presented my reflections on the broad ideological differences of the 
respondents about LED and within the aerotropolis project. I now discuss each of the nine 
outer layers in the diagram, around which major ideological differences emerged. 
 
5.2.12 Definitions of “local” 
 
 
Respondents’ understanding of the meaning of local in LED differed substantially. 
Interestingly, their views depended largely on the various subjects to which the word was 
associated. I return to this point at a later stage. However, the idea of local was felt by 
several respondents to be a broad and complex notion that could potentially mean anything. 
One respondent suggested that local is in the eyes of the beholder; another suggested that 
the meaning of local depends on the prevailing interests at play in any given time and place. 
 
The varied understandings of the respondents about the meaning of local were also 
influenced by their socio-economic and political interests. For some respondents,  local 
meant spatiality, as is also understood by the ILO as stated earlier (Rogerson 2009), which 
variously meant anything from South African’s entire spatial land space to a single ward or 
a region in Ekurhuleni. At times local was understood exclusively in a combination of 
various spatial categories. For example, for some local meant only EMM; at times, it was 
understood to mean the entire Gauteng province. To qualify the above categories, Nkosi of 
BAF expressed his opinion by defining local as follows: 
 
To me, local is the municipality I am reporting to … I chose to say my local is 
Ekurhuleni as opposed to Tsakane, where I reside, because our funding and services 
are provided by Ekurhuleni and not Tsakane.  Tsakane is a small constitutive part 
of Ekurhuleni. 
 
Responding to the same question, Kolobe commented that “The word local is quite broad… 
 
The local for me is Gauteng Province.” For Tiisetso, chairperson of KKTA, the word local 
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means people who are born in Katlehong, or at least in Gauteng. These categories were felt 
to be important and were heightened when issues of employment preferences were raised. 
Tiisetso, emphasising the provincialism of his view of local, opined: “You cannot have 
someone from the Eastern Cape to come to head a key and strategic department without the 
working knowledge of the place here.” 
 
For councillors Bodibe (Ward 24 Benoni) and Hassan (Ward 29), local is national. 
According to them, all local LED initiatives add to the national interests and objectives of 
South Africa as a whole. For example, Bodibe explained that all municipal wards have their 
locales with specific LED interests, which then get negotiated to become part of the design 
of the broader development frameworks of national government. She explains further also 
that some government departments also exist at national level and that their functions cut 
across  the  province  down  to  the  municipal  level.  One  such  a  department  being  the 
department of economic development, which nevertheless work in unison with those at the 
level of the province and in local municipalities. Linked to this understanding of cross- and 
trans-boundary government administrative functions, MEC Vadi commented on the fluidity 
of spatiality and spatial rigidity in development. He explained, “If I have to build a road on 
the N12, and it cuts across two municipalities, it cannot mean that only people from there 
must be considered for employment.” 
 
For Councillor Jiyane, because Ekurhuleni lacked a CBD in the past and had only 
independent towns, local in Ekurhuleni means that people think of their own town. He 
added, “So, it is hard for a person of Kempton Park to think his local to be in Nigel.” 
Kempton Park and Nigel are two former independent towns, which – as mentioned earlier 
– constituted the old East Rand before all the towns were amalgamated into one EMM. 
 
 
Another understanding of the local was said to be assigned by political and juridical power. 
Simply put, this means that what becomes understood as local is also made possible by 
government proclamations, demarcation processes, and administrative designs, such as in 
municipalities and municipal wards and regions. The Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998 
and the Municipal S ystems Act of 2002 which demarcates municipal boundaries and spells 
out their functions, respectively, is a case in point. 
 
For former Mayor Gungubele the idea of local, if used in an exclusivist manner and 
particularly in relation to business activity, can easily amount to stagnation. For him, 
164  
globalisation does not give an opportunity for anything to be local, anymore. He advised 
that people should operate locally but be relevant globally. Echoing similar opinions about 
the meaning of local, especially in business and economic development, former Ekurhuleni 
MMC of economic development Khaya stated that economic activity does not operate on 
the logic of boundaries, be those racial or national. That would be politics, he suggested. He 
added, the normal progression of economic development activity should take part in an open 
market, and not one restrained by boundaries. Mashile, of the Ekurhuleni Cooperatives 
League, also warned about the counterproductive backlash of territorial determinism, which 
according to him has caused many development projects to fail due to conflicts about 
entitlement over locales. Some respondents believed local to be anything that brings money 
to EMM. 
 
It must be noted that, the foregoing categories of understanding local purely as land or 
geographic space changed slightly when the respondents were pressed to define local in 
relation to their understanding of LED. In many cases, spatiality was then no longer the sole 
descriptor of local but became linked to people inhabiting certain spaces or land. That is, 
local began to mean people plus space. People were understood to benefit from any LED 
gains in any space. Typically, this meant that whenever a space was considered local, people 
inhabiting those spaces were its local. Also interesting was the shift of opinion in the 
respondents’ views when asked about who the local beneficiaries of LED support initiatives 
ought to be, in any given space. Various categories of exclusions were introduced to 
determine who the ‘authentic’ local people were, who were entitled to gain from LED 
support. The systematic exclusions of people varied and were generally based on variables 
such as birthplace and residence, including citizen status, with the highest exclusion in this 
category being about nationality. It was therefore clear that when talking about LED, 
especially in relation to its beneficiaries in each space, not everyone living in a particular 
space was considered to be a local person. As stated earlier, this confirms Mayekiso, Miller, 
and Swilling’s (2000) observations of complexity within development and LED discourse 
in South Africa. 
 
Many respondents especially in the SPAP group, felt that all foreign nationals – regardless 
of their citizenship status in South Africa – were not entitled to LED support opportunities. 
Only a few accepted those foreign nationals who were in the country legally, to be entitled 
to benefit. It is no surprise therefore that the issue of foreign nationals was high in the 
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exclusion category among SPAP respondents. As explained earlier, in this category, LED 
was understood to be about issues of access to land, housing, poverty alleviation, social 
justice, and participatory development, which these respondents felt foreign national were 
not entitled to. The inclusion of foreign nationals as beneficiaries of LED was therefore 
understood to threaten the limited resources aimed at supporting South Africans. 
 
Confirming this observation about the complex nature of how people in the SPAP category 
understood the meaning of local in LED, another interesting twist surfaced after respondents 
were pressed to explain their views about the meaning of local in relation to the aerotropolis 
project. Here, opinions about the exclusion of foreign nationals remained unchanged, 
however, spatial exclusivism became more rigid amongst them about who is a local person. 
For example, community respondents from Tembisa and Kempton Park – areas close to OR 
Tambo International Airport – felt that any aerotropolis LED support opportunity should 
support South Africans in Region A, first. This region encompasses Tembisa and Kempton 
Park. 
 
By contrast, the opinions within the TEDP category (especially the political and technical 
steering committees) on the question of local were dynamically different. For the former 
Mayor, the idea of local meant nothing as he felt that local no longer exists in the current 
globalized world. For MMC Khaya, the idea of local referred to Ekurhuleni but only for 
particular purposes, and not necessarily for business activity. For Pooley and Tsakane, local 
meant Ekurhuleni; for Kolobe and MEC Vadi, it meant Gauteng Province. 
 
It was interesting to note also the correlation between respondents’ views about local and 
the spatial demarcation of their administrative functional reach within the TEDP. For 
example, there was a strong attachment to Ekurhuleni as a local among those who worked 
for EMM, and who served in various steering committee of the aerotropolis project. 
Although they were not spatially conservative or separatists (as were those in the SPAP 
category), Ekurhuleni was generally their local. For respondents who worked for Gauteng 
provincial administration, such as MEC Vadi and Kolobe, local meant the entire Gauteng. 
For those working for ACSA, such as Zille – because the entity owns airports across South 
Africa – local meant spatial, both countrywide and beyond. 
 
So what was understood to be local was not a matter determined only by the physical space 
and  the  people  inhabiting  those  particular  spaces.  It  was  also  determined  by  the 
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administrative role and location of the representative of key stakeholders in the project, 
including the ability to access areas. Within the technical and political steering committee 
stakeholders, documented foreign nationals and businesses operating outside Ekurhuleni 
were welcomed to participate and leverage from the aerotropolis LED initiatives. This was 
no surprise; within the TEDP category LED was understood mainly as technical method of 
achieving development. It was not necessarily seen as being about politics, as suggested b y 
MMC Khaya. In the TEDP category there were no exclusions for participation in the 
economy. All are welcome to set up business enterprises that create jobs. 
 
This view was confirmed by former MMC Khaya criticizing the exclusion of foreign 
nationals from participating in the business of the aerotropolis projects in Ekurhuleni. He 
stated: 
 
The economy and economic activity does not operate on the logic of race or 
nationality. That is politics, and not a matter for the normal progression of economic 
activity in an open market system. 
 
An interesting point was that the various categories of local and their justifications did not 
feature in the initial responses when respondents were asked to explain in general terms, 
what they understood about LED. The idea of the local, when singled out and discussed in 
relation to LED, made the demarcation of exclusion stronger. When local was not separated 
out, the idea of local appeared almost invisible and ineffectual in LED and appeared to be 
operating silently in the background. 
 
This realisation, that confirms Bond (2003); Nel and Binns (2003); Rodriguez-Pose and 
Tijmstra (2005); Rogerson (2009) and Mqedlana’s (2014) observation, suggests that that 
the words “local economic development” means different things to different people and that 
it also means different things under different circumstances. Hence sometimes LED was 
spoken of idealistically and without individuation and at times the local was overly 
emphasised. When spoken as in local-economic development, the idea of the local appears 
stronger and more visible. That is, respondents, by declaring themselves to be locals within 
specific spaces, saw themselves as the agency for LED and demanded accountability from 
government. An example was Scotland’s decrying the Ekurhuleni economic department for 
its distance from communities in Ekurhuleni. He proposed that the department should be 
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decentralised and be visibly embed inside communities, and not be centralised only in 
 
Kempton Park, yet servicing the entire Ekurhuleni. 
 
 
In this respect, we believe that the idea of local in LED was understood in two ways: 
informally and in law. In law, local means physical spaces recognised by statues of 
municipalities, provinces, and their administrative centres. Here the idea of local enjoys 
some fluidity, within the categories demarcated in law. For example, local can be defined 
as a municipality, province, region or South Africa as a whole, including all the people 
rightfully and legally in those spaces. 
 
Informally, the idea of local appears to more in the imaginary. This imagination is not 
necessarily sanctioned by law, especially when referring to exclusions about who is a local 
person. For example, the idea of local appeared to be founded on a collective identity – 
expressed by the word “our” (“our surrounding”, “our township” and “our town”) when 
respondents referred to particular spaces. Notwithstanding the absence of legal basis for 
such claims of ownership to spaces, socially these claims take concrete forms and determine 
categories of inclusion and exclusion. 
 
The meaning of local was fluid, even within the (informal) categories of inclusion and 
exclusion. Qualification status stretches from birth right, to residency, nationality, and to 
heritage. These variables are used for various reasons at various times to determine who is 
local and who is not, given the political interest at play at any time. This informal meaning 
of local and its fluidity about who qualifies for LED support and opportunities, also explains 
the respondents’ changes of opinion when asked about their understanding of local in 
relation to LED. 
 
This informal form is especially the mode of determining those who are the local in 
townships, where economic activity is driven largely by solidarities of informal survivalist 
enterprises and SMMEs, and where LED is understood to be about poverty alleviation. In 
this category, foreigners and shopping malls are excluded from the register of the local – a 
matter I discuss later. 
 
As mentioned, contrary to the informal understanding of local, in law, the term means 
anything from a municipality, region, or province to South African land mass. It includes 
those who live legally in these spaces. This understanding endured within the TEDP group, 
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and as such, legal foreign nationals were also considered locals with rights to the extent that 
the laws provide. 
 
5.2.13 What is development? 
 
 
There were again many varied understandings among respondents about the meaning of 
development or what it is about. However, in this category there were more shared 
similarities which cut across different categories of respondents, particularly across the 
SPAP and TEDP. For example, development was understood across respondent categories 
to be about education and skills development, as well as economic growth and job creation. 
It also included social issues such as health care. This understanding of development 
resonates with the idea of progress, which as I have stated earlier, is a classical meaning of 
development closely associated with The UN Charter (UN 1945) and President Truman’s 
inaugural speech. 
 
Transcending the generally shared understandings and meanings of development across the 
spectrum of respondents, I also noted interesting ideological differences. For example, most 
respondents felt that access to and acquisition of land would mean development – or at least 
a catalyst for development. “Land is everything,” commented Ward 53 councillor Moseki. 
Several other councillors and business people believed that access to land had a strong 
developmental role. This was true especially for respondents engaged in urban agriculture, 
such as members of the Brakpan Agricultural Forum. The East Rand Industrial Association 
reported many of their members to be in desperate need of land to expand their enterprises 
and unlock job creation and development. Councillor Langa of Ward 21 in Makause, 
Germiston – which is a 100% informal settlement ward – understood the issues of land 
access  as  developmental.  He  stated  that  land  would  create  a  chance  for  housing  and 
accessing water and other basic services for residents of Makause. 
 
Several respondents including Ward 50 councillor in Katlehong, Steve, stated that 
development is about building on what already exists and not necessarily starting something 
anew. This view was expressed in relation to the understanding that development ought to 
be a bottom-up process that builds from below. Councillor Jiyane (Ward 38 in Alberton) 
welcomed the idea of support for the township economy, because it is a bottom-up 
development process that will be building on that which already exists in the townships. 
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Furthermore, development was understood as simply meaning positive change. That is, 
something that will ultimately be to the advantage of the community, particularly from a 
cost benefit perspective. This view was aired by Ndlovu, councillor of Ward 36 in 
Germiston, who said she had seen the abuse of resources in the name of development. 
 
5.2.14 Participation in the aerotropolis project 
 
 
My findings about respondents’ understandings about participation in LED and the 
aerotropolis project differed ideologically. For example, because most of the civil society 
(SPAP) respondents understood LED as a community led process, they expected the 
participatory exercise of the aerotropolis to follow the traditional bottom-up participatory 
development apprach. As stated earlier, this is a paradigm which according to (Bond 2002; 
Sen 1999) participation is understood as a bottom-up process meant to offers the community 
or participants the opportunity to shape their own development in accordance with their own 
needs and desires. 
 
By contrast, there was also an understanding of participation as a top-down process 
c h a m p i o n e d  b y  “expert”. This seemed to have been the main view which 
dominated the aerotropolis project approach to participation and reflected views of certain 
sections of the TEDP category.   The   use   of   the   appreciative   enquiry   method   to   
facilitated   community participation  in  the  project  confirms  the  restrictive  and  top-
down  approach  of  the aerotropolis project. This scenario explains why the participatory 
process of the aerotropolis was castigated by civil society and further confirms Bridger’s 
(2015) observation that aerotropolis are generally non-participatory. 
 
Against this background of a decried top-down approach to participation in LED and in the 
aerotropolis project, Deon suggested that things could have turned out better had the project 
been built from the bottom up.    He stated that this would be the approach where the 
community’s interests were the foundation of the master plan, and not the other way around. 
Deon explained that: 
 
At the time that we were busy with the preliminary plans of the aerotropolis master 
plan, we were told to re-design the plans, in such a way that the new plans would 
include and show how townships would also benefit from the aerotropolis project… 
such changes required that, [key stakeholders] had to identify strategic sites of 
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economic potential in townships, and plan around them. These strategic economic 
sites were identified without the involvement of the communities in those particular 
townships. This meant that the key economic nodes in the master plan were not 
identified by, or together with, the communities. 
 
5.2.15 LED preferentialism 
 
 
On the question of whether LED should be practiced through preferentialism, respondents’ 
views varied widely also. Respondents believed that LED practice and the aerotropolis 
project in particular should give preferential treatment for LED support and opportunities 
to local people and businesses in Ekurhuleni, as a matter of policy. For Tsakane, in addition 
to the municipal set-aside for local procurement and development, the aerotropolis project 
ought to also have its own internal support mechanisms set-aside for assisting local business. 
This should assist small local business to be incubated into the mainstream supply chain of 
the mainstream business activity that would be stimulated by the aerotropolis. However, 
respondents mentioned that preferentialism for local persons and business entities should 
be based on merit and be internally competitive to avoid monopolistic practices. 
 
Adding to the idea of preferentialism in LED practice, Makula (chairperson of Salute 
Empowerment) suggested that support for black businesses should be carefully planned and 
executed, to avoid technical challenges that black businesses in townships are already faced 
with, with the 30% set aside government procurement declaration. Makula claimed that 
much of this 30% has not been enjoyed by the intended beneficiaries (black township 
business) because of the massive capital investment required by certain projects, which no 
township business owners have readily available. He added that financing institutions are 
still reluctant to fund black and township businesses. Makula also stated that both EMM and 
the aerotropolis project office must go beyond “meaningless declaratory proclamations.” To 
systematically make things practicable, township businesses must exploit the 30% set-aside 
opportunity. To this end, Ekurhuleni NAFCOC was waiting to hear how much of the 
aerotropolis capital expenditure would be directed to the township businesses. 
 
For Ward 1 councillor  in Tembisa,  Hanekon, the idea of internal competitiveness was 
central even under a preferential procurement system. He believed in what Bond (2002) 
understood as entrepreneurial-competitive form of LED, as stated earlier, and believed the 
municipality should be run like a business and thus should procure from the best competitor 
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in pricing. He stated that the municipality cannot pay more for services only on the basis 
that they are sourced locally, when there are cheaper options available elsewhere. 
 
Advancing the same viewpoint, MEC Vadi (Gauteng MEC) suggested that preferentialism 
for employing local people must come into play only when locals have the competencies 
required for a given task. Reflecting on the limitations of rigid spatial prefentialism 
privileges, he asked ironically: 
 
How many people know anything about aerotropolis design in Ekurhuleni, let alone 
in the entire country? After all, to do a proper job for the aerotropolis, we may also 
be required to search for skills outside our borders. 
 
In  line with the qualified understanding of preferential procurement and privileging of 
locals, Kolobe suggested that the privileging of locals, especially for jobs, should be 
restricted to unskilled and semi-skilled categories of labour. That is, it should not necessarily 
be applied at the level of skilled and professional jobs. 
 
Other respondents suggested that preferential procurement and privileging of Ekurhuleni 
residents for jobs should be enforced only when there is no skills or capacity available within 
Ekurhuleni. This would be regardless of the skills rank, from unskilled to professional and 
skilled. This idea was based on the belief that people must work close to where they live. 
 
Some respondents suggested that preferential procurement should purposefully target black 
businesses and townships to address the economic transformation agenda. Respondents 
added that the aerotropolis, because of its sheer size and economic potential, has the capacity 
to transform the economy in favour of black business and townships. Ward 63 councillor in 
Katlehong, Ngena, suggested that LED programmes and the aerotropolis should consider 
preferential infrastructure development in townships. 
 
Another perspective on the subject was that preferential procurement and privileging should 
exclude foreign nationals. This opinion was based on several grounds including allegation 
that foreign nationals were said to enjoy preferential treatment and privileges in their own 
countries, which are not open to South African locals. I discuss this point in some detail 
here below. 
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5.2.16 Foreign nationals 
 
 
The issue of foreign nationals in South Africa emerged in the interviews, especially about 
who qualifies as a local person. That is, who should enjoy preferential treatment in LED 
support initiatives and especially from the aerotropolis project. On this score, several issues 
came to the fore. One category was those who accepted foreign nationals’ participation in 
the economy on condition that they had arrived legally in the country and were paying their 
dues. Some respondents suggested that foreigner-owned SMMEs, informal street-trading 
outlets, and artisans should be assisted by government though LED and the aerotropolis 
project, to be integrated into the community of Ekurhuleni and South Africa. 
 
The coordinator of  the  cooperatives  league  representative  in Ekurhuleni, Masale,  went 
further by stating that foreigners who conduct legitimate business in South Africa open the 
export market opportunities for South African local businesses. Foreign national traders are 
thus an advantage for South Africa, and a vital conduit that opens doors for locally produced 
goods into wider markets on the continent. Other respondents stated that South Africans can 
learn a lot from foreign nationals about how to run businesses more effectively. “Foreigners 
arrive here with very little, but after a short space of time their businesses are developed,” 
stated councillor of Ward 21, Zwide, regarding foreign nationals’ business acumen. 
 
By contrast, most respondents expressed anti-foreign-national sentiments. These sentiments 
ranged from the innocuous – allegations of foreign nationals stealing South African women 
– to the more serious. For example, there were serious allegations that foreign nationals 
(assumed to be African migrants) steal jobs from South Africans, and that they contribute 
to the rapid urbanisation process which has resulted in the rise of informal settlements, 
especially in urban townships. Foreign nationals were also alleged to benefit unduly from 
the economy. They were said to be paying bribes to corrupt government officials to acquire 
RDP  houses  and  other  associated  benefits  from  government,  intended  of  poor  South 
Africans. 
 
Furthermore, foreign-owned enterprises were decried for allegedly benefiting themselves 
only and not South Africans. They were accused of not investing or contributing to the 
communities in which they operated, or to the rest of South Africa. They were alleged not 
to be paying taxes such as business tax and were thus said to be enjoying a competitive 
advantage over businesses owned by South Africans, which pay taxes. One respondent 
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stated that foreign nationals live and sleep in their stores to cut their overhead costs, which 
is not allowed from an occupational health and safety perspective. Mlangeni of the Greater 
Tembisa Business Council (GTBC) stated that “They bribe government health inspection 
officials to bypass business health regulations… but these officials enforced the rules on us 
local business owners because we are unwilling to pay the bribe.” 
 
Another concern was the rise of rivalry between Somali, Bangladeshi and Pakistani people 
over business territories in the townships. Mlangeni explained that – 
 
When a Pakistani rents out a place from which to operate, very soon a Bangladeshi 
or a Somali would also want a place to trade in the same area, and each one of the 
rival partners would recruit their friends into the area. What you end up having is 
several rival conglomerates of Pakistani, Somali, and Bangladeshi spaza shops, 
tussling each other out and operating in residential areas that are not even zoned 
for business trade. 
 
Mlangeni, expressing disquiet about foreign nationals’ business practices in Tembisa, 
further asked: 
 
How is it possible that my business can survive when there are five illegal spaza 
shops in a street in which my shop is based, with owners living on the premises and 
not paying any business tax or levies … it is unfair on me! 
 
Furthermore, foreign-owned businesses were accused of not employing local people but 
their kin. They were said to be selling counterfeit goods and increasing the black-market 
industry. Tembisa Business Association chairperson Moreki, adding to the criticism of 
foreign nationals states that, they do not employ South Africans and also keep a distance 
between themselves and the organised business associations in their communities. They 
have their own independent business conglomerates operating in tandem, and in competition 
with those in our own community! Moreki protested: 
 
When have you ever seen these guys in the banks saving their money … they are 
actually extracting money from us, and shipping it out of South Africa. 
 
Many reasons were put forward to explain why foreign nationals outcompete local business 
people, especially in township mini grocery stores, such as spaza shops. Scotland from the 
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KKTA state that apartheid education was the reason why foreigner businesses were 
outperforming  locals  in  their  neighbourhood.  “We  are  not  as  entrepreneurial  as  the 
Pakistanis because we were never taught entrepreneurship at school,” Moseki claimed. For 
other respondents, the success of foreigners in business was attributable to their ability to 
organise and galvanise their resources and efforts among themselves, to negotiate better 
deals that surpassed those of local traders. For others, the success of foreign-national-owned 
businesses was related to their ability to pay bribes to further their business interests. 
 
5.2.17 Shopping centres and shopping malls 
 
 
Respondents’ views about the role of shopping centres and shopping malls in relation to 
LED were significant. Many respondents, especially from the SPAP category expressed 
displeasure about the spate of shopping malls mushrooming in townships. However, a few 
of them praised shopping malls and shopping centres for their shopping convenience, job 
creation and for contributing to the national tax in various ways. Others felt them to be 
highly destructive of community life and for LED. Ward 36 councillor Ndlovu stated that 
shopping malls have squeezed many community-owned businesses out of the market, 
especially grocery retailers. 
 
Ndlovu also stated that shopping malls have not only affected townships negatively but that, 
they have also destroyed the vibrant economic activity in towns because no-one really goes 
to town anymore to shop. Some respondents from the townships stated that shopping malls 
and shopping centres were responsible for the failure of informal traders and small grocery 
retail stores in townships. Other respondents felt that shopping centres and malls do not 
contribute enough to the local communities in which they do business. The malls and 
shopping centres are seen by communities as money-extractive machines in townships, 
which are not locally owned. Decrying the lack of economic transformation in South Africa 
and in townships, and accusing shopping-mall owners of the same, Ward 53 councillor 
Moseki commented: 
 
The shopping malls have killed the inner cities and have now moved to townships, 
but the mode of their business and ownership remains untransformed… it is 
extractive, and is still owned by the same people [assumed to be white] . 
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Ward 36 councillor Ngena, pointing at a shopping mall through the window of her office, 
added that: “We have a shopping mall, right here, but it is not known who owns it, it is not 
owned by local people.” Commenting on the same subject, Bubsy stated that shopping mall 
developers are granted permission by political authorities to set up in communities, often 
without consulting the community itself or organised business. “This undermines us!” she 
exclaimed. 
 
The contestation expressed by respondents about the role of shopping centres and shopping 
malls in relation to LED has an interesting dynamic. First, it shows the continued clash 
between two forms of LED, including the different understandings about development 
discussed earlier. On the one hand, there was an understanding, especially among the SPAP 
category that, shopping malls and shopping centres are allegedly responsible for the death 
of community retail businesses because they squeeze small businesses and spaza shops out 
of the market. On the other hand, I found an understanding within the TEDAP category of 
the role of shopping malls and shopping centres being viewed in a positive light with regard 
to LED. Job creation was cited as their biggest contributing factor to LED. 
 
What was of interest was that many respondents from the SPAP category who were opposed 
to shopping malls did not consider these entities to be local, even when they were spatially 
located in specific communities in townships. According to respondents in the SPAP 
category, shopping centres and malls, because they did not contribute directly or positively 
to the communities in which they operated, were not local entities. They were viewed in the 
same way as foreign nationals who resided in and operated businesses in certain areas of 
the townships. It was interesting to note that both shopping malls and shopping centres, and 
the informal enterprises owned by foreign nationals in townships, were unwelcome by large 




In this chapter I have identified and discussed key themes which emerged from my 
respondents during interviews phase of the study, and which corresponded to the purpose 
of this research and its attendant research questions. These findings were presented in their 
purest form possible and uncontaminated by the literature for the reader’s appreciation of 
their fulness. In this chapter, I have also discussed how certain themes related and how 
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respondents understood them similarly or differently. I also reflected on how some of the 
themes reinforced one another. This chapter has therefore established the following: 
 
a)   There are various understandings of what LED or development is about. These 
understandings are largely driven by competing socio-political realities and the 
interests of affected people. Even where there is common understanding about the 
meanings, differences remain about the best methods for achieving LED or 
development. 
b)  Ideological contestations about LED amongst the stakeholders in the aerotropolis 
project resonated strongly with contestations within the general LED discourse, with 
only minor differences. 
c)   The idea of “local” in relation to LED is a politically contested one and not a matter 
of natural qualification by citizenship only. Being considered a local person or entity 
is   also   rights-based.   Such   rights   are   socially   earned   though   demonstrated 
participation and loyalty to a specific community. 
d) Race featured strongly in LED discourse amongst the respondents even when 
unaccounted for in LED literature. 
e)   The idea of LED occurring through the Ekurhuleni Aerotropolis project seemed to 
favour the TEDP category rather than the SPAP. In the TEDP category, the 
aerotropolis is broadly understood to be about FDI and economic growth. In the 
SPAP category, it is understood to be mainly about pro-poor initiatives and poverty- 
alleviation efforts. 
 
In the next chapter, I use interview findings discussed in this chapter and the literature 
review for critical analysis and greater reflections. Chapter 6 also attends to some of the 
remaining issues and questions which were not fully addressed in this chapter. 
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In this chapter, I analyse the study findings. The analysis is based on the main thematic 
categories listed in the previous chapter, which are discussed here theoretically. Each 
thematic category is linked to a specific research question and sub questions, which address 
research objectives. The research questions are as follows: 
 
1.   What is the nature of the Ekurhuleni Aerotropolis Project? 
 
 
• What is the background to the Ekurhuleni Aerotropolis Project? 
 
• In what way does the project bolster LED? 
 
• What type of LED form does the project support? 
 
 
2.   What are the different conceptions and meanings of LED among stakeholders 
in the Ekurhuleni Aerotropolis Project? 
 
 
• What does LED mean? 
 
• What are the different conceptions of ‘local’ in LED discourse, and, within the 
aerotropolis project? 
• What are the different conceptions of ‘development’ in LED? 
 
 
3.   What is the ideological contestation within LED amongst the stakeholders in 
the Ekurhuleni Aerotropolis Project about? 
 
 
• What issues are contested in LED discourse and within the aerotropolis project? 
 
• What is the nature of the of the inconsistencies in contestation? 
 
• How do we explain these inconsistencies and contestations? 
 
 
4.   What can be done to improve LED discourse and practice in South Africa? 
 
 
• Is the current regime of LED discourse and practice appropriate for development 
problems in South Africa? 
• Any chances that LED discourse can address development problems in South Africa. 
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Many of the thematic categories I have discussed related and reinforce each other in many 
ways. They also addressed more than one research question. I have therefore discussed some 
themes under more than one question. For example, respondents’ views about the meaning 
of local, and development provided specific meanings of LED, which addressed research 
question number two. At the same time, respondents’ views about the meaning of local and 
development were also contested, and therefore addressed research question number three. 
I start discussing analytically each one of the research questions as listed in relation to my 
findings. The analysis of my findings is then followed by a conclusion. 
 
6.2 UNDERSTANDING THE EKURHULENI AEROTROPOLIS 
 
As stated earlier, some of our respondents such as the Mayor of Ekurhuleni understood the 
aerotropolis to be a new phenomenon in South Africa. However, I argue that the aerotropolis 
is not a new thing, even in Ekurhuleni. This is because Ekurhuleni was already in the process 
of transforming itself into a smart-city before the aerotropolis idea was introduced to the 
Ekurhuleni City Planning Department, as suggested by Pooley. This is also evident in Figure 
6, which explains the background to the Ekurhuleni Aerotropolis Project. As stated earlier, 
the shift of the aerotropolis from Ekurhuleni to Gauteng Province further proves that the 
aerotropolis is a portal for international capital flows that stimulate national and regional 
government economic interests. 
 
Furthermore, this is also because the aerotropolis is more about intensifying the transport 
(air, road and rail) and ICT infrastructure of Gauteng in order to heighten the province’s 
efficiency in responding to globalisations’ demand for speed for trade and the delivery of 
goods and services to international markets observed by Kasarda and Linday (2011 and 
Luthili and Houghton (2019). The fact that the Ekurhuleni aerotropolis was headed by a 
transport infrastructure engineer, Jack van der Merwe who also headed the Gautrain project, 
and MEC of Gauteng Roads and Transport Department, Ishmael Vadi, on behalf of the 
Gauteng Province, confirms this point further. It is no surprise therefore that Kosher, also 
felt that Ekurhuleni was already an aerotropolis, which according to him only needs 
infrastructure improvement to meet the standards of aerotropolises elsewhere. 
 
It is my view also that, the aerotropolis project is affirming a shift of development planning 
from LED (Ekurhuleni) to RED of R-LED (Gauteng). As stated earlier, the Gauteng City 
Region (GCR), the Joint Planning Initiative, the South Cape Economic Partnership, and the 
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West  Coast  Economic  Development  Partnership  are  examples  of  region-wide  LED 
initiatives already underway in South Africa (Luthuli and Houghton 2019(a); Van Niekerk 
and   Bunding-Venter   2015;   Wray  2015).   As   correctly  pointed   out   by  Gungubele 
commenting on the need for aerotropolis project to take on a region-wide posture, the region 
(Gauteng), because it is larger, is understood to offer greater potential in a competitive in 
the global market and to earn greater FDI, than Ekurhuleni acting alone. Furthermore, the 
words of Gungubele are incisive in this respect when he states that a united Gauteng has 
greater capacity for being an effective player in the global trade than a divided one. 
 
The views of Gungubele also explains why the aerotropolis plan took on a region wide 
posture when, initially, it was meant to be project of Ekurhuleni only. The repositioning of 
the aerotropolis from EMM to the wider Gauteng region and the project’s value proposition 
was also affirmed by the words of the current Mayor of Ekurhuleni. As stated earlier, 
according to Pienaar (2017) the Mayor stated that, the aerotropolis under the auspices of 
Gauteng Province will enhance the value proposition of the entire Gauteng City Region. 
 
It is certainly not unreasonable to also argue that, the shift of the aerotropolis project from 
Ekurhuleni to Gauteng signifies the shift in development planning from LED to R-LED or 
RED. As stated earlier (see chapter 3) this shift is encouraged by the 2014–2019 LED 
framework which emphasises greater need for regional economic planning to bolster what 
is calls “national prosperity” Bunding-Venter (2015). As stated earlier, Regional planning 
and development falls under Schedule 4, Part A which is the Functional areas of national 
and provincial government (Rautenbach and Malherbe 1999; RSA 1996). 
 
The shift of the aerotropolis project from Ekurhuleni to Gauteng is generally motivated by 
national and provincial government’s macroeconomic development interests, which are 
informed by the neo-liberal principles of GEAR, such as FDI attraction. These efforts often 
displace community led LED initiatives and prioritises corporate capitalist interests at the 
expense of the community. The fact that Ekurhuleni’s initial plan to develop a city around 
the OR Tambo airport and to stimulate LED for the local community in the metro were 
usurped by the province, through the aerotropolis project, is a case in point. As stated earlier, 
the   aerotropolis’   negative   effects   identified   by  Bridger   (2015)   Crichlow   (20016); 
Pleumarom (2017); Portes (2016) and Sassen (2017) such as its deleterious environmental 
impact,  unfair  tax  incentives  offered  to  attract  MNC  and  export  companies,  and  the 
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aerotropoli’s capacity to gentrify space and divide communities along class lines, is a case 
in point. 
 
As I had indicated earlier, the usurping of the aerotropolis project by the province was a 
source of some tension between EMM and the Gauteng Province. The words of Zille, which 
I repeat here below, observing territorial/project-ownership clashes between Gauteng 
Province and EMM on the matter confirms this when he states: 
 
There was definitely some political tensions about this issue [the naming and 
management of aerotropolis] . EMM did the dirty work, and now the project is 
confiscated from them. 
 
The aerotropolis project was no longer an Ekurhuleni project but a region-wide project 
supported by national government. As also stated earlier, it is clear from the forgoing that, 
even when EMM have powers to govern on their own, the exercise of power is technically 
circumscribed by the scope of their competences, and by both national and provincial 
government to which they are subject. This further suggests that municipalities have a 
restrained exercise of power even within their boundaries. The fact that the Ekurhuleni 
Aerotropolis Projects had taken a region wide posture seeking to attract MNC and export 
companies within the aerotropolis zone, not only confirm Bridger’s (2015) observation of 
the general lack of community participation in aerotropolis project. This also explains why 
both the community and organised business in Ekurhuleni was alienated from the 
participatory processes of the Ekurhuleni Aerotropolis Project. 
 
Because airports also fall under concurrent national and provincial legislative competences 
and that the province also reign over municipalities, EMM, which is home to OR Tambo 
International Airport, risk losing projects around the airports to national and provincial 
government, as is already the case. We can also argue based on the forgoing that, RED or 
L-RED planning can be largely in the interest of capitalist macroeconomic interests of 
national and provincial governments and less so, to the advantage of communities within 
municipalities. It is my view that this displaces communities further away from local 
economic development planning in their area. 
 
It my view also, that the aerotropolis’ intensification and consolidation of transport and ICT 
 
infrastructure for the smooth flow of goods, capital investments, and money capital in 
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Gauteng is reconfiguring the geography of the province. As stated earlier (see chapter 3) 
this changing mode of global capitalism also require new spatial configurations, which 
Jessop (2013) called global cities, smart-cities, major city regions, and inter-regional 
cooperation, and which I call smart regional-and-global city. This simply mean that the 
aerotropolis is itself a smart regional-and-global city and that the two words can thus be 
used interchangeably, as also suggested earlier. From the forgoing and the fact that the 
aerotropolis stimulate the efficiency in global trade flows, it is also clear to me that the 
aerotropolis project is oriented more in the direction of neo-liberal, free market global 
capitalism, which is animated by GEAR in South Africa. As we have stated earlier and is 
also suggested by (Bond 2003), GEAR is about attracting FDI to stimulate development and 
LED and therefore not about social or local development initiative that stimulate LED 
through community development initiatives. 
 
For the smooth flow of goods, capital investments, and money capital at the global scale, 
the changing modes of global capitalism require new spatial configurations at both the 
global level and within nations. These include global cities, smart-cities, major city regions, 
and inter-regional cooperation (Jessop 2013). As I have also stated earlier, the aerotropolis 
will reconfigure the space, by extension, this will also affect the discourse of LED in man y 
ways as is already visible with the rise of RED or R-LED observed by Luthuli and Houghton 
(2019(a)). Such moves are increasingly displacing LED from the centre stage of 
development planning. It is my view that this reconfiguration of space together with the 
free-market global capitalism, will extend and reproduces new cites of inequalities and lead 
to new forms of contestations over belonging. The intensification of territorialism and 
exclusions of both certain people and entities from being considered local discussed in 
chapter 5, is one case in point. 
 
 
Contestations about LED and rights to a place were affirmed by my respondents’ differing 
views about who should be the beneficiaries of the opportunities and gains of the 
aerotropolis. Certain categories of respondents who lived in Ekurhuleni felt they were 
entitled to business opportunities and gains accruing from the aerotropolis more than people 
who do not live in Ekurhuleni. Meanwhile, some others suggesting that the project 
opportunities should benefit citizens of the Gauteng equally.  Interestingly, the forgoing 
views corresponded with respondent categories on their views about the meaning of local, 
in LED. For example, those who live in Ekurhuleni – mostly from SPAP- believed that local 
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mean Ekurhuleni, and those who lived outside Ekurhuleni – mostly from TEDP - believed 
that local meant Gauteng Province. However, as stated earlier, some respondents also 
rejected the aeotropolis project outright, alleging that the project will entrench racial 
inequalities. 
 
It is my view also that, respondents’ views about who should be the beneficiary of the 
opportunities and gains of the aerotropolis between SPAP and TEDP, is also motivated by 
access  to  the  aerotropolis’  transport  and   ICT  infrastructure.  Most  SPAP  category 
respondents who rejected the aerotropolis project and those who believed the project 
opportunities should be given to blacks and various categories of people of Ekurhuleni, were 
residing and operating businesses in the townships. As suggested earlier and also confirmed 
by Charles et al (2007) and Sassen (2016(a)), townships are the wastelands and dumping 
sites of the aerotropolis zone, which are disconnected from its precinct in various ways. 
Here, there is generally scant smart ICT (wi-fi) or efficient transport infrastructure networks 
for them to leverage the precinct. They felt that Ekurhuleni, and everything that accrues 
from it ought to be theirs only. This is probably also because many of them could not easily 
access the opportunities of province, due to their lack of transport and ICT infrastructure 
networks that connect them to Gauteng as a whole. 
 
On the contrary, TEDP respondents who understood the idea of local more fluid and felt 
that  the  aerotropolis  project  opportunities  should  be spread  province-wide,  had  greater 
access to the transport and ICT infrastructure network of the aerotropolis. This network 
vastly, or in some cases eliminate, and reduce the time and distance needed to move from 
one metro to the other. For example, one respondent in the TEDP category lived in Pretoria 
and worked for the Gauteng Province finance department, based in Johannesburg. Thanks 
to Gautrain, he commuted swiftly between Johannesburg and Pretoria daily, and was able 
to attend aerotropolis stakeholder meetings in Ekurhuleni. The transport and ICT 
infrastructure made it possible for this person to interact physically across all three metros 
of Gauteng, all in a day. 
 
As I have suggested earlier that the aerotropolis is a smart-regional-global city, this means 
that it also exists in cyber-space and thus part of the digital modernisation of the economy 
as well, as also suggested by Popkova and Haabazoka (2019). 
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However, enjoyment of citizenship and participation in the cyber-space of the aerotropolis 
will also be limited only to those with access and can afford to pay for the ICT infrastructure 
network of the city. This, even when citizenship to the cyber-city of the aerotropolis will be, 
theoretically, open to all. It is against the background of the forgoing – user must pay 
principle – in an unequal society, that I need to emphasise that the aerotropolis will also 
extend existing inequalities to confirm Pleumarom’s (2017) observations. He further states 
that the aerotropolis subverts the goals of building inclusive, equitable and sustainable cities 
and that it is not designed to enhance the lives and livelihoods of ordinary urban citizens 
(Pleumarom 2017). 
 
The disquiet expressed by community members and business leaders in Ekurhuleni about 
the poor community participation process of the aerotropolis project is also incisive. The 
aerotropolis’ community participation process was only meant to conscientise community 
stakeholders about the development of the aerotropolis; to discuss opportunities associated 
with the project; to discuss concerns and expectations; to guide the order of priorities or 
preference on DoT voting; to enhance decision-making process through community inputs; 




As stated earlier in chapter 2, true participation is fundamentally based on the principle of 
community empowerment and the entrenchment of democracy (Arnstein 1969; Cavey 2004; 
Duraiappah, Roddy and Parry 2005; Hanley and Hossain 2010; Solesbury 2003). It is about 
partnership where power is redistributed between local people and power holders in an 
equitable  manner  and  where  decision  making  takes  place  between  equal  participants 
working towards a common goal of optimizing the well-being of all concerned (Arnstein 
1969; Duraiappah, Roddy and Parry 2005). 
 
 
The nature of community participation in the aerotropoli projects and the use of AI 
participation method does not meet the forgoing standards and values of community 
participation. As stated earlier, the participatory exercise of the aerotropolis was reflective 
of manipulation, passive participation, participation in information giving, and participation 
by consultation, which are methods often used in the name of participation and for 
legitimation, in development planning and project management (Ruiter 2005). 
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The words of Moreki, which I repeat here below, expressing his alienation from the 
participatory process of the aerotropolis project affirm this point, when he states: 
 
 
It seemed like it (aerotropolis project) was already decided. It was not participatory 
at all, and nor was it for and or about business. It seemed as though they bussed in 
people to become the audience. It was like they realised that they did something 
wrong by not consulting people and later started to cover lost ground through these 
ineffective consultative meetings. … How can you expect maximum participation of 
business in a community meeting? 
 
This alienation of community and local business from meaningful participation in the 
aerotropolis confirms several points about the nature of aerotropolis. It confirms 
Pleumarom’s (2017) observation as stated in chapter 3, that the aerotropolis is not a city 
designed to enhance the lives and livelihoods of ordinary urban citizens and to provide a 
space to invite participatory democracy, civic empowerment and inclusive communities. It 
also confirms Bridger’s (2015) observation that host communities of the aerotropolis are 
often excluded from governance of project since foreign investors are major shareholders, 
and further confirms the fact that local small and medium size enterprises stand no chance 
to benefit from the aerotropolis because it serves the growth and profits of Aircraft 
manufacturers, airlines, oil companies and TNCs. 
 
 
The exclusion of the community from meaningful participation in the aerotropolis is further 
proof of the aerotropolis’ capacity to expel communities even from dialog about issues that 
will affect their lives. This is because the installation of new forms of road and rail network 
construction and ICT networks that come with the project, will affect people’s physical 
movement in the city, land use patterns, and their environment, as Bridger (2015) also 
cautions.   It is furthermore against this background of poor community participation and 
their alienation by the aerotropolis project that, many of my respondents, especially those 
from the SPAP category rejected the project. Some respondents such as Karabo, cited fears 
that the aerotropolis is going to continue economic marginalisation of blacks and 
entrenchment of racial inequalities. 
 
 
I further wish to opine that, if the aerotropolis is indeed only an infrastructure project 
spawning the smart regional-and global city, it stands to reason that the rejection of the 
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aerotropolis project by the community, within the SPAP category, is not a rejection of the 
aerotropolis project alone. It is also a rejection of the unfolding forms and processes of the 
smart regional-and-global city which have long began with the rejection of smart technology 
infrastructure for pre-paid water and electricity, by communities. 
 
6.3 UNDERSTANDING DIFFERENT MEANINGS OF LED 
 
As mentioned earlier, I asked my respondents to explain their understanding of the meaning 
of LED in general first, and then I asked them to also explain the meanings of local, and 
development in relation to LED. Furthermore, I also asked them same in relation to the 
aerotropolis. Their responses allowed me to examine the consistency of the respondents’ 
views and understandings about LED. This approach allowed me to examine and to see 
much more clearly the nature of the complexity of contestations around meanings of LED 
in the LED debate, which was the main topic of my study. As also mentioned earlier, these 
contradictions and complexities arise through the lack of clarity about what LED is about. 
Below I provide an analysis on how the respondents’ varied understandings of the meaning 
of the local, and development influence their understanding of LED. I further reflect on how 
the contestations about the meaning of local and development also complicates the idea of 
LED. 
 
6.3.1 The meaning of “local” in LED 
 
 
In the previous chapter,  I alluded to respondents’ various understandings and meanings 
which they ascribed to the term local in relation to LED and the aerotropolis LED project. 
That is, local was understood to by many respondents across all responded categories (SPAP 
and TEDP) such as Kolobe and Tsakane, and Zwide, Scotland and Mlangeni respectively, 
to mean spatiality. This view confirms Rodriguez-Pose and Tijmstra (2005:3) conception 
of LED to be territorially based, locally owned and managed. For example, BAF’s Zwide 
states; 
 
To me, local is the municipality I am reporting to … I chose to say my local is 
Ekurhuleni as opposed to Tsakane, where I reside, because our funding and services 
are provided by Ekurhueleni and not Tsakane.  Tsakane is a small constitutive part 
of Ekurhuleni. 
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Tiisetso of KKTA who lives in Katlehong further adds; the word local means people who 
are born in Katlehong, or at least in Gauteng. Kolobe, who represented Gauteng Province 
in  the aerotropolis  commented;  “The word  local  is  quite broad… The local  for me is 
Gauteng Province.” 
 
The term local was understood by some respondents to also mean social identity such as 
citizenship/nationality, and at times it meant a combination of various types of spaces and 
inhabitants. As discussed in more detail in the previous chapter 5, many respondents, 
especially in the SPAP group such as Mlangeni and Moreki for example, felt that all foreign 
nationals – regardless of their citizenship status in South Africa – were not entitled to LED 
support because for them, foreign nationals are not considered locals. Shopping malls were 
also considered not to qualify for local status in townships by most SPAP respondents. Ward 
36’s Ngena states “We have a shopping mall, right here, but it is not known who owns it, it 
is not owned by local people.” Ward 53 councillor Scotland also commented: 
 
 
The shopping malls have killed the inner cities and have now moved to townships, 
but the mode of their business and ownership remains untransformed… it is 
extractive, and is still owned by the same people [assumed to be white] . 
 
In this regard, shopping malls were not considered local entities in townships and were 
criticised for opportunism and for stealing money from the township economy. The forgoing 
view of SPAP about foreign nationals and shopping malls in LED were however, criticised 
by most of the TEDP category respondents. Documented foreign nationals as well and 
shopping malls were considered in TEDP to be local and were praised for their role in LED 
through job creation. 
 
Furthermore, for Mlangeni and Moreki, local in relation to the aerotropolis LED initiative 
meant only for people of Tembisa and Kempton Park – areas close to OR Tambo 
International Airport. As discussed in the chapter 5, the pair felt that any aerotropolis LED 
support initiative should support South Africans in Region A, first. This region encompasses 
Tembisa and Kempton Park.  As also discussed in the preceding chapter, for Tsakane who 
is on the TEDP category, local in relation to the aerotropolis LED initiative meant the whole 
EMM. This means people of EMM should all have priority and equal access to support and 
benefit that may arise from the aerotropolis project. 
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For Gungubele who is also in the TEDP category, local is simply hard to contextualise 
because, as he suggests, globalisation does not give an opportunity for anything to be local 
anymore.  According  to  Gungubele,  the  aerotropolis  project  and  the  opportunities  that 
accrues from it must be seized by all in South Africa. Khaya adds to this view when he 
states: 
 
The economy and economic activity does not operate on the logic of race or 
nationality. That is politics, and not a matter for the normal progression of economic 
activity in an open market system. 
 
It is clear from the forgoing accounts and as discussed in the previous chapter, that SPAP- 
category respondents were more spatially rigid and restrictive about who qualifies as a local 
person/entity in LED, or, for LED support, compared to the more liberal views of TEDP 
respondents. As stated earlier, the understanding of LED within the latter category resonated 
with what Bond (2002) calls entrepreneurial competitiveness. This further suggests to me 
that socio-political interests do also determine who or what qualifies as a local especially in 
LED discourse. 
 
It was also interesting to note the correlation between respondents’ views about their 
understanding of local and the spatial demarcation of their administrative functional reach, 
especially within the TEDP category, by respondents such as Tsakane and Kolobe and Vadi, 
as quoted in the forgoing sections. For example, there was a strong attachment to Ekurhuleni 
as local by those working for EMM who served in various steering committee of the 
aerotropolis project. These respondents were less spatially conservative and separatist than 
those in the SPAP category. For the people working within EMM, Ekurhuleni was their 
primary local.  For  those  respondents  who  worked  for the  Gauteng Provincial 
administration, such as MEC Vadi and Kolobe, their primary local was understood to be all 
of Gauteng. For Zille, who worked at ACSA, an entity that owns airports across South 
Africa, his idea of local was – in spatial terms – countrywide and beyond. 
 
Therefore, what was understood as local was not a matter determined only by physical 
spaces and the people inhabiting those spaces. It was also determined by the administrative 
role and location of the representatives of the key stakeholders of the project, including the 
ability to access certain areas. 
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Among the technical and political steering committee stakeholders, documented foreign 
nationals and businesses that operate beyond Ekurhuleni were welcomed to participate and 
leverage from the aerotropolis LED initiatives. This was no surprise because within the 
TEDP category, LED was understood mainly as a technical method of achieving 
development (see Chapter 5). According to MMC Khaya, LED was not necessarily about 
politics, as was suggested by the SPAP respondents. In the TEDP category there were no 
exclusions from participation in the economy. All are welcome to set up businesses that 
create jobs. 
 
All the varied categories of local and justifications thereof did not feature in the initial 
responses when respondents were asked to explain in general terms what they understood 
LED to be about. In this regard, respondents understood LED in general terms and without 
any exclusions. They stated that LED is about such issues as community participation, 
entrepreneurship, informal trade, pro-poor support efforts, capacity building for the poor, 
job creation, improvement of quality of life, and pro-growth measures referred in figure 7, 
and as also suggested by Bond (2002); Rogerson (2009); the 2006 LED Framework (DPLG 
2006); and the 2014–2019 and 2017-2022 National LED framework (Department of 
Cooperative Governance 2017a; b) in the preceding chapter. Here, the idea of local appeared 
almost invisible and merely operated silently in the background of LED. 
 
However, when I pressed respondents to explain the idea of local in relation to LED and the 
aerotropolis project, or when local was dissociated from and referred back to same for 
meaning, qualification categories for inclusion and exclusion emerged. As discussed in the 
previous chapter and in the preceding sections, foreign nationals and shopping malls were 
amongst those not considered by some respondents to be local and were therefore expected 
to be excluded by SPAP respondents, from any LED initiative support. 
 
Other respondents felt that the aerotropolis LED initiative was primarily for EMM only, 
with others suggesting it a province-wide LED project. These differing opinions of my 
respondents, especially about who qualifies to be considered local in LED and the 
aerotropolis project, confirm ideological differences about LED debate in general as 
confirmed by Bond (2003); Nel and Binns (2003); Rodriguez-Pose and Tijmstra (2005); 
Rogerson  (2009)  and  Mqedlana (2014),  and  amongst  aerotropolis  project  stakeholders. 
They also highlight seeming politics of the idea of local in LED, which I think needs greater 
attention than is being afforded in discourse currently. 
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The intensification of categories of exclusions when local is singled out and spoken of in 
relation to LED, may well be a motivation for LED to be spelt with a hyphen, as Local- 
economic development (L-ED). This hyphen will naturally also bring to the surface the 
question of who or what is local in LED, amid the currently existing spheres of government 
which exists at local, provincial and national level and which enjoy varied powers and 
functions. It is my view also that this form will prevent LED discourse form sliding further 
into the elusive and idealistic categories, with an undefined and unidentified agency. 
 
Respondents, by declaring themselves first to be locals of spaces, saw themselves first as 
agents of LED and demanded greater accountability from government authorities. One such 
example was raised by Scotland, decrying the Ekurhuleni economic department for its 
distance from communities in Ekurhuleni. Scotland proposed that the department should be 
decentralised and be embedded within communities, and not be centralised in Kempton Park 
yet servicing the entire Ekurhuleni. 
 
Given the foregoing accounts of my respondents, I also posit that the idea of local in LED 
could also be understood in two ways: informally and in law. In law, local mean physical 
spaces recognised by statues of municipalities, provinces and their administrative centres. 
As stated earlier, the Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998 and the Municipal Systems Act 
of 2002 are good examples in this respect.  Here the idea of the local enjoys some fluidity 
within  the  categories  demarcated  in  law.  For  example,  local  can  be  defined  as  a 
municipality, province, region, or South Africa as a whole. This would also include all the 
people who rightfully and legally occupy those spaces. 
 
Informally, the idea of the local appears to exist mainly in the imaginary and thus not always 
sanctioned by law. This is particularly the case in the determination of qualification for 
being a local person in any given space. For example, as stated earlier, the idea of the local 
appeared to be founded on the idea of a collective identity, which was commonly expressed 
by the use of “our” by respondents, when they referred to specific spaces. Examples were 
“our surrounding”, “our township” and “our town.” Notwithstanding the absence of legal 
basis for such claims of ownership to spaces, socially, these claims take concrete forms to 
determine and enforce inclusion and exclusion in the register of local, in communities. 
 
The meaning of local is also fluid, even within the informal categories of inclusion and 
exclusion. Qualification status stretches from place of birth to residency, nationality and 
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heritage. All these categories are considered for specific reasons at any time to determine 
who is local and who is not, given the political interests at play at a time. I believe that this 
informal meaning of local and its fluidity about who qualifies for the status, explains the 
respondents’ sudden changes of opinion when asked about their understanding of local in 
relation to LED, and the aerotropoli project in particular. 
 
This informal form of determining who is a local is used in townships, where the mode of 
economic activity is driven largely by solidarities of informal survivalist type enterprises 
and SMMEs, and where LED is understood by the community to be about poverty 
alleviation. This is the category in which foreigners and shopping malls are excluded from 
the register of the local – a matter I discuss below. 
 
As explained earlier, the shift in opinion of respondents in the SPAP category when asked 
to define local in relation to LED (as in L-ED), and in relation to the aerotropolis was 
significant. This finding affirms that LED was understood within SPAP not only as a 
poverty-eradication measure, but also as a matter of historical social justice for black South 
Africans for having suffered neglect and racial discrimination under apartheid. For example, 
as stated in chapter 5, Mlangeni re-emphasising Khumalo’s et al (2019) call for informal 
trade support referred earlier, states that LED should be about the support informal trade 
and businesses in townships only. This sector has the highest concentration of black people 
who lacked any government support during apartheid. Mlangeni further added that 
ultimately, LED is about integrating the economic interest of previously disadvantaged 
peoples into the mainstream economy. 
 
Makula of Salute Empowerment Forum also echoes these sentiments by suggesting that 
LED initiatives must have a preferential support structure for black business in order to 
assist them with technical challenges that black businesses in townships are already faced 
with. With the forgoing respondent accounts, respondents’ claim for LED and the 
aerotropolis to restore historical social justice was closely associated with race. Hence race 
essentialism was considered important for LED across respondent categories, more so in 
the SPAP category. Furthermore, the understanding by SPAP respondents of LED having 
to be about poverty alleviation and historical social justice, further explain why many of 
them were hostile towards foreign nationals and shopping malls. To a large extent, it also 
explains why many of them also rejected the aerotropolis project. They felt marginalised 
and alienated from the project. 
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For example, understanding LED as a poverty-alleviation measure and a matter of historical 
social justice suggests that LED is meant only for black South African citizens, whom 
because of the legacy of apartheid are poor and live in the squalid conditions of townships. 
The presence of foreign nationals therefore, seemed to be understood as an encroachment 
by illegitimate persons posing a threat over limited resources and opportunities, meant for 
victims of apartheid. As stated earlier, according to Bond (2002) and Sen (1999) these 
resources included access to housing, land and other linked services, which LED was 
understood to be about, amongst certain quarters of SPAP respondents. 
 
It is my view also that foreign nationals, especially those operating businesses in townships, 
experienced hostility because of their lack of social rootedness in the communities in which 
they operated. The fact that foreign nationals are alleged by Moreki of Tembisa Business 
Association not to be employing South Africans, and also not t o  b e  working with 
organised business associations in the communities where they operate, Is a case in point. 
Moreki further protested: 
 
When have you ever seen these guys in the banks saving their money … they are 
actually extracting money from us and shipping it out of South Africa. 
 
It is my views that in addition to being black and residing in South African, according to 
SPAP respondents, social rootedness is another important variable for qualify for local 
status and LED support, by extension. In contrast to physical rootedness, which is about 
one’s physical location or presence in a particular space, social rootedness is more of a 
socialised belonging. It is a rootedness in space that is both physical and social, and which 
is acquired often through demonstrable loyalty and active participation in community issues, 
perhaps even more so when one is foreign to a place. 
 
Therefore, the fact that foreign-owned businesses in townships have their own business 
agglomeration networks operating parallel with those of the local communities, as suggested 
by Moreki, isolate them from the surrounding community itself. Worse, they are seen as a 
threat to non-foreign-owned township businesses. The foreign-owned businesses become 
socially dislocated entities that lack social legitimacy and therefore enjoy very little 
community protection and are left vulnerable to criminal activity. This attitude is often 
mistaken for xenophobia. This logic explains why mob attacks and looting of foreign-owned 
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spaza shops in townships is often not wholesale but selective, with some foreign-owned 
spaza shops being protected against attack by the local communities themselves. 
 
The same principle of social dislocation and lack of social rootedness and legitimacy 
acquisition suffered by foreigner-owned spaza shops, also explains why SPAP respondents 
decried the shopping malls and shopping centres. That many respondents such as Ngena 
reported not to know the owners of these entities and their role in the community, suggested 
that they too suffer dislocation. It is my view that shopping malls suffer dislocation from 
two fronts. The first is a dislocation from the social life of the communities in which they 
have settled, and the second is dislocation from the broader business fraternity in the 
communities operating on the ground. Such processes have also alienated shopping malls 
and shopping centers in townships from the community and this explains why they are not 
considered local entities also, even when they are physically located in townships. 
 
The lack of civic presence by shopping malls in the communities also explains why they are 
viewed by communities  as anti-loyal disembodied parasitic money-extractive machines, 
said to be responsible for economic expulsions and the death of locally owned businesses 
in townships.  As stated earlier, these MNC entities see space not as living entities but only 
as dead spaces of raw material from which to extract value and leave once it dries up. 
However, for communities, space or place is a living entity which can speak, and which 
grows and exudes life. It is a community of people, culture, memory, history, and aesthetics, 
which is often jealously protected by those who live in it as suggested by Mbembe and 
Nutall (2008) and Ruiters (2005). 
 
As confirmed by Gungubele who dismissed the idea of local in LED, and Mohonko, who 
believed that LED initiative ultimately serve government’s national interests, including 
Khaya who understood LED only as a technical process of generating economic growth: it 
is clear that within the TEDP category, LED were not spatially fundamentalist. All people 
were welcomed to participate freely in the local economy. In the TEDP category, the idea 
of local was less rigid and thus corresponded more with the logic of the smart regional-and- 
global city (aerotropolis) phenomenon, which is based on free market principles elucidated 
by Bond (2003; 2010) and Nel and Rogerson (2005) and Rogerson (2009). That is a desire 
to attract FDI to stimulate economic development. 
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The anti-political attitude towards spatiality within the TEDP category also explains why 
they understood LED to be only about economic growth and enterprise development. The 
words of Khaya, which we repeat here, are incisive in this respect, when he states that: 
 
The economy and economic activity does not operate on the logic of race or 
nationality. That is politics, and not a matter for the normal progression of 
economic activity in an open market system. 
 
The forgoing accounts also explains the cordial attitude of the TEDP respondents towards 
legally documented foreign nationals and shopping malls. However, this observation does 
not discount the fact that some TEDP respondents were responding in their official capacity 
as representatives of various government entities, which could have potentially restrained 
more radical stances on the matter. 
 
I argue that shopping malls are a product of the logic of unrestrained global flows of 
international trade, which are inscribed in what I have called the smart regional-and-global 
city, which is highly desired within the TEDP category. As stated earlier, this city is already 
underway and is being consolidated by the Ekurhuleni Aerotropolis Project. Because of the 
ethos of unrestrained global flows of global trade networks and free market principles of 
global capitalism widely celebrated within the TEDP category, MNC and individuals can – 
after satisfying technical  administrative requirement  processes  –  settle in  communities. 
These views of the TEDP resonate with the economic philosophy behind the aerotropolis’ 
push for unrestrained flows and competition in global trade and attraction of MNC as 
spinners of FDI for host countries, as confirmed by Kasarda and Linday (2011). 
 
MNCs settle in communities and in the aerotropolis zone regardless of whether the 
communities approve. The fact that political authorities are alleged by Mlangeni to be 
granting permission for property developers to build shopping malls in township 
communities without community participation, is a case in point: “this undermines us!” 
protested Mlangeni. Therefore, within TEDP, shopping malls and MNCs were celebrated 
because of their claim of capacity to create jobs and contribute to the national tax base. For 
the same reasons, only legal foreign nationals were welcomed because they were said to 
contribute to the economy in various ways. These included payment of property taxes, 
employment of local South Africans and skills transfer. 
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I also wish to highlight that, the anti-shopping mall phenomenon on the part of SPAP 
respondents is also a rejection of the smart regional-and-global city (aerotropolis) 
phenomenon as well, which strives to service what Sassen calls “corporate capitalism.” As 
already explained, the smart regional-global city philosophy has begun to reconfigure not 
only forms and method of socio-economic interactions, activity and governance, but has 
also reconfigured human and corporate relations to spatiality and associated rights thereto. 
As stated earlier, these spatial reconfigurations often expose the poor and racialised people 
to expulsions from the aerotropolis/smart regional-global city’s spaces. As pointed out by 
Charles et al (207), there is no planning allowance within the aerotropolis model for 
dwellings that could house the working poor. Many of low paid workers find themselves 
forced into poverty and the informal economy or living in the periphery and far-flung 
townships and having to commute long distances to work. 
 
It is certainly possible that the more the expulsions of the poor from the aerotropolis/smart 
regional-global city’s spaces, the more they will become even more territorialised, setting 
in motion new forms of geopolitical complexities. The diverse ways of understanding local 
and the rigidification of locality in LED within the SPAP, is a case in point. The words of 
Mosekei are incisive in this respect, when he states that: for the expelled poor, the township 
is the only thing that black people in townships can call theirs, and that they will thus 
jealously protect against it to secure access to resources and their basic needs, even if it 
means using violence. 
 
It is my view also that, this expressed sentiment of entitlement and ownership of the 
township by communities, must be understood against the backdrop of apartheid, which 
according to Ruiter (2005:3) kept people in “their place” through discriminatory separatist 
laws. Apartheid’s incessant drive to keep people in “their place” is therefore also responsible 
for the seeming culture of rigid territorialism and insider–outsider binaries in South Africa. 
According to respondents’ such Karabo, such binaries can potentially also intensify hostile 
geopolitics in Ekurhuleni. I believe these binaries also harm LED efforts such as those that 
require spatial fluidity and could also over politicise RED efforts. 
 
At the time of revising this thesis in 2020 – after an examination process which lasted a full 
year after submission, in 2019 – foreign nationals especially the Pakistani, Somali and 
Ethiopian traders have been prevented to operate their stores in Katlehong, by Katlehong 
local business owners following the recent spate of “xenophobic” attacks nationwide. The 
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case of Amadelangukubona SA Business Forum’s activities provides another practical 
example to the intensification of politicization of spatiality in LED. 
 
Amadelangukubona is a radical group of business people from eThekwini municipality in 
Kwazulu Natal. This group demands that government jobs in the municipality to be given 
only to the people of eThekwini, whom the group claims to represent. They have allegedly 
interrupted service delivery by storming municipal depots and contractors’ work sites, 
carrying weapons, threatening violence against municipal workers and contractors 
(Rondganger 2015). The same principle applies to taxi operators in eThekwini. They 
reportedly  obstructed  the  construction  of  the  city’s  public  transport  network  after 
demanding a slice of the contract. In addition, the National Funeral Practitioners Association 
(Nafupa SA) stated that as of 1 February 2018, no white or Indian funeral parlours would 
be allowed to carry out burials in any townships in Durban (IOL 2018). 
 




In Chapters 2, 3, and 5, I explained that the meaning of “development” is a contested subject 
of historical record. It is a subject that has not only evoked various dichotomized 
interpretations  and  responses  but  has  also  produced  various  schools  of  thought  and 
competing development methodologies within intellectual and political discourse. As also 
mentioned in Chapter 2, these varied and sometimes dichotomous interpretations of 
development range widely. They vary from those of the classical theories of development, 
which want to see it unfold within the current hegemonic Eurocentric forms and through 
neo-liberal economic principles, to the post-development reformists who want to see it 
transformed and fair, and opened to other cultural influences, and to those of the de-colonial 
school dismiss and reject development. 
 
These historical categories in development thinking continue to play out dynamically, even 
today. This was evident in this study with the varying understanding of development and or 
methodologies of achieving it, between the SPAP and TEDP respondents. As stated earlier, 
SPAP respondents understood development within the sustainable framework which places 
a high premium on social capital and human capacity-building in development. TEDP 
respondents believed in neo-liberal macro-economic strategies which resonate with the 
aerotropolis projects, such as FDI attraction and a push for economic growth. 
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What is certain, however, as clarified in the preceding chapters and confirmed by Cornwall 
(2010), is that the word “development” itself is charming. It is an expression that evidently 
conjures up positive attitudes about life. Hence the word was always associated with 
progress, prosperity, joy, and a better life among our respondents. It is also certainly clear 
(as stated in previous chapters) that this progress, prosperity, joy and better life are generally 
conceived in accordance with the hegemony of neoliberalism and Western and Eurocentric 
modernity (see Chapter 2). Fact that respondents, especially of those of the SPAP category 
who opposed neo-liberal principles in LED, did not raise concerns and or disquiet about 
modernity’s influence on the erosion of local traditions and cultures, is a case in point. None 
of the respondents also raised environmental concerns about greenhouse gases generally 
associated with aerotropolis developments or neo-liberal models of LED. Their interests 
were only about blacks securing access to their basic needs and business opportunities 
accruing from LED and the aerotropolis project. 
 
It is no wonder, therefore, that there was some consensus across all respondent categories 
about  the  meaning of  development  being  about  jobs,  skills  and  economic growth  (see 
Chapter 6). This ideological consensus on the meaning of development between SPAP and 
TEDP respondents, also confirms White’s (2002) observation about development’s capacity 
to systematically transform the consciousness of its victims and reform their subjectivities. 
As also stated earlier, this further confirms that the regime of the pro-poor approach of the 
SPAP respondents is not necessarily in line with any of the post-development critiques 
discussed earlier, such as the post-growth and certainly not degrowth, with which the pro- 
poor methods also share some common elements, especially with the former. 
 
It is no surprise also that governments officials in the TEDP category understood LED and 
the aerotropolis project within the neo-liberal framework, which as I have stated before, is 
animated by the GEAR policy in South Africa. This policy position is at odds with the SPAP 
respondents, most of whom understood development to be primarily about poverty 
alleviation, along the path of the sustainable-livelihood framework. As I have also suggested 
earlier, the sustainable-livelihood development framework is more in line with the erstwhile 
RDP, which stood diametrically opposed to GEAR. 
 
On the basis of the foregoing accounts, I argue that SPAP respondents were more aligned 
to the ideas of humanist development thinkers in development discourse and certain 
categories within the post-development school (see Chapter 2). As mentioned earlier, these 
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thinkers do not necessarily reject the current form of development in general, but advocate 
for its reformation. SPAP respondents fell within this category because they did not reject 
development or LED per se. They only demand its transformation to prioritise poverty 
alleviation efforts and, development and business interest of blacks, due to their historical 
neglect and oppression under apartheid. This demand for the transformation of development 
by SPAP respondents also includes the demand for race-consciousness in development 
planning. This is because respondents were worried that race-blind LED/aerotropolis would 
exacerbate racial inequalities and social unrest. As Mentioned earlier, the words of Karabo, 
which we repeat here, are incisive when he states: 
 
We cannot talk about social cohesion in Ekurhuleni… even at the national level, 
when black people are still in townships, suffering from all imaginable social ills, 





These divisions harbour anger… we cannot cohere because others are talking about 
their poverty, while others are more concerned about protecting their wealth. If the 
aerotropolis was developmental in nature, its planners should be able to tell us how 
much is being set aside for black and township businesses within the aerotropolis 
project. They would have to convince me by numbers. 
 
As also mentioned earlier, Karabo further stated that the neglect of government support for 
black township businesses would amount to the continuation of economic marginalisation 
of blacks and township small businesses. Scotland also weighed in on Karabo’s concerns 
about the aerotropolis project having the potential to intensify racial inequalities and 
dismisses the aerotropolis. He states that it is non-starter for economic development interests 
of black people and businesses and that “It speaks the language of white people.” The 
aerotropolis therefore militates against the local people and has no benefit for them. 
 
It is my view that the rejection of the aerotropolis on the basis that it speaks “the language 
of  white  people”  suggests  that  community  also  have  their  own  understanding  of 
development and LED. This understanding of LED is expressed within SPAP and draws 
from the pro-poor LED initiatives and the sustainable livelihoods framework principles 
advocated for by Bond (2000, 2002); Moree, McNamara and Acholo (2009) and Sen (1999). 
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These sustainable development framework principles and pro-poor LED initiatives do not 
resonate with the corporatist approach to development, which is championed by Kasarda 
through the aerotropolis, which I discus in some detail further below. 
 
Based on the forgoing accounts I also argue that the rejection of the aerotropolis by SPAP 
respondents, was also due to the project’s insensitivity to the unresolved problem of racial 
inequality in development, which according to them, still favour whites in South Africa. I 
therefore also argue that, the rejection of the aerotropolis project by SPAP respondents is 
ultimately a rejection of race neutral LED discourse as well. No wonder Ngena suggested 
that the aerotropolis project or LED programs should consider preferential infrastructure 
development for blacks in townships. 
 
Respondents’ concerns about racialised distribution of development and inequality in South 
Africa and the fact that the LED/ Aerotropolis Project do not have tools to address racial 
issues, confirm Whites’s disquieting observation of race denialism and silencing in 
development. According to white (2002) this denialism manifests racism. As suggested by 
Modiri (2012) earlier, the silencing of race in South Africa’s development discourse is 
sustained by the myth of the 1994 “rainbow nation” project and the absence of visible signs 
of racism. However, the lived experience and concerns of many blacks over racial inequality 
illustrated by respondents, remain evidently hard to contain. 
 
6.4 IDEOLOGICAL CONTESTATIONS IN LED 
 
In this section, I reflect analytically and in greater detail on the two broad categories of LED 
understandings in my study, including the ideological contestations between them. As noted 
earlier, these categories are SPAP and TEDP. 
 
6.4.1    Socio-political activist perspective (SPAP) 
 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 5, the SPAP category resonates strongly with what in general LED 
discourse is called the pro-poor approach, which is not in line with the aerotropolis’ 
economic developments strategy of FDI attraction and global trade flows. However, race 
essentialism is an additional category in this group. This perspective is often put forward as 
both a critique and an alternative to the dominant pro-growth or market approach to 
development, which it criticises for corporate bias at the expense of the poor. The pro-poor 
school  of  thought  strongly advocates  for  LED  to  be  more  community  oriented  and 
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championed by community initiatives and participation. It is therefore no surprise that 
respondents in this category listed poverty alleviation; social justice and pro-poor interests; 
participatory development; and access to land as the hallmark of LED, as listed in figure 9. 
In addition, respondents understood LED to be also about empowerment and support of 
township informal traders, cooperatives and SMMEs, job creation, including the delivery 
of basic services such as health care facilities, water, housing and electricity, and to be also 
about   provision   of   skills   development   programmes   and   empowerment   of   black 
communities. 
 
The pro-poor approach advocates for LED to be concerned about community capacity- 
building projects, with the understanding that such an approach can restore the livelihood 
strategies of poor people. According to SPAP respondents, the aerotropolis project 
represented none of the forgoing principles of community development and poverty 
alleviation, hence many of them rejected the project citing that it is going to exacerbate 
racial inequalities. As stated earlier, the areotropolis represents a consolidation of global 
capitalism as it responds to the 21st-century trade demands for speedy movement and 
delivery of goods and services spawned by globalisation and its attended informational 
economy (Castells 2010), including the ascendency of information communication 
technology (ICT) and associated increases in the mobility and liquidity of capital, and 
demands for new forms of urban redesign, which complement rapid urbanisation taking 
place at the global scale. Borders no longer matter in the modern age of trade as suggested 
by Kasarda and Linday (2011). 
 
 
As  also  stated  earlier,  the  principle  underlying  the  aerotropolis,  according  to  Kasarda 
(2011), is understanding where you are in the product cycle, how much you add, and where 
you can harness speed to raise productivity and cut costs. Revenue raising productivity and 
cutting costs for corporations through non-compliance to environmental or labour standards 
generates more profit for them. This view further confirms the fact that profit and 
international corporate interests dominate the aerotropolis, and not the community or local 
interests per se. Tax breaks and a variety of concessions offered to corporations to attract 
them to the aerotropolis precinct are some of the cost cutting measures that allow them to 
generate profit everywhere in the globe. 
 
For Kasarda, the aim of the aerotroppolis is to attract MNC and TNC to the precinct at all 
cost, even if this means forced removal of people from their land, environmental degradation 
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and violation of human rights as also observed by Crichlow (20016), Portes (2016) and 
Sassen (2017). As stated earlier, the fact that Kasarda celebrates New Songdo City in South 
Korea as the best exemplary aerotropolis, yet its construction led to irrevocable loss of 
unique habitats for vulnerable species of birds such as Mongolian Gulls and Black-faced 
Spoonbills (Bridger 2015), is incisive in this respect. 
 
As we have also stated earlier, tax incentives offered to TNC and MNC take away the much- 
needed  funds  for  the  poor  and  promote  unfair  competition  between  them  and  local 
businesses operating outside the precinct, as suggested by Bridger (2015). The aerotropolis 
precincts can also be declared as SEZ and therefore corporations in them enjoy operating 
under relaxed labor laws. This has unfortunately also lead to exploitation of workers through 
long working hours and unsatisfactory working conditions and without minimum wage pa y 
(Scheepers 2012). 
 
The fact that respondents decried the lack of community participation in the project – the 
cornerstone of community development ethos – and that the aerotropolis showed no 
deliberate effort to restore social justice and equality, is a case in point. The words of Harry 
of the [EBI, Captain of Industry and Chambers of Commerce] which I repeat here, decrying 
lack of community participation in the project are telling in this respect, when he states that: 
 
Even having been involved from the start, we did not have influence in terms of the 
ideological makeup of the aerotropolis projects. We were told about it via 
presentations, which said: “development is coming.” 
 
Harry’s views about the poor nature of participation in the aerotropolis were confirmed by 
 
Gungubele’s explanation of the participation process when he states: 
 
 
The nature of the participation was [only] to explain to people how jobs were going 
to be created, to explain to small business how they were going to benefit. 
 
 
As stated in the forgoing section, LED understanding within the SPAP school of thought 
resonates with Bond (2003) and Rogerson’s (2009) ideas on LED. As mentioned in chapter 
3, these authors argued that LED should be about poverty alleviation and the strive for 
equality. It is for this reason that I also believe the SPAP school is ideologically in tandem 
with the sustainable livelihood framework shown in Figure 2. As mentioned, the sustainable 
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livelihood framework is a poverty-alleviation method that deploys people’s various 
intricately linked and mutually reinforcing livelihood assets for their own community 
development. As listed earlier, these assets include human capital, comprising of skills, 
knowledge, labour, good health and physical capability; natural capital, which includes 
natural-resource stock and the environment;    financial capital, such as cash, credit/debt, 
savings, and other economic assets; physical capital, which includes infrastructure, 
production equipment and technologies;  and social capital, such as networks, social claims, 
social relations and affiliations and associations (Krantz 2001; Moree, McNamara and 
Acholo 2009). 
 
The fact that respondents in the SPAP group, especially councillors Jiyane and Steve, stated 
that development was about building or improving that which already exist in communities 
and not necessarily starting something new, confirms this point. It confirms that SPAP 
respondents understood LED to be rooted in the community development paradigm. This is 
a paradigm where existing human capabilities and social capital are prioritised and 
understood as the constitutive elements for mobilising community development, as also 
suggested by Hindson and Vicente-Hindson (2005); Krantz (2001); Moree, McNamara and 
Acholo (2009). 
 
Accordingly, this mean that for SPAP, the aerotropolis is unnecessary, since it is considered 
by some to be a new thing that will require funding and divert public resources away from 
community needs to benefit corporate interests. In this respect, SPAP respondents would 
have preferred Ekurhuleni to facilitate their access to land for housing, water and electricity 
including skills development programs. They would have preferred the EMM to support 
existing small micro enterprises and the informal sector for poverty alleviation and to 
stimulate LED in Ekurhuleni as confirmed by Mlangeni, instead of the aerotropolis project, 
which Bridger (2015) has confirmed to serve corporate interests. 
 
As  stated  earlier,  Bond  (2000,  2002)  confirms  that  for  every 100  households  that  are 
supplied with electricity, 10 to 20 new economic activities are started by the poor, such as 
those who need refrigerators to store meats, cold drinks and other perishable food products. 
As I have stated earlier, the informal trade is currently employing 2.9 million people in 
South Africa today, 70% of whom start informal business due to unemployment and as wa y 
to sustain themselves economically (Khumalo’s et al 2019). In sum, SPAP respondents 
would have appreciated to be empowered by EMM through support with their varied assets 
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and capacities sustaining their livelihoods, for them to realise their full potential and 
development, and to be part of the mainstream economy. 
 
The sustainable livelihood framework’s understanding of people and their livelihoods as a 
resource for their own development makes the delivery of basic services such as water, 
electricity, housing, education, skills training and healthcare, not as mere consumable 
resources. Rather, it views such services as concrete economic assets and resources from 
which the poor can leverage and improve their lives both socially and economically, as also 
expressed by Jiyane of the SPAP group. Demands by Zwide, Moseki and Nkosi for land 
and housing access, and further demands for racial equality in SPAP, are issues underscored 
within the sustainable livelihood paradigm. 
 
The synergy between the delivery of basic services to communities and the resultant impact 
on development and LED for poor communities, was explicated by Jiyane. As stated earlier, 
for Jiyane, LED was about human development and social capital. According to him 
development is stimulated by categories that empower people to function optimally such as 
hospitals, schools, clean environment, and safety. “You need good health in order to be a 
good consumer or a good businessman,” Jiyane emphasised metaphorically. The forgoing 
sentiments by Jiyane also emphasise the need for development or LED to maintain a balance 
between human consumption and or development with the environment, as advocated for 




The sustainable livelihood approach to development and LED championed within SPAP do 
not resonate the corporatists “growth” led understanding of development championed by 
Kasarda through the aerotropolis. This is because the aerotropolis according to Kasarda has 
two main purposes. As stated earlier, that is to serves as a hub where the global meets the 
local in global international trade, and to provide corporations with the infrastructure to 
responds to 21st-century trade demands for speedy movement and delivery of goods and 
services spawned by globalisation and its attended informational economy (Kasarda 2018). 
Community-led economic development initiatives such as local enterprise development 
support, poverty alleviation efforts, skills development initiatives and support initiatives for 
the informal sector advocated for by Hindson and Vicente-Hindson (2005); Krantz (2001); 
Moree, McNamara and Acholo (2009) and Sen (1999) are not part of Kasarda’s aerotropolis 
paradigm. 
203  
Development thinking of Kasarda rests on the belief in the Rostowian trickledown theory 
of classical development thinking, which as we have stated earlier, suggests that economic 
growth leads naturall y to development for all. In the context of the aerotropolis and Kasarda 
in particular, this is to suggest that TNC and MNC will stimulate or generate economic 
growth, that will naturally overcome the problems of poverty, unemployment and racial 
inequality, and lead to development for all in Ekurhuleni and South Africa. 
 
However, as we have stated earlier, the Ekurhuleni Aerotropolis projects was found to 
exhibit corporate bias towards MNC and TNCs through unfair tax concession offered to 
them, lack of community participation and prove to be somewhat counterproductive to 
community interests.  This is particularly so  because significant public resources which 
could have been used to secure and improve the delivery of basic needs of the community, 
such as water and electricity and skills development programs have been diverted to the 
aerotropolis project. As stated earlier, The Mayor has committed R570 million in addition 
to earlier funding, for implementation of the Aerotropolis Master Plan in 2020 (James 2019). 
In this way, it is also clear that public resources are used to benefit TNC and MNC who will 
leverage the aerotropolis for their own gain, and not the public or local enterprises. 
 
The   SPAP   perspective   of   development   and   LED   is   broadly  expressed   in   Sen’s 
“development as freedom” thesis. Here, development is understood as freedom, with such 
freedom depending on access to socio-economic resources such as education, health care, 
housing and livelihood assets, as well as political and civil rights – such as the right to 
participate in public discussions (Sen 1999). 
 
Sen, like Bond and most respondents in the SPAP category such as Jiyane and Steve, 
understood the improvement of living standard of the poor through community participation 
and bottom-up processes as the hallmark of development. Bond and Sen did not understand 
development to be only about acquisition of high GNP or FDI, personal income, 
industrialization and technological advancement, or social modernisation (Sen 1999), as it 
is the case with Kasarda’s understanding. Kasarda’s conception of development through the 
aerotropolis is espoused within the TEDP category and resonate more with the neo-liberal 
macro-economic development strategies of GEAR I discussed earlier. 
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It was thus no surprise that LED among SPAP respondents such as Moseki and Steve also 
corresponded with Bond’s views about development. Bond suggested further that the pro- 
poor model aims to link profitable growth and redistributive development. This confirms to 
me further, as also observed by Patterson (2008) that, the SPAP conception of LED also 
resonated with the RDP. As stated in chapter 3, the RDP adopted a mainly community- 
driven approach to development. This is reflected in the passage spelling out the urban 
economic development strategy of the RDP, which I repeat here below: 
 
In order to foster the growth of local economies, broadly representative institutions must be 
established to address local economic development needs. Their purpose would be to 
formulate strategies to  address job creation and community development (for example, 
leveraging private sector funds for community development, investment strategies, training, 
small business and agricultural development, etc.). If necessary, the democratic government 
must provide some subsidy as a catalyst for job-creation programs controlled by 
communities and/or workers and target appropriate job creation and development programs 
in the most neglected and impoverished areas of our country. Ultimately, all such projects 
should sustain themselves. 
 
(Mayekiso, Miller and Swilling 2000:355) 
 
 
It is against this background of the RDP inclined understanding of LED as a community- 
driven development, that I also argue that, the RDP was the ideological progenitor of both 
the 2001 draft LED policy paper entitled Refocusing Development on the Poor, and the 2002 
draft LED policy (DPLG 2001; Rogerson 2009). Both these initiatives sought to steer LED 
in the direction of the pro-poor approach and rejected the orthodox corporate-led LED 
approach. 
 
As also discussed earlier, the principle of equity is another category of the pro-poor school. 
This category was appreciated by respondents in the SPAP category by their concern about 
racial inequalities in South Africa, as expressed by Mlangeni, Makula and Karabo, amongst 
others. As mentioned in Chapter 5, the SPAP adherents went on to even suggest ways in 
which the question of racial inequality could be addressed though LED and the aerotropolis 
project. They suggested such efforts as black-owned business preferential consideration for 
jobs and government support for township informal trade, including township infrastructure 
development. Responded stated that such  support efforts for blacks would assist black 
owned enterprises (formal and informal) to be active and meaningful players the mainstream 
economy of South Africa, from which they have been denied access. 
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6.4.2 Technicist economic development perspective (TEDP) 
 
 
As mentioned in chapter 5 also, the TEDP falls largely within the pro-growth approach to 
LED, which is in tandem with the aerotropolis economic growth strategy. This categor y 
essentialised FDI and SMEs as key drivers of LED as shown in figure 10. TEDP 
respondents’ views are therefore in line with government’s macro-economic strategy of 
GEAR.   This even when there were also certain elements which sat uncomfortably within 
this category and advocated for the social economy and racial inequality. The TEDP 
category is generally constituted by two types or forms namely, the pro-growth form and 
the pro-market entrepreneurial form. The former represents macro-economic interests 
through FDI attraction and establishment of SEZ and aerotropolis projects amongst others, 
as suggested by Kasarda (2018) and Scheepers (2012). The latter represents the category of 
SME entrepreneurial interests. 
 
The TEDP approach to LED is thus aimed mainly at the support of different scales and sizes 
of business and corporate enterprise development as drivers of LED. As shown in figure 10 
in the previous chapter, in TEDP, LED was understood broadly to be about attracting FDI 
and the development of SMMEs to create job opportunities and was also understood to be 
about the development of the social economy. Apart from the social economy category in 
TEDP, the general understanding of LED in TEDP is at odds with that of SPAP, which 
embraces the sustainable livelihoods framework. 
 
In TEDP, LED is generally enterprise-led. Often such enterprise-development initiatives are 
driven through various efforts including skills transfer; research support and development; 
innovation, provision of business advisory services, capital and finance; and supporting the 
development of business and trade associations, including infrastructure development 
projects through public–private partnerships (PPPs), as also confirmed by Bond (2002, 
2003); Nel and Rogerson (2005); Rogerson (2009). 
 
 
As  state  earlier,  PPP  is  a  long-term  government  cost  saving  contractual  arrangement 
between the public and private sector, where the private sector provides operating services 
and/or puts private finance at risk for the development of infrastructure assets such as 
airports, amongst others (Farrugia, Reynolds, and Orr 2008). It must be noted that the 
Ekurhuleni aerotropolis project is part of the PPP scheme, which is designed to facilitate the 
implementation  of  the  30-year  Aerotropolis  Master  Plan  (James  2019).  However,  as 
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indicated earlier, R208m in public funds has been secured for the bulk development of the 
entire 7.5ha OR Tambo precinct and a further R134m in public funding and R129m in 
private funds for the development of the northern precinct. (Anon 2018).  As stated earlier, 
according to James (2019) the Mayor of Ekurhuleni committed another R570 million in his 
state on the State of the City address for the implementation of the Aerotropolis Master Plan 
 
These huge public funds Ekurhuleni is paying towards the infrastructure development of 
aerotropolis prove that government is contributing financially more towards the projects 
than corporations, and thus going against the grain of PPP philosophy. As we have stated 
earlier, that is, to allow the private sector to provide operating services and/or puts private 
finance for the development of the aerotropolis infrastructure, with government only setting 
programmatic infrastructure investment objectives and approving new projects (Farrugia, 
Reynolds, and Orr 2008). Other grander methods deployed within the TEDP category of 
LED is attracting investment through incentives such as making land cheap and easily 
available, in order to attract corporations and businesses to settle in particular areas and to 
invest in them. Other incentives include reduced rates and taxes for businesses. The Port 
Elizabeth (Coega IDZ), East London (ELIDZ), and Richards Bay (RBIDZ) are a case in 
point. The Special Economic Zones established by Durban and The Ekurhuleni SEZ at OR 
Tambo, which is a site housing a 4ha jewellery manufacturing precinct and an agro- 
processing plant, and which provides corporate incentive tax of 15% to companies in the 
precinct is therefore in keeping with this logic. 
 
The 15% customs and excise incentives, employment tax incentives and VAT incentives 
offered to sectors specializing in high-value and low-mass products and exporting these via 
airfreight, together with public funds contributed to the infrastructure development of the 
aerotropolis, is incisive. This confirms Pleumarom’s (2017) observation that in the 
developing world projects such as the aerotropolis are often funded by public pension funds 
and taxes, to offset the risk involved. The aerotropolis therefore serves to turbocharge 
corporate dominance (Bridger 2015) and its growing power to dictate terms to the state, as 
also observed by Kasarda and Linday (2011). Furthermore, this also confirms Bridger’s 
(2015) observation of aerotropolis projects serving the interest of corporations and at best, 
macro-economic development interests of national and provincial government, and not the 
local community around which the aerotropolis is built. 
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As stated earlier, the central idea about LED in TEDP is a strong belief that a competitive 
private sector can be an effective driver of economic development as Bodibe, Khaya and 
Hanekom have stated, and not government or community development  initiatives. This 
view resonates with Kasarda stating that regions will need the aerotropolis to survive 
competition  for  the  most  lucrative  trade  links  (Kasarda  and  Linday  2011).  As  also 
mentioned earlier, in the TEDP category, development is understood to be stimulated by 
economic growth through free-market principles, job creation and DFI attraction, all of 
which the aerotropolis is going to make possible. 
 
As stated earlier, in TEDP, greater FDI attraction and development also mean substitution 
of local with region wide or regional development planning, which has already begun with 
the GCR initiative, amongst others (Van Niekerk and Bunding-Venter 2014; Luthuli and 
Houghton 2019(a); Van Niekerk and Bunding-Venter 2015; Wray 2015). As also stated 
earlier, regional development planning is increasingly becoming more attractive to 
governments due to their large size and capacity to compete more vigorously in the global 
market and to attract more FDI, than local municipalities acting alone. So, the involvement 
of Gauteng Province in the Ekurhuleni Aerotropolis Project, after Ekurhuleni had been 
championing the project alone, heralded regional interests in the project. This also explains 
why at the later stage the aerotropolis project was usurped from Ekurhuleni by the Province 
and took on a region wide posture. As also stated earlier, this is because the province stands 
a better chance of attracting FDI than Ekurhuleni acting alone, as is also confirmed by the 
Ekurhuleni Mayor. 
 
It is my view that the ethos of the 2006 LED framework as expressed through the TEDP 
respondents represents a radical shift from the understanding of LED within the RDP 
paradigm. It departed LED imperatives from the RDP’s pro-poor model to mimic the 
American, British and Australian forms of LED practice, which are based on GEAR’s neo- 
liberal economic imperatives. It distanced government from the responsibility of driving 
LED to rather provide a “conducive” environment for job creation, as suggested by Ward 
36 councillor, Break. 
 
 
This background of clashing understandings of LED and the aerotropolis between SPAP 
and TEDP also explains the clashes between the two groups regarding the role of shopping 
malls and shopping centres, and foreign nationals in LED. I have presented earlier the 
reasons motivating m y respondents’ views on both the opposing sides about the role of the 
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forgoing entities in LED. That is SPAP rejecting foreign nationals and shopping malls as 
illegitimate actors in LED on the one hand, and TEDP accepting them on the other hand. 
However, I personally believe the differences in opinions is also owed to the manifestation 
of both the ideological and systems clash between communities (SPAP) and state (TEDP) 
over the management and implementation of development. Simply put, this means a clash 
between the social and economic interpretations of space and associated rights thereto, as 
well as a clash between development expectations among the community and the state. 
 
6.5 UNDERSTANDING THE SOURCE OF LED CONTESTATION 
 
Notwithstanding the wide and sometimes contradictory ideological and methodological 
contestations about LED between the pro-poor/SPAP and the pro-growth/TEDP models 
discussed earlier, social justice and by extension racial inequality is another source of major 
contestation about LED. This is because even when concerns about social justice were not 
as robust within the TEDP, concerns about racial inequalities featured strongly across both 
respondent categories. This is confirmed by racial concerns raised by Steve, Bubsy and 
Moseki from SPAP, and Karabo and Makula of TEDP, amongst others. 
 
Fears of Karabo and Makula for example, about LED projects such as the aerotropolis 
project having the potential to escalate racial inequalities, is significant. This is because 
since 1994, South Africa has experienced growing and persisting racial inequalities that 
have left most black populations in poverty and unemployed and locked outside the 
mainstream economy. 
 
As stated earlier, in 2015, nine out of every 10 poor people in South Africa (93%) were 
black (Wilkinson 2018). The continued racial inequalities in the distribution of poverty 
indicated in table 2, confirms this point. It further qualifies Modiri’s (2012) observation that 
development problems such as poverty, illiteracy and joblessness are generally black 
problems. This also confirms Omi and Winant ‘s observation that development itself is a 
racial formation project, which is often aimed at reorganizing and redistributing resources 
along specific racial lines (White 2002). This racialised distribution of development takes 
place at the global level between the Western world and the  global South, and within 
nations, with race as an organising principle. 
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The epistemic racism, cultural racism, Eurocentric chauvinism and imperialism founding 
the very idea of development and modernity, is a case in point of racism in development at 
the global sphere (Amin 1974, 1997, 2011; Bergesen and Wallerstein 1983; Dussel 1998, 
2002; Escobar 2004; Grosfoguel 2011; Hopkins and Wallerstein 1980). As also stated, the 
racist distribution of development cascade and take form also within nations. Power (2006) 
notes for example that in the US, poverty affects people of colour more than whites. 
Wilkinson (2018) confirms this in the case of South Africa as well. The fact that race 
continues to determine the distribution of development in South Africa 25 years into a 
constitutional democracy is incisive. As stated earlier, it qualifies the fact that racism is 
structural and that it embeds itself in social structures that reproduce it through racially 
deferential outcomes of development which privilege whites (White 2002). 
 
It is against this background of the structural properties of racism which continue to survive 
even the “progressive” Constitution, that race consciousness in development scholarship is 
also said to be an imperative (Kalpana 2017; Kothari 2006 a;b; Power 2006 and White 
2002). As state earlier, these scholars argue that racism in development is foregrounded by 
its very silencing,  in the same way Bell (1995) and  Gotanda (1995) warn  against  the 
potential risk of race-neutral jurisprudence serving to perpetuate racist ideology. Here the 
idea is thus to center race consciousness into the debate to examine, and to undo the 
reproductive structures that perpetuate racism. 
 
It is against this background of the structural reproduction of racial inequalities and endemic 
poverty in  black  communities  - where  most  SPAP  respondents  come  from  –  that  the 
question of racial inequality and historical social justice became a central concern for them, 
to the idea of LED and the aerotropolis project. As stated earlier, respondents such as 
Makula amongst others, demanded LED support from government to privilege only blacks 
and black businesses. This is no surprise because many of them are confronted with with 
challenges such as lack of managerial expertise and experience, lack of access to finance, 
lack of technology, lack of education and professional qualifications and inadequate 
infrastructure that impede their success, including and punitive regulatory framework, as 
confirmed by Mathibe and Croucamp (2019), in the context of black women. 
 
As stated earlier, many SPAP respondents understood LED as a historical social-justice 
issue that is meant to undo racial inequalities. According to them, this means that LED 
support and planning must be categorical about the race and nationality of beneficiaries. 
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They believed that only black South Africans qualify for LED support initiatives and 
opportunities, because only they experienced racial oppression of apartheid and continue to 
suffer its legacy today. 
 
As also stated earlier, the rejection of the aerotropolis project by some respondents was also 
based on racial concerns, especially the fact that aerotropolis project had no mechanism in 
place to try to mitigate the problem of racial inequality. As stated earlier, Karabo warns that 
this issue of racial inequality harbours anger in the community. The fact that the aerotropolis 
project planning does not have deliberate program to empower blacks or black business, 
confirm that development and LED discourse are either in denial of the problem of racial 
inequality, or simply outright racist. Race issues remain outside and unaccounted for in 
mainstream LED discourse as also confirmed by Kalpana (2017); Kothari (a2006), (b2006); 
Power (2006) and White (2002). Evidently, much to the frustration of respondents like 
Karabo quoted severally in previous chapters. 
 
It is my view also that, the abdication of race problems in LED and development discourse 
reproduces and exacerbates racial inequalities and reaffirms apartheid. This explains why 
for example, the informal, semi-formal, and survivalist enterprises are mostly black owned, 
and do not enjoy much official government support (Plaatjie 2018). Meanwhile formal 
industry and business enterprises are mostly in former white areas and cities and enjoy 
greater  official  government  support  and  leverage  greatly  from  better  infrastructure  in 
suburbs. Government’s response in supporting business during the lockdown period to stop 
the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic, is also incisive. 
 
The rolling out of business relief packages for small and registered formal businesses by 
government and its capacity to design an appropriate and responsive relief package for 
informal traders, is the case in point (Karabe 2020). To qualify for relief packages, spaza 
shops and informal traders are required by the department of small business to register with 
CIPC, SARS, UIF and to be willing to buy products produced by selected South African 
small manufacturers and submit monthly financial records over 12 months period (Karabe 
2020), which is beyond the capacity of these entities and disqualify them from enjoying 
government relief packages. 
 
This also explains why township-based entities are excluded from participating in 
mainstream  government-led  LED  projects.  The  exclusion  of  communities  and  black 
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business from participating in Ekurhuleni Aerotropolis Project planning is another case in 
point. As I have also noted earlier, this also explains why research on innovative LED 
focuses only on the formal sector, with informal enterprises hardly featuring in innovation 
LED debates in South Africa. 
 
It is against this background of the persisting problem of racial inequality in South Africa 
on the one hand, and the failure of LED discourse to manage it on the other hand that I also 
argue that, LED is detracted from addressing the true problem of development in South 
Africa. This means the failure – or dishonesty – of LED discourse in South Africa to be 
responsive to questions of the who and where of LED. It is also a failure of LED to 
decisively identify who ought to be the beneficiaries of LED support programmes in a 
racially unequal society such as South Africa. The failure to decisively identify spatial 
locations and peoples to target for LED support means that, the resultant planning does not 
give dedicated support to specific beneficiaries to thrive in their respective spatial locations 
and in their choice of development enterprises, as we have also stated elsewhere (Plaatjie 
2018:260). This means that although the pro-poor LED approach may be relatively 
progressive, it remains still inadequate to the problem of South Africa’s racialised inequality 
and distribution of development. 
 
In England, LED was understood to be about targeting certain groups, such as disadvantaged 
people; in Northern Ireland, LED was understood to mean improving people’s quality of 
life and stimulating the community (local people) and entrepreneurs (Haughton and Naylon 
2010). It is my view that in South Africa, LED should aim to resolve the problem of racial 
inequalities and social injustice that persist today, as highlighted by our respondents. LED 
should accordingly also be able to lift the poor out of poverty and enhance their standard 
of living through the development of human physical capabilities and by promoting equity, 
as also suggested earlier by Blackely and Leigh (2010) and Sen (1999). 
 
The fact that the problem of black poverty and racial inequalities persist and continue to rise 
 
20  years  under  black  rule  is  incisive.  It  suggests  that  racial  inequalities  are  complex 
structural and systemic problems which even a black government may not have the 
competence or interests to overturn. This further suggests that the structural problems of 
racism impact blacks in particular ways that continue reproduction of racial inequalities and 
marginalisation of blacks in mainstream economy. Concerns raised by Makula qualify the 
observations of Mathibe and Croucamp (2019), that financing institutions are still reluctant 
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to fund black and township businesses, and that many of them still unable to enjoy the 30% 
set aside by government, is a case in pointing to structural problems confronting blacks. In 
addition, Makula points out that black businesses experience technical challenges imposed 
by the townships environment. These concerns raised by Makula point to the fact that 
structural problems affecting blacks and reproducing racial inequalities need greater 
understanding to arrest them. The words of Karabo, which we repeat here below are incisive 
in this respect when he commented on the aerotropolis: 
 
We have dynamic differences in terms of our business aspirations and interests 
which need specific attention, and which could  never be realised when  we are 
lumped together with white business. 
 
However,  notwithstanding  the  problems  posed  by  reproductive  structures  of  racial 
inequality on the poor black majority, wide spread corruption in the ANC government, 
which steals much needed state resources meant to empower the poor black majority, 
intensifies these already existing racial inequalities. With regards the aerotropolis, concerns 
of the mayor about what he calls “political management of governance” may well also 
suggest that the aerotropolis project will also not be immune to the contagion of corruption 
in the ruling party which according to Tooley and Mohoai (2007) and Burger (2009) 
frustrates service delivery. 
 
It is against this background of the persisting structural reproduction of racism and racial 
inequality in development, which is least understood, that I argue for race consciousness in 
development and LED.  As I have stated earlier, Mathibe and Croucamp’s (2019) call for 
policies and strategies geared to stimulate, grow and sustain black women-owned businesses 
is a potential step in the right direction. I however, also suggest that LED requires CRT to 
begin to confront the problem of racial inequality in development discourse. As stated 
earlier, this is because CRT understands racism as a structural, systemic problem that is 
produced economically, socially and politically, and which must be confronted in those 
terms. Mainstreaming CRT will thus force LED discourse to confront and to address the 
reproductive forces of racial inequalities in LED and development practice in South Africa. 
It will require LED to apply itself over the politics of race in development by examining 
development’s material outcomes, its techniques of transformation, and its modes of 
knowing. 
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It is my view also that, a race conscious LED will move LED lenses away from irrelevant 
disembodied categories and begin to confront problem of racialised inequality and 
development in South Africa more directly. I argue that the absence of any concerted effort 
to systematically confront the race problem through LED from a CRT perspective, will 
continually exacerbate racial inequalities, as already feared by most respondents such as 
Karabo. The most privileged spaces of the aerotropolis in urban centres, which are mostly 
occupied by whites and black middle-class would be the biggest beneficiaries of LED 
opportunities. This will further fuel more racial division and resentment feared by some of 
my respondents. Against this background, I believe that CRT will afford LED a 
transformative  paradigm  that  will  not  only  assist  in  resolving  the  problem  of  racial 




In  this  chapter,  I  have  argued  that  development  and  LED  discourse  are  contested 
phenomena. That is, development and LED mean different things to different people. I have 
further explained the true ideological nature of the aerotropolis project that:  it responds to 
the 21st-century trade demands by globalisation, including the ascendency of information 
communication technology (ICT) and associated increases in the mobility and liquidity of 
capital,  and  demands  for  new  forms  of  urban  redesign,  which  complement  rapid 
urbanisation taking place at the global scale. As also stated earlier, the aerotropolis 
consolidates capitalism and this is often to the disadvantage of local communities due to 
environmental problems, unfair business competition and the disintegration of communities 
that come along with it. The exclusion of the community and local businesses from the 
consultative processes of Ekurhuleni Aerotropolis Project confirms that the aerotropolis is 
not a community led initiative. It is aimed FDI attraction and not at empowering local 
communities in accordance with the sustainable livelihood framework.        This further 
confirms that these projects are largely influenced by MNC and private interests, as 
postulated by critics of the aerotropolis. 
 
 
As also stated, the aerotropolis appears to be more of a process that seeks to consolidate 
Gauteng into a smart regional-and-global cit y. This further suggests that the aerotropolis is 
one project that is effecting the changing development planning methods, from LED to L- 
RED or RED. As discussed earlier, L-RED or RED displace municipalities and centres 
provincial government, as the agency of development. This shift is generally motivated b y 
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national and provincial government’s macroeconomic development interests, which often 
displaces community led LED initiatives and prioritises corporate capitalist interests, as 
suggested by critics. 
 
Furthermore, the smart regional-and-global city phenomenon, which comes with the 
aerotropolis, is also known to breed staggering inequalities, exclusions and expulsions. As 
suggested by critics, many of the low paid workers cannot affords dwelling within the 
aerotropolis precinct and are systematically expelled into townships. 
 
The chapter has also discussed the various interpretations of LED as expressed by the SPAP 
and TEDP respondents. I have also highlighted in this chapter that, both categories (SPAP 
and TEDP) share similar ideas with their equivalent in mainstream LED discourse, namely 
the pro-poor and pro-growth model. However, the race question sets them apart from the 
traditional categories in LED. Pro-poor and pro-growth LED approaches hardly consider 
race in the language of LED. However, the race consciousness in LED seem to be a concern 
cutting across all respondent categories, including within business in the TEDP category. 
 
Key among these distinctions is that LED is understood mainly among SPAP respondents 
as a historical social-justice phenomenon. LED is understood to be required to address the 
injustices of apartheid, especially the racial inequalities, and to restore justice and dignity 
to victims of apartheid, as elucidated by Mlangeni, Karabo, Bubsy and Moreki amongst 
others. This understanding is partly responsible for why most of the SPAP respondents 
rejected the aerotropolis project and were hostile towards foreign nationals and shopping 
malls. To them the aerotropolis “speaks the language of white people” thus represented their 
exclusion and continued marginalisation from participating in mainstream economy, and 
continuation of social injustice, as expressed by Karabo, amongst others. As stated earlier, 
many of the SPEP respondents live in townships and are already disconnected to varying 
degree from the aerotropolis precinct. Foreign nationals represented a threat over limited 
resources which they believed are justly due to them, as victims of apartheid, and shopping 
malls were accused of being responsible for the death of small township businesses. 
 
TEDP respondents understood LED as technical process of stimulating economic growth 
through the neo-liberal principle of a free market system and often through FDI attraction 
and entrepreneurialism, as postulated by Khaya and the mayor, amongst others in this 
category. The words of Khaya that economic activity does not operate on the logic of 
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boundaries, is incisive in this respect. This explains why TEDP respondents accepted the 
aerotropolis projects’ value proposal to take on a region wide posture and to attract MNCs 
and to setup SEZ in Ekurhuleni, to generate greater economic growth for the region. 
Furthermore, this also explains why respondents in the TEDP category also welcomed 
foreign nationals to be part of LED initiatives. For them, all the foregoing elements have 
greater capacity to create jobs and to grow the economy. 
 
The chapter has reflected on the implications of LED contestations about development, 
especially on  the  race question.  The near silence on  the  issue of race in  development 
thinking and practice in general and in LED, seemed to contradict its glaring centrality for 
most respondents in this study. I have highlighted that the continued elision of race and 
racism in mainstream development and LED discourse can only reproduce the racial 
inequalities that still exist in South Africa. I further argued that colour-blind LED is 
inappropriate to resolve development problems of South Africa. As a result, in this chapter 
I also proposed mainstreaming CRT in development and LED discourse. I further proposed 
engaging with politics of race in development by examining the material outcomes of 
development as well as its techniques of transformation and modes of knowing. 
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In this chapter I provide a summary and reflections from the study, including the final 
conclusions and recommendations. The purpose is to remind readers of the primary aim of 
the study and the research problem, and to make clear how the research problem and 
objectives of the study were addressed. Furthermore, this chapter highlights the unique 
contributions of my study to LED discourse. 
 
7.2 RESEARCH BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES 
 
My research, titled “Contestations about the meaning of Local economic development: A 
case of the Aerotropolis Project in the Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality”, set out in 
chapter 1 reflected on the contestations about the meanings and practices of LED, from the 
perspective of the stakeholders in the Ekurhuleni Aerotropolis Project. The specific research 
questions that this study addressed are the following: 
 
 
• What is the nature of the aerotropolis project of Ekurhuleni? 
 
• What are the different conceptions and meanings of LED among stakeholders in 
the Ekurhuleni Aerotropolis Project? 
• What is the ideological contestation among the stakeholders in the aerotropolis 
project LED about? 
• How do we explain the inconsistencies in contestations about LED among the 
stakeholders in the aerotropolis project? and 
• What can be done to improve LED discourse and practice in South Africa? 
 
 
This research contextualises LED within development discourse in South Africa through 
the stakeholders of the aerotropolis project of Ekurhuleni. As LED has become an 
unquestionable apex catalyst for stimulating development. It is often considered a pre- 
requisite condition for creating effective conditions for tackling modern-day development 
challenges. Current debates about development seldom pass without reference to LED as a 
method or idea that could unlock progress. It is no surprise therefore that LED thinking has 
often taken centre-stage in the psyche of government’s development thinking. 
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As pointed out in chapter 1, In South Africa, the NDP, the NSDP, the IDP, and the National 
LED framework – both the 2006–2011 version and the revised 2012–2016 version – all 
point to  government’s  unwavering commitment  to bolster LED  thinking and practices, 
across all municipalities (Gunter 2005; Oranje et al 2009 and Rogerson 2008). 
 
However, the widespread ideological tussles and the lack of common understanding about 
LED across public and academic discourses continue to persist in South Africa (Blackely 
and Leigh 2010; Bond 2003; Nel 2001; Patterson 2008; Rogerson 2014; Rogerson and 
Rogerson 2010). Key among these unresolved issue are: 1) the question of how LED theory 
and practice can be a real antidote to development challenges, when there is still no 
consensus about the meaning of ‘development’ or even of LED itself; 2) what local means 
in a rapidly globalising world; 3) what the meaning of development is in a democratic, multi- 
cultural and racially hierarchized class society such as South Africa; and 4) who are or ought 
to be the beneficiaries of this development in a society such as South Africa. 
 
These unresolved ideological issues are also at the level of LED practice and methodology. 
Methodological tensions have arisen between the pro-poor and pro-growth (or pro-market) 
approaches, especially in the context of South Africa (Bond 2003; Nel and Binns 2003; Nel 
and Rogerson 2016b). In addition to these tensions are also unresolved complexities about 
the geographic boundaries of LED projects, and attendant categories of inclusion or 
exclusions, especially in a country marked by historical racial inequalities such as in South 
Africa. 
 
My study was initiated within this context of these ignored ideological and methodological 
tensions in LED theory and practice in South Africa. While this study was not about the 
aerotropolis project per se, but the views of the stakeholders in the project: the diversity of 
stakeholders’ ideological orientations, socio-economic class background, geographical 
location and sphere of function, and race, created a good platform to achieve the objective 
of this study. That is, to investigate the varied contestations and conceptions of LED in the 
LED debate, and to explain these, from as wide and diverse a group as that of the 
stakeholders in Ekurhuleni Aerotropolis Project. 
 
This sampling choice also came with an added advantage because stakeholders were 
involved in the same project (aerotropolis), which also served as a common reference point 
for examining their views  and  perceptions  about  LED.  Furthermore,  the diversity of 
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respondents' views can also be potentially representative of the differing categories of LED 
 
understanding in South Africa, in general. 
 
 
7.3 RESEARCH PROCEDURE AND METHODS 
 
To achieve the research objectives and to respond to the research questions, I deployed a 
qualitative research approach using the grounded theory process, which i discussed in 
chapter 4. The use of a qualitative research design in this study was appropriate for several 
reasons. Key among the reasons was due to the exploratory and descriptive nature of the 
study. To address the research questions, I conducted in-depth face-to-face conversations in 
the form of interviews with all relevant stakeholders. 
 
Through these conversations with the stakeholders I was able to gather rich descriptive data, 
which I interpreted while exploring different possibilities to address my research questions. 
As stated earlier in chapter 4, face-to-face interviews were important as Kothari (1985:23) 
also observed, because they allow respondents the liberty to express their views more freely 
when they are alone and without the potential intimidation by presence of their colleagues. 
The interviews followed a semi-structured technique. I was guided by literature to develop 
a set of theme-based questions to steer the interview discussions in a manner that was open, 
and which did not limit or restrict respondents to a fixed set of pre-determined questions. 
My respondents were therefore free to speak their minds broadly on the subject matter. 
 
The interviews were recorded with a voice-recording device after permission for recording 
was granted by the respondents. I also captured data through hand-written notes during the 
interviews.  In  addition  to  the  interviews,  I consulted  literature,  books,  journal  articles, 
official government documents and magazines to gain further data. 
 
Regarding the sampling technique, I deployed a judgment and purposeful sample technique. 
I considered the purposeful sample useful because I was interested in collecting in-depth 
understandings via conversation with people who knew about and participated in the 
Aerotropolis Project. The first category of this sample was drawn from the Ekurhuleni 
Mayoral Committee and members of the political and technical steering committees, 
including the technical working groups as shown in table 4, chapter 4. The latter were the 
proverbial heart and brains of the aerotropolis project design, as they saw it through its 
conception to its consultative and planning phases and nursed it through to the delivery of 
the final 30-year master plan. 
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Within the sub-categories listed above, that is the Mayoral Committee, the political steering 
committee and the technical steering committee (and technical working groups), a total of 
15 people were interviewed. Each interview lasted, on average, 90 minutes. As mentioned 
earlier, some respondents were serving on more than one committee, significantly reducing 
the sample size. Four were from the Mayoral Committee, two from the political steering 
committee, five from the technical steering committee and four from the technical working 
groups. 
 
The second category of respondents were selected from aerotropolis stakeholders whom I 
considered to represent broader community interest, such as organised business in 
Ekurhuleni, ward councillors and community-based organisations reflected in table 5, 6 and 
7 in chapter 4. These three groups of community respondents (business, ward councillors 
and civil society) were selected on the basis of the master plan’s consultation categories. 
Face-to-face interviews were conducted with respondents who were available and willing 
to participate at the time of my fieldwork. 
 
I endeavoured to cover interviews with as many of the targeted stakeholders in the listed 
categories as possible. Respondents were identified from the list provided in the Ekurhuleni 
Aerotropolis Masterplan report and the Ekurhuleni public participation office. A snowball 
technique was used to identify other relevant respondents who were not on the list, following 
the re-demarcation of wards and installation of new ward councillors after the 2016 local 
government elections. 
 
Under the category of business, I conducted eight in-depth interviews with various business 
representatives in Ekurhuleni, 12 with ward councillors across Ekurhuleni, 11 with civil 
society groups, and two with specialist consultants of the project. Just like in the first 
category where respondents served in multiple committees, many respondents from the 
business sector were also affiliated to several business organisations in Ekurhuleni that 
participated in the project’s consultative process. Each respondent in the business category 
was affiliated to an average of two other business organisations. Some were affiliated to 
three and enjoyed leadership positions in both. This fact significantly reduced the number 
of interviews initially intended under this category as well. 
 
All recorded interviews were transcribed. Data from the interviews and my fieldwork diary 
were then thematically coded using Atlas.ti, - a qualitative research analysis software 
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program. The first step of coding was consistent with the grounded theory approach and 
with Auerbach and Silverstein’s (2003:31) observation that, coding of data often makes 
patterns of ideas visible and helps to reduce the data. I then cross-linked my codes to one 
another to look for similarities and differences and to explain how the codes were 
interrelated. This process meant building up new codes and cross-linking them with others 
and dismantling them to build new codes based on new emerging patterns of similarities 
and differences. I reiterated this process of constituting new patterns many times over, until 
the codes were saturated and only a few prominent thematic categories addressing my 
research questions remained. These themes, with the aid of literature, were then clustered 
into theoretical categories that were eventually used to frame the final analysis of the study. 
 
In addition to using a voice recorder and writing notes during the interviews, I enhanced the 
validity of this study by cross-checking for inconsistencies and by verifying the responses 
of interviewees against the views of people with whom they worked in the project. 
Furthermore, I sustained the reliability through the respondents themselves, especially the 
political  and  technical  steering  committee  members  who  had  working  knowledge  and 
insight about the project. 
 
Consistent with the practice of ethical research, the full details and purpose of the research 
were explained to all respondents. They were also informed about how the findings would 
be used and communicated. Furthermore, respondents were informed that participation in 
the study was voluntary and they could stop participating at any stage, if they wanted, 
without consequences. The respondents signed consent forms to participate in the study in 
which details of the study were provided. 
 
The highest ethical standards were observed in handling and analysing the data. All data 
were kept secured in a locked cabinet and password-protected electronic documents, and 
cross-validation methods were performed for the findings and the data analysis. Therefore, 
no manipulation or false representation of data occurred that might suit any interest other 
than the research aims. 
 
7.4 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
 
The main limitation in this study was in my inability to secure interviews with two key 
members of the steering committee, Mr Chaiphus Chauke (HoD of EMM’s Economic 
Development and the convener of the Aerotropolis Project in Ekurhuleni), and Mr Jack van 
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der Merwe (overall convener of the Aerotropolis Project and a representative from Gauteng 
Province). The absence of these two key individuals denied this study somewhat, the 
potentially salient insight from those at the driving seat of the project. However, I extracted 
as many insights as possible from senior officials on the political steering committee and 
the technical steering committee, with whom the said unavailable colleagues worked closely 
with. 
 
Another limitation was accessing desired respondents from the community side, especially 
ward councillors who had participated in the aerotropolis consultative processes. My 
fieldwork happened in 2016 and this was after the local government elections. By the time 
I conducted the field work, new councillors who had not been part of the aerotrpolis process 
had been elected into office, and municipal wards had been re-demarcated. Only a few old 
councillors were retained in the new council. 
 
Through a snowball technique and tracing, I attempted to target particularly the previous 
ward councillors who had participated in the consultative processes. This process also meant 
checking the list of names of councillors and municipal wards, against the list of newly 
installed councillors and re-demarcated wards, which often did not match. Therefore some 
councillors whom I interviewed had not been part of the previous council and did not 
participate in it. The new councillors whom I interviewed therefore had little official 
knowledge about the aerotropolis project. However, I made substantial effort to draw 
parallels between their views about LED and the aerotropolis to arrive at my conclusions. 
 
7.5 FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS 
 
As I have mentioned earlier, my findings were derived from the analysis of various thematic 
codes that emerged from responses during interviews. Codes were cross-matched with other 
codes repeatedly to test and check for similarities and differences in opinions on the subject 
matter. This also assisted in checking for inconsistencies in responses. I now present the 
analysis of my findings in relation to my research questions. 
 
7.5.1 What is the nature of the aerotropolis project of Ekurhuleni? 
 
 
• What is the background of the Ekurhuleni Aerotropolis Project? 
 
• In what way does the project bolster LED? 
 
• What type of LED form does the project support 
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In chapter 5, Figure 6 shown again here below captures the background to the aerotropolis 
project. This figure displays the processes leading to the development of the Ekurhuleni 30- 
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The above figure illustrates that what ended up as the aerotropolis project was initially an 
EMM Spatial Development Framework, which then progressed to become the EMM spatial 
development framework for Region A. These spatial development frameworks were then 
consolidated into the aerotropolis project when the idea of the aerotropolis became popular, 
and finally developed into the 30 Year Aerotropolis Masterplan. Furthermore, the 
aerotropolis project has since ceased to be an Ekurhuleni LED project per se, but rather a 
project of the entire GCR. 
 
As stated earlier, this confirms Luthuli and Houghton’s (2019(a), (b)) observation that 
development planning is increasingly shifting from local to the regional planning and 
implementation, more especially with projects such as the aerotropolis. Furthermore, this 
also qualifies the fact that the aerotropolis as a portal to national and regional economic 
interests. More concerning though, as we note in chapter 3, is that L-RED or RED planning 
is displacing municipalities, which are the closest form of government to the people, and 
centralising provincial government which is further away from the people, as the agency of 
development planning. This further suggests that technically, local communities in 
metropolitan municipalities have no guarantee to leverage infrastructure (airports) or the 
aerotropolis within their boundaries, for their LED initiatives. 
 
Broad opinions about the Aerotropolis Project 
 
 
As noted in chapter 5, some of the respondents, especially the official government project 
stakeholders, understood the idea of the aerotropolis as a new and positive phenomenon in 
South Africa, which can stimulate LED for the entire Gauteng Province. These respondents 
reverberated Kasarda’s optimism about the aerotropolis and believed that the aerotropolis 
will respond positively to the changing forms of urbanism and the 21st-century trade 
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demands for speedy delivery of goods and services. They further believed that through the 
aerotropolis, Gauteng will stand a better chance of attracting FDI, which will further 
stimulate job creation and LED. 
 
However, most of the civil society respondents rejected the aerotropolis. Chief amongst 
their reasons was the project’s failure to allow community participation in the project’s 
design, and its lack of effort in dealing with racial inequalities. Due to poor community 
participation, respondents felt alienated from the project and felt it was not suited to them. 
Some respondents went as far as suggesting that the aerotropolis project was a ‘white man’s 
thing’ that would only serve to entrench the prevailing racial inequalities in South Africa. 
To most civil society respondents, the aerotropolis was also not considered to be a LED 
project. 
 
It my view also that the aerotropolis’ intensification and consolidation of transport and ICT 
infrastructure in Gauteng, is reconfiguring the geography of province into what I call smart 
regional-and-global city. It is my view that the aerotropolis is itself a smart regional-and- 
global city and that the two words can thus be used interchangeably. From the forgoing 
point and the fact that the aerotropolis aims to stimulate global trade flows and attracting 
FDI, it is also clear to me that the aerotropolis project is oriented more in the direction of 
neo-liberal, free market global capitalism and GEAR. It is therefore not a project aimed at 
social or local development initiative that stimulate human development capacities and 
community development initiatives. This even when aerotropolis projects are in 
municipalities and are often couched in the language of community development. 
 
 
As stated in chapter 3, furthermore, the aerotropolis seem to also have a negative impact on 
communities due to their deleterious impact on the environment, including the projects’ 
capacity to gentrify space and divide communities along class and racial lines. Furthermore, 
aerotropolis projects’ tax incentives for MNC to attract them to the aerotropolis zone take 
away the much-needed taxes for the poor and promote unfair competition between them and 
local businesses operating outside the aerotropolis precinct. 
 
 
The reconfiguration of the geography of Gauteng by the aerotropolis to be a smart regional- 
and-global city with major ICT and transport networks, will not only redefine the nature of 
trade flows and management of the city. 
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As we have stated before, this reconfiguration will also reconfigure the idea of space and 
belonging, including ideas about citizenship and rights thereto, as confirmed by Joss et al 
(2017:5). Furthermore, it will generate new forms of communities and subjectivities, all of 
which are too common with infrastructure development. The cyber-community is one such 
a community that is already underscored by the aerotropolis/smart regional-and-global city 
phenomenon.   The reconfiguration of space by the aerotropolis will also reconfigure the 
discourse of LED, as is already evident with development planning shifting more in the 
direction of RED planning. Furthermore, this reconfiguration of space will also require LED 




7.5.2 What are the different conceptions and meanings of LED among stakeholders in 
the Ekurhuleni Aerotropolis Project? 
 
 
• What does LED mean? 
 
• What are the different conceptions of ‘local’ in LED discourse, and, within the 
aerotropolis project? 
• What are the different conceptions of ‘development’ in LED? 
 
 
Understanding the Local in LED 
 
 
The word local meant many contradictory things. As noted in chapter 5, for some 
respondents local exclusively meant spatiality, which variously also meant anything from 
South Africa’s entire land space to a single municipal ward or a region in Ekurhuleni. At 
times local was understood exclusively as a combination of various spatial categories. At 
other times it was understood as a province, such as Gauteng, and at other times the idea of 
local was refuted as non-existent in the age of globalisation. However, it should be noted 
that respondents’ views about the meaning of local changed dramatically when they were 
asked to define local in relation to LED, and to the aerotropolis project. Under this 
consideration, the definition of local became more politicised. 
 
In the case of the latter, local became understood not on spatiality alone but also tied to 
various categories such as citizenship status and national identity, including one’s place of 
birth. For example, at times the meaning of local referred only to people who are South 
African citizens and not foreign nationals. At other times, local referred to all South African 
citizens,  including documented  foreign  nationals.  Sometimes,  it  meant  South  African 
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citizens residing only in Ekurhuleni and excluded foreign nationals or South Africans living 
outside EMM. 
 
I have come to appreciate that the varied meanings of local in relation to LED and the 
Aerotropolis Project were influenced by the socio-economic and political interests of my 
respondents. For example, communities in the SPAP category felt that LED was a historical 
social justice phenomenon and thus felt that that local in LED meant South Africans only. 
At times, they understood local in relation to LED to mean only South Africans living in 
Ekurhuleni, and in relation to the aerotropolis local meant only those people living in certain 
areas in Ekurhuleni. TEDP category respondents were mostly government officials and 
political authorities. They understood local not as spatially rigid and restrictive. For them, 
local  meant  all  South  Africans,  including  documented  foreign  nationals,  who  live  in 
Gauteng. 
 
It is thus clear that the idea of the local in relation to LED is highly politicised, leading to 
geopolitical complexities and territorialism in LED. The Amadelangukubona SA Business 
Forum in eThekwini municipality in Kwazulu-Natal is a case in point. Amadelangukubona 
is a radical group of business people from eThekwini who demand that government jobs in 
the  municipality should  be  given  only to  people  of  eThekwini,  whom  they claim  to 
represent. 
 
The territorialism in LED has been spawned by expulsions of the community from 
mainstream economic activity under apartheid, and now by the intensification of the smart 
regional-and-global city phenomenon. To recall Moseki, many communities have nothing 
to call their own except the township. 
 
Understanding development in LED 
 
 
Respondents’ views on the question of the meaning of development were mostly similar 
across all respondent categories. For example, development was understood across 
respondent categories to be about education and skills development, including social aspects 
such  as  health  care,  as  well  as  being  about  economic  growth  and  job  creation.  As  I 
mentioned earlier, I ascribe these similar meanings to development’s capacity to transform 
people’s consciousness so that they desire what development claims to offer. 
226  
However,   there   were   also   interesting   ideological   differences.   For   example,   most 
respondents in the SPAP category felt that access to or acquisition of land was understood 
to mean development. They also understood development not as necessarily starting 
something anew. Rather, they understood it as a bottom-up process that builds from below 
through wider participation, negotiations and consensus building. They further understood 
development to be about positive change as advocated by the sustainable livelihoods 
framework. As also noted in chapter 6, this understanding of development resonates well 
with the erstwhile RDP. Furthermore, development was also understood within the SPAP 
respondents as to be about historical social justice. That is, correcting the racial injustices 
of inequality suffered by blacks under apartheid, which they argue to continues to this day. 
 
The community-centredness of the understanding of development therefore partly explains 
why most community respondents rejected the aerotropolis. As I argued earlier, the 
aerotropolis project adopted a top-down approach, which involved little community 
participation. This also further confirms Bridger’s (2015) observation noted in chapters 3 
and 6 that, host communities of the aerotropolis are often excluded from governance of 
project since foreign investors are major shareholders and that local small and medium size 
enterprises stand no chance to benefit. 
 
TEDP-category respondents mostly understood economic growth through mechanisms such 
as attracting FDI as stimulus for development. In this regime of thinking, development also 
rests on the idea of innovation and change, which is dependent on specialist planning 
intervention.  The  top-down  managerial  approach  of  the  aerotropolis  project  and  the 
incessant drive by projects to attract TNC and MNC and FDI, through establishment of SEZ 
is a case in point. ICT and transport infrastructure improvement to bolster trade efficiency 
of Gauteng in global market, is another case in point. 
 
The general meaning of development, and the meaning of development in relation to LED 
were strikingly similar. In both cases development meant job creation, improved education 
and skills development, economic growth, and improved standard of living. The only 
differences between the SPAP and TEDP was the method of achieving it (development). 
One approach which was advocated mostly by SPAP is the bottom up, pro-poor and 
sustainable-livelihoods  framework  approach.  The  other  is  the  TEDP’s  top-down,  pro- 
growth macro-economic strategy, aimed at attracting FDI. These are generally the two 
approaches found in LED. 
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7.5.3 What is the ideological contestation within LED among the stakeholders in the 
Ekurhuleni Aerotropolis Project about? 
 
 
• What  issues  are  contested  in  LED  discourse  among  the  aerotropolis  project 
stakeholders? 
• What is the nature of the contestation? 
 
• How do we explain these contestations? 
 
 
Respondents’ understanding about the meanings of LED varied widely and at times 
contradicted. These differences and contradictions were also tied to respondents’ varied 
understandings and sometimes contradicting meanings of local and development in relation 
to LED. Hence, the differences and contradictions in meanings were not always exclusively 
between the SPAP and TEDP groups. They were also within each category. For example, 
LED was understood by some respondents, especially in SPAP, to be about support for 
black business and informal trade in townships only, and less so about pro-poor community 
development initiatives. Within the same group, others understood LED to be mostly a 
bottom-up  initiative  that is  meant to improve human  capital.  Improving human  capital 
meant developing an assemblage of all things that empower people to function optimally – 
such as hospitals, schools, a clean environment and safety. 
 
In the TEDP category, LED was understood mainly within the pro-growth or pro-market 
paradigm to be about attracting MNCs for stimulating DFI and supporting enterprise 
development. It was also understood to be about creating an enabling environment for 
business to flourish in a competitive free-market  entrepreneurial community.  However, 
some contradictions were also evident in this group with those who wanted to waive free- 
market principles and advocated for some forms of preferentialism for government support 
for black business. 
 
However, most SPAP respondents generally understood LED as a pro-poor and a historical 
social justice phenomenon that should alleviate poverty and reduce racial inequalities. They 
understood LED not as a race-neutral social justice matter, but as historical social justice 
phenomenon that is categorical about race and nationality of beneficiaries. This 
understanding explains why many felt that LED and the aerotropolis should exercise racial 
preferentialism as a matter of policy. SPAP respondents believed that the Aerotropolis 
Project  implementation  would  contribute  positively to  address  the  problem  of  racial 
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inequality only through racial preferentialism for blacks. The understanding of LED as a 
historical  social  justice  matter  within  SPAP,  also  explains  why  they  wanted  foreign 
nationals excluded from opportunities accruing from LED or the aerotropolis project. 
 
This is because they believed that LED opportunities are meant only for black South African 
citizens, whom because of the legacy of apartheid are poor and live in the squalid conditions 
of townships. Foreign nationals were also alleged by SPAP respondents to be taking jobs 
that are meant for South Africans, and to be benefiting unduly from RPD houses and other 
associated benefits that were meant for South Africans. 
 
On the contrary, the TEDP respondents understood LED more from an economic 
perspective, with enterprise development and stimulation of MNC and SME’s business 
activity as the main goal. Respondents had no restrictions for participation in LED initiatives 
or in the aerotropolis project due the free-market principle that guide neo-liberal trade. 
Foreign nationals were thus welcome to participate in the economy on condition that they 
were legally in the country and were paying their dues. Other respondents within TEPD 
even went as far as suggesting that foreigner-owned SMMEs and informal street traders and 
artisans should be assisted by government to be integrate into the mainstream community. 
 
Shopping centres and shopping malls were viewed by most SPAP respondents as not having 
any LED value but rather as being extractive machines taking over people’s livelihoods in 
townships. Respondents alleged that shopping centres were responsible for the death of 
small community retail businesses and contributed little to the communities in which they 
operated. Decrying these entities, some respondents stated that malls have no loyalty to the 
surrounding communities. Most SPAP respondents did not consider shopping malls and 
shopping centres to be local entities, even when they are spatially located within specific 
communities in townships and contributed to the national tax base. Shopping malls and 
shopping centres were thus seen as powerful aliens backed by government to invade 
communities without community consent. Shopping malls and centres, as well as foreign- 
owned business entities were said not to be local and were therefore unwelcome by most 
SPAP respondents. However, TEDP respondents hailed shopping malls and centres as 
champions of job creation and LED. 
 
It became clear that SPAP respondents’ attitudes towards shopping malls and centres as 
well as foreign nationals was also related to the respondents’ understanding of what it meant 
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to be a local. Being a local, whether a person or entity, according to SPAP respondents was 
not only determined by physical presence. It was also determined by one’s level of 
participation and embeddedness in the social life of the community in  which one was 
located. This suggests that being considered a local person or entity is partly also rights- 
based, with such rights also being socially earned though demonstrable participation and 
loyalty to the community. This explains why some SPAP respondents felt that other South 
Africans who had migrated to Ekurhuleni were not necessarily also locals within EMM. 
 
With the forgoing, it is thus clear that the contestation about the meaning of LED is both 
ideological and methodological. On SPAP side, LED is about poverty alleviation and 
historical social justice, and the method of achieving LED is through the sustainable 
livelihoods framework and racial preferential support for black owned businesses (formal 
and informal) in  townships.  The aerotropolis  did not  meet  these criteria, hence it  was 
rejected by respondents in this category. On the TEDP side, LED is about indiscriminate 
enterprise support and development, and stimulation of economic activity for economic 
growth. The method of achieving success is through free market principles and though FDI 
attraction. The aerotropolis project resonated with these ideas and hence it was supported 
by TEDP respondents. 
 
7.5.4 What can be done to improve LED discourse and practice in South Africa? 
 
 
• Is the current regime of LED discourse and practice appropriate for development 
problems in South Africa? 





As I have mentioned earlier in chapter 3, the history of colonialism and apartheid is also 
responsible for the development problems of South Africa. Apartheid systematically created 
the conditions that produce racial inequalities, which continued to manifest in the 
“democratic” dispensation. As noted in chapter 6, the distribution of poverty indicated in 
table 2, pointing that in 2015, nine out of every 10 poor people in South Africa (93%) were 
black, confirms this point (Wilkinson 2018). It further confirms that Modiri’s (2012) 
observation that development problems such as poverty, illiteracy and joblessness are 
generally black problems. 
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It therefore no surprise that SPAP respondents believed LED was supposed to address 
historical social justice, with racial inequality being a central concern in both the opposing 
categories of SPAP and TEDP. Race or racial inequality concern set apart both SPAP and 
TEDP   from   their   equivalent   race-neutral   pro-poor   and   pro-market   approaches   in 
mainstream LED discourse. This even when they share strong similarities. 
 
Notwithstanding the problem of persisting racial inequality in South Africa, development 
and LED discourse remains conspicuously silent on the question of race. This even as when 
development itself is also understood by scholars also as a racial formation project, which 
is often aimed at reorganizing and redistributing resources along specific racial lines (White 
2002), as we also noted in chapter 6. I argue that by avoiding the question of race, LED has 
little theoretical and methodical clout to deal with development challenges of South Africa. 
The absence of any concerted effort to systematically confront the race problem in 
development from a CRT perspective will continually exacerbate racial inequalities. A 
transformed LED regime that will begin to address the problem of race or racial inequalities 
is thus necessary. This LED regime will require mainstreaming CRT as an analytic 
category in development and LED discourse. This approach will allow LED discourse to 
confront not only the problem of racial inequalities but will also challenge the structural 
issue that produces racial inequalities in development. 
 
7.6 THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF THIS STUDY 
 
This research contributes to the knowledge on LED in three broad aspects. The first is by 
highlighting the ongoing complexities, uncertainties and contradictions in LED discourse. 
The second is a contribution to development and LED discourse by bringing to the surface 
the problem of race or racial inequality in development, and by suggesting CRT 
mainstreaming in development and LED discourse. The third contribution of this study is 
that of establishing variations in the meaning of the word “local economic development” 
and suggesting that the term be spelt with a hyphen, namely L-ED. I reflect briefly on the 
foregoing below. 
 




I have come to appreciate the complexity of the idea of the local in LED. Through this study, 
I have come to demonstrate how the idea of the local in relation to LED is politicized and 
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ideologically contested. For example, at times local in LED means space only, whereas at 
other times it means space and all people living in that space. It also means space and not 
all people but a select few who live within that space and meet certain criteria. These varied 
interpretations held by government and community often clash, causing complexities in 
systematizing LED thinking and practice. For example, government officials believed that 
local  in  LED  meant  all  the  people,  including  legally  documented  foreign  nationals 
inhabiting a particular space. At times, they dismissed the idea of the local, stating that the 
local no longer exists in a globalized world. By contrast, the community believed local to 
mean only South Africans, townships, and at times specific places and people. At other 
times, local means only certain South Africans who reside in particular areas. An example 
was that respondents from Tembisa felt that the aerotropolis project should benefit them 
alone – or benefit them first – because Tembisa falls in Region A of Ekurhuleni, the center 
of the aerotropolis. 
 
These ideological clashes about the local further complicate the meaning of LED and 
generate additional contractions in the field. For example, if LED is understood as a 
historical social justice phenomenon that should privilege all victims of apartheid, no room 
remains for rigid territorialism in LED thinking. All blacks would qualify for LED support 
purely on racial grounds, regardless of where they reside. This would contradict the various 
territorial meanings of local suggested by the same advocates of historical social justice in 
LED, especially the respondents from Tembisa. They believed LED should privilege blacks 
in general but felt that the aerotropolis project should privilege people of Tembisa only, or, 
it should privilege people of Tembisa first. 
 
Another interesting contradiction was that the smart regional-and-global city is increasingl y 
moving into cyber-space. This means that spatiality will become increasingly invisible in 
LED due to cyber-space. However, communities are taking on more rigid and politicized 
forms over territory in LED. They use this approach as a last defense mechanism for their 
survival after their expulsion from the smart regional-and-global city networks. I explain 
the above complexities through the following questions: If cyber-space becomes the new 
habitat of socioeconomic activity that is generated by the smart regional-and-global city, 
then what relevance will LED discourse have beyond its current form? What will be the fate 
of technologically disenfranchised poor people in such an environment? Furthermore, if 
LED takes on a double life, such as existing in both cyber-space and physical territory, what 
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Another challenging complexity in LED discourse in South Africa lies in its segregationist 
apartheid history, which has created racial inequalities that continue to play out today. The 
complexity here is that racial inequalities can possibly be resolved only through racial 
projects that privilege blacks to improve themselves. However, some blacks have since 
become wealthy and some whites have become destitute, thus making LED more complex. 
 
7.6.2 Mainstreaming CRT in LED 
 
 
This study has exposed how race matters in development and LED, especially in South 
Africa where the problem of racism and its material distribution is visible. As suggested b y 
Modiri (2012), the fact that blacks remain in the underclasses – under black rule and in a 
country with such a “progressive” Constitution – points to the systematic nature of racism. 
As noted in chapter 6, it qualifies the fact that racism is structural and that it embeds itself in 
social structures that reproduce it through racially deferential outcomes of development 
which privilege whites (White 2002), and which even a “progressive” constitution cannot 
overturn. It is my view thus that this problem requires CRT because it understands racism 
as a structural and systemic problem that is produced economically, socially and politically, 
and which must be confronted in those terms. It is thus my view that LED thinking that is 
embedded in CRT would systematically confront structural problems that reproduce 
racialized poverty and inequality in South Africa. My contribution to LED discourse is 
therefore my proposal that that LED needs CRT to be more apt to the challenges of poverty 
and inequality, which are still racially defined in South Africa. 
 
7.6.3 Local economic development versus L-ED 
 
 
During this study, I realised an interesting dynamic regarding how respondents reacted 
differently depending on how I phrased the word “local economic development,” when I 
was asking questions. When I asked respondents their understanding about the meaning of 
LED, many – without pausing to think – provided their responses, which were often similar 
like jobs creation, skills development, ending poverty and entrepreneurship. However, when 
I asked them their understanding of LED in relation to a particular matter, in this case the 
aerotropolis, many paused to think before responding. I believe that the pause represented 
a symbolic hyphen between the terms “local” and “economic development” – which I have 
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written as in “L-ED.” The pause created by the symbolic hyphen was due to respondents 
thinking about where they featured in the project. Hence their responses varied considerably 
and invoked politicised categories. 
 
It is against this background that the contribution of this study to LED discourse, is in 
proposing that  LED should rather be spelt with a hyphen, to read as L-ED. This is simply 
because I found LED and L-ED to trigger different attitudes and meanings from respondents 
about the same thing. The separateness of the word local to the rest of the term (economic 
development) in L-ED, allowed the respondent to think first about the meaning of local, 
which is often lost in the silent background of the unhyphenated LED. Attention to the word 
local first, invokes and enlivens agency, be it spatial, human, or both. It illuminates the 
agency of the category local and brings the politics of LED more closely. More importantly, 
highlighting the category of local fosters the need for LED to define the concept of local in 
specific and concrete terms amid the current spheres of government at local, provincial and 




Based on my research findings and analysis, I recommend the following issues for further 
consideration by academics and researchers, and by practitioners in the field of development 
and LED. 
 
7.7.1 Mainstreaming race or CRT 
 
 
Mainstreaming of race or CRT as an analytical category in development and LED discourse 
would assist researchers to study and understand the systematic operations of race or racism 
in development and assist to arrest them. This approach would also allow for better 
management and planning of LED to respond to development challenges on the ground in 
South Africa. I further recommend research to develop LED project-management models 
that are informed by CRT. Such project models would assist projects such as the aerotropolis 
project to be cognisant of issues of race and would help to minimise the production of worse 
racial inequalities in their implementation. 
 
7.7.2 LED in the era of cyber-space 
 
 
The digitisation of the world is an inevitable phenomenon that is already evident. The smart 
regional-and-global city and the demands of the information age are a case in point. As 
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mentioned in Chapter 6, new technological developments will lead to reconceptualization 
and reconfiguration of space and its usage. Technological development will also create new 
forms of citizens and new regimes of rights over space. LED discourse must grapple with 
developments in the cyber-space platform in order to remain relevant in the future. Further 
research is required on how LED discourse can penetrate cyber-space. 
 
7.7.3 ROLE OF AEROTROPOLIS IN LED 
 
 
Since the aerotropolis phenomenon is gaining momentum worldwide and appears to be 
appealing to governments, I would recommend further research on its direct impact on LED. 
Furthermore, I would also recommend studies investigating ways in which aerotropolis 
projects can partner with small scale enterprises in poor communities around their precincts. 
As I have also mentioned the relationship between the aerotropolis and the smart-city, I 
would also recommend further research on the impact of the smart city on LED especially 




This chapter concludes the study. It provides a summary of the study and reflections about 
the findings. The main finding is that LED remains contested ideologically, politically and 
methodologically. Furthermore, LED discourse remains riddled with unresolved conceptual 
tensions and meanings, as was evidenced by the idea of the local. In addition, development 
and LED discourse, by avoiding the problem of race, is potentially complicit in the problem 
of racial inequality in South Africa. 
 
In this chapter, I have reflected on my contributions to development and LED discourse. 
The main contribution was to show the importance of race or CRT in LED. I have also 
proposed that LED be spelt as L-ED to illuminate the agency of the category local in LED, 
which is often lost in the silent background of the unhyphenated LED. The hyphen also 
brings   the   politics   of   LED   closer   for   greater   attention.   I   have   also   provided 
recommendations for consideration by development and LED researchers, academics and 
development practitioners. 
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APPENDIX A: INTERVIEW GUIDE 
 
 
Thematic Question 1: Background 
 
 
• What is your organisation all about? 
 
• What is your general understanding about the aerotropolis project? 
 
• What has been the nature of your involvement in the project and at what stage did 
you get involved in it? 
• What has been your experience during your involvement in the project? 
 
• What do you generally think about the aerotropolis project in relation to LED? 
 
 
Thematic Question 2: Local Economic development 
 
 
• In your own view, please explain what LED is or should be about? 
 
• Do you think that the aerotropolis is a LED project? Please motivate your response. 
 
 
Understanding the local in LED 
 
 
• What is the meaning of the word local? 
 
• What is the meaning of local in relation to LED and the aerotropolis? Please 
motivate your response. 
• What are the categories of inclusion and exclusion to be a “local” in LED, and in the 
aerotropolis project? 
 
Understanding development in LED 
 
 
• What is the meaning of development? 
 
• What is the meaning of development in relation to LED and the aerotropolis? Please 
motivate your response. 
 
Thematic Question 3: Ideological contestations 
 
 
• What type of development would you like the aerotropolis project to bring, and how 
would you like the developments to come about? 
• What is  your view on  the potential development outcomes of the aerotropolis 
project? 
258  
• Do you think the developmental outcomes of the aerotropolis will address your 
development interests? Please motivate. 
• Are there any conceptual differences between yourself and other stakeholders in the 
project, about the aerotropolis and the meaning of LED? Please explain. 
 
Thematic Question 4: Understanding the ideological differences. 
 
 
• Why do you think there exists these ideological differences within the aerotropolis 
project 
• What is the possible cause of the differences? 
 
• How do you think these ideological differences could have been handled differently? 
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APPENDIX B: CONSENT FORMS TO PARTICIPATE IN THE 
RESEARCH 
 
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH: FOR PHASE 1 (CIVIL SOCIETY 
STAKEHOLDERS) 
 
Title of Study: Contestations about the Meaning of Local Economic Development: A Case 
of the Aerotropolis Project in the Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality 
 
You are hereby invited to participate in a research study conducted by Sebeka Richard 
Plaatjie, enrolled for a PhD in Development Studies at the Department of Anthropology and 
Development Studies at the University of Johannesburg. The study is part of his PhD 
research project. Please carefully read the information below and feel free to ask questions 
about anything you do not understand, before deciding whether or not to participate. I will 
also talk you through this. 
 
Purpose: The overall aim of this research study is to find out the varied meanings about the 
idea of local economic development within the Ekurhuleni Aerotropolis Project. 
 
Potential general benefit: Given the seeming policy consensus around the potential of an 
aerotropolis for development and growth, and the corresponding geographically uneven 
economic development and localised environmental impacts produced by aerotropolis 
projects, studies about aerotropolis projects are necessary. This study is important because 
it will focus on one of the very first LED project that encapsulates the idea of an aerotropolis, 
not only in South Africa, but also in the continent. Results of the academic study will 
therefore most probably be the first on this specific LED initiative, and thus possibly a 
benchmark study. 
 
Your participation: Your participation in this research is completel y voluntary; hence you 
are more than welcome not to answer any question that makes you feel uncomfortable. 
Should you decide at any time during the research that you no longer wish to participate, 
you are free to withdraw without prejudice. 
 
Procedure: If you are willing to participate in this research you will be asked to take part 
in a face-to-face interview that will take 45 to 60 minutes at the most. I will also request 
permission to audio record the interview. 
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Confidentiality: The findings of my research will be published. I therefore guarantee not 
to reveal your identity (i.e., you will remain anonymous), by making use of a pseudonym 
when drawing on your responses, and making sure that the responses I use in no way reveals 
your identity, if you so wish. Both my notes and the audio recording of the interview will 
be kept in a locked cabinet and in password-protected electronic documents. 
 
Should you have any concerns or more questions about the study, feel free to contact me, 









Consent to participate in research on Ekurhuleni Aerotropolis project 










I have read and understood the nature of this study and my questions have been answered 











CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH: FOR PHASE 2 
(OFFICIAL STAKEHOLDERS) 
 
Title of Study: Contestations about the Meaning of Local Economic Development: A Case 
of the Aerotropolis Project in the Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality 
 
You are hereby invited to participate in a research study conducted by Sebeka Richard 
Plaatjie, enrolled for a PhD in Development Studies at the Department of Anthropology and 
Development Studies at the University of Johannesburg. The study is part of his PhD 
research project. Please carefully read the information below and feel free to ask questions 
about anything you do not understand, before deciding whether or not to participate. I will 
also talk you through this. 
 
Purpose: The overall aim of this research study is to find out the varied meanings about the 
idea of local economic development within the Ekurhuleni Aerotropolis Project. 
 
Potential general benefit: Given the seeming policy consensus around the potential of an 
aerotropolis for development and growth, and the corresponding geographically uneven 
economic development and localised environmental impacts produced by aerotropolis 
projects, studies about aerotropolis projects are necessary. This study is important because 
it will focus on one of the very first LED project that encapsulates the idea of an aerotropolis, 
not only in South Africa, but also in the continent. Results of the academic study will 
therefore most probably be the first on this specific LED initiative, and thus possibly a 
benchmark study. 
 
Your participation: Your participation in this research is completel y voluntary; hence you 
are more than welcome not to answer any question that makes you feel uncomfortable. 
Should you decide at any time during the research that you no longer wish to participate, 
you are free to withdraw without prejudice. 
 
Procedure: If you are willing to participate in this research you will be asked to take part 
in a face-to-face interview that will take 45 to 60 minutes at the most. I will also request 
permission to audio record the interview. 
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Confidentiality: You have been selected to be interviewed given that you are a member of 
the official stakeholders of the Ekurhuleni Aerotropolis Project. As the findings of my 
research will be published, you have a choice whether you want our discussions to be 
confidential and anonymous or not. Should you request confidentiality, I will guarantee that 
through the use of a pseudonym. Furthermore, when presenting your views I will do it in 
such a manner that your identity cannot be deduced from what I present. Both my notes and 
the audio recording of the interview will be kept in a locked cabinet and in password- 
protected  electronic  documents.  Should  you  not  require  confidentiality,  I will  refer  in 
writings from my research to your position and name when using information provided by 
you. 
 
Should you have any concerns or more questions about the study, feel free to contact me, 









CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH ON EKURHULENI 
AEROTROPOLIS PROJECT 
 











I have read and understood this consent form and my questions have been answered to my 
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